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Abstract 
This research, unlike other studies, examines the French Revolution, not through a 
debate on its economic, social or political causes, but through its economic consequences. The 
research shows that the lack of investment in agriculture prior to the French Revolution was 
due to institutional constraints inherent to the Old Regime. Reforms, undertaken during the 
Revolution of 1789, were responsible for most of the nineteenth century successes. 
The argument is carried out through an examination of the political economy of 
drainage and irrigation. Drainage and irrigation were two types of investment in agriculture 
that increased the productivity of land and extended the area under cultivation. Both were 
important means of achieving growth in agriculture. The research shows that transaction costs 
involved with such activities were very high during the Old Regime but were substantially 
reduced after 1789. 
Olapter One introduces the issues and makes the necessary definition for the study. 
Olapter Two is an empirical study of drainage in Normandy from 1700 to 1860. The chapter 
shows that drainage would have been profitable in the absence of transaction costs during the 
period 1700-1789 yet no drainage occurred. The problems of transaction costs lay with endless 
litigation over property rights and the inability of property rights owners to write binding con-
tracts. Resources were, thus, expended to redistribute property rights rather than to make 
improvements. 1be Revolutionary reforms removed all causes for litigation and gave the state 
the authority to enforce contracts between landowners. As a result of the reforms of the Revo-
lution, most of the marshes in Normandy were drained from 1820 to 1850. 
Olapter Three examines irrigation supply in Provence from 1700 to 1860. As in 
Olapter Two, quantitative evidence suggests that, in the absence of transaction costs, irrigation 
should have been very profitable in the eighteenth century when it was carried out only in a 
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very limited way. 1be market failure is ascribed to the Old-Regime division of authority over 
eminent domain and water rights as well as to the inability of developers to commit to 
announced prices for irrigation water. The extreme division of authority that prevailed before 
1789 gave many individuals and groups the opportunity to hold irrigation projects up and 
claim part of the profits. The Revolutionary reforms centralized all authority over water rights 
and eminent domain in the hands of the national government. Furthermore, the state took on 
the task of enforcing announced prices for developers, thereby solving an important revenue 
problem. From 1820 to 1860 the irrigated area in Provence nearly doubled. The research on 
Provence, thus, also points to the dramatic consequences of the decline in transaction costs as a 
result of the Revolution's reforms. 
Olapter Four is a theoretical analysis of litigation and settlement that bears directly on 
the questions raised in Olapter Two. The model features a developer who has rights to the pro-
perty of the plaintiff. The object of the game is to set the level of compensation for the pro-
perty. The plaintiff can either accept a settlement offer made by the developer, or sue. If the 
plaintiff sues, both parties may search for evidence. The court will make a decision based on 
the evidence that plaintiff and defendant bring to court. The chapter shows that a sequential 
equilibrium generically exists. Modeling expenditure decision endogenously allows an exami-
nation of the issues of burden of proof in litigation. It is shown that burden of proof has sub-
stantial impact on the probability of litigation and the magnitude of the settlement offer. The 
conclusioos of the theoretical research suggest why drainage proposal were so frequently liti-
gated in eighteenth century Normandy. 
Chapter Five extends the results of Olapters Two and Three beyond the specific 
regions of Normandy and Provence. Moreover, the results of Olapter Four are applied to the 
history of peasant property in Britain and France. The chapter then offers a general conclusion. 
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Introduction 
2 
In the most influential book written on the French Revolution since World War II, the 
late Alfred Cobban reflected that: 
Whether.. .France was capitalist before the Revolution has been a subject of 
some debate. Jaures, Levasseur, Germain Martin, des Cilleuls, Picard, 
Ardachev, said it was; Kovalesky, Tarle, Petrov, Loutchitsky argued that 
France remained a "pays agricole." This is mainly a matter of terminology. 
The essential point is to decide if the revolutio? does in fact represent an 
important stage in the economic history of France. 
This study meets Alfred Cobban's challenge by examining the political economy of drainage 
and irrigation in France from 1700 to 1860. 
The literature on the French Revolution has focused either on its causes or on its distri-
butional consequences.2 Some historians have been greatly concerned with questions such as 
the relative importance of social groups in achieving the overthrow of the monarchy in 1789, 
while others have made efforts to show that the Revolution was the result of the complete 
decay of Old-Regime society.3 The issues of redistribution and social change, while 
significant, cannot allow us to answer Cobban's question, because redistribution and social 
change had a limited impact on the French economy. To be sure, the redistribution of Church 
wealth made some individuals better off, but mostly those Frenchmen who bought Church 
assets at three-fifths of the market value were already part of the local elites.4 Furthermore, it is 
far from obvious what impact the land redistribution of the Revoution had on productivity, 
1) Alfred Cobban, The Social ll'llerpretation of the French Revolution. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1964, pp. 66-67. 
2) William Doyle, Origins of the French Revolution. New York: Oxford University Press, 1980; Michel 
Vovelle, La Chute th Ia Monarchie 1787-1792. Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1972; Francois Furet and Denis Richet, 
The French Revolution, New York: The Macmillan Co., 1970, and D.M.G. Sutherland, France 1789-1815, Revolu-
tion and CoiUilerrevolution. New York: Oxford University Press, 1986. 
3) On the topic of social groups in the Revolution, see William Doyle, Origins of the French Revolution, 
pp. 116-138; on the decay hypothesis, DM.G. Sutherland, France 1789-1815, Revolution and Counterrevolution, 
pp. 49-62. 
4) Michel Vovele, La Chute de Ia Monarchie 1787-1792, p. 192. 
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unless we assume that the Church was a poor manager of its resources and there is no evidence 
to that effect. 
Yet the true measure of the impact of the French Revolution lies beyond redistribution 
or causation. The Revolution was an important event because it dramatically altered the institu-
tional costs associated with many economic activities. Settling the question of whether the 
Revolution occurred because of fiscal problems, or because of the need for deeper social and 
political change, is less important than understanding how much social, institutional change the 
Revolution achieved and the impact of that change on France. While the causes of the French 
Revolution may give us clues to the problems that needed to be addressed in 1789, they cannot 
measure the success of the Revolution at addressing those problems or its overall impact. In 
contrast, research on the institutional change brought about by the Revolution will answer 
Cobban's question. Although institutional reforms such as the end of feudal privileges had 
some redistributional consequences, these reforms also dramatically altered the returns to many 
forms of private investment. 
This study shows how the private returns to investment in agricultural improvements 
changed as a consequence of the French Revolution. The argument is developed through an 
examination of investment in water control. Two types of water control are considered: 
drainage of marshy areas, which extended the cultivated acreage, and irrigation, which raised 
the productivity of areas already under the plow. Both were important means of achieving 
growth in agriculture. The bargaining costs involved with such activities were very high dur-
ing the Old Regime but, I argue, were substantially reduced after 1789. This study focuses on 
drainage in Normandy and irrigation in Provence. In both cases the eighteenth-century institu-
tional structure featured uncertain property rights, veto players and a rent-seeking judiciary. 
These aspects of the institutional structure significantly raised transaction costs and prevented a 
4 
Coasian resolution of externality problems. 
The Revolution swept away most of ~e obstacles to investment in drainage and irriga-
tion. Economic progress was a central issue during the Revolution, and in agriculture, at least, 
the policies of the revolutionary governments were not merely redistributive but increased 
economic efficiency as well. Curiously, the institutional changes brought about after 1789 
realized rather than destroyed the goals of the Old-Regime bureaucracy. Indeed, in the face of 
high transaction costs in most sectors of the economy, the need for reform had been evident for 
a long time. In agriculture, in particular, French officials, in the latter part of the eighteenth 
century, were very concerned--but not very successful--with increasing output. I show that 
their failures were due to institutional constraints inherent to Old-Regime France. Reforms, 
which eliminated the ability of local groups to oppose projects and decreased the costs of bar-
gaining and arbitration, were undenaken during Revolution. The Revolutionary reforms were 
responsible for most of the nineteenth century successes. 
Institutions and Economic History 
The subject I have taken up here has an importance that transcends French history for 
it makes explicit the link between institutional change and economic growth. All too often 
economic history, though acknowledging the importance of institutions, fails to make claims 
about institutions testable or ignores institutions in order to focus on technological change as 
the prime motor of economic growth. Douglas North and others have long argued that 
institutions--defined as humanly devised constraints on economic activity--play an important 
role in economic activity.5 The very breadth of North's definition makes testing claims about 
institutions difficult, and we thus remain ignorant of the true contribution that institutional 
5) Douglas North, Structure and Change in Economic History . New York: Norton, 1981, chapter 
15. 
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change makes to sustained economic growth. Other economic historians, such as David 
Landes have focused on technological change. 6 For them economies grow at the rate at which 
they adopt new technologies, but their argument fails to account for the fact that many coun-
tries adopt new technologies slowly or not at all. Thus any comparative research on economic 
development must have an institutional component 
One such comparative question permeates the entire study: why did French agriculture 
lag so far behind that of England in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries? Issues of technol-
ogy and environment cannot alone carry the burden of explaning the lag of France because the 
same technologies were available at roughly the same time on both sides of the English Chan-
nel. In some regions, mostly in the north, a few French landowners adopted the same tech-
niques that made England more productive? In fact there would have been no need for France 
to seek technology abroad in the adoption of enclosure, consolidation, and drainage improve-
ments, nor was mixed husbandry unknown in France. Yet the improvements associated with 
mixed husbandry were adopted only locally and by very few landowners. In many areas, how-
ever, the French environment should have made adopting the English innovations at least as 
profitable as in England. Indeed, many areas in eighteenth-century France suffered from a 
shortage of pasture as well as poor drainage. Hence if the innovations associated with the agri-
cultural revolution were not adopted in France it may well be because of institutions. This 
investigation suggests that uncertain property rights and the extremely high cost of judicial and 
legal reform were an important factor in France's lag in agriculture. 
6) David Landes, The Unbound Prometheus. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969. Introduction. 
In later chapters Landes does hint that institutions may explain why France and Germany lagged behind Britain (see 
pp. 134-152). 
7) See Jean Meuvret, Le Probleme des Subsistences a l' Epoque Louis XIV, part II, Paris: E.H.E.S.S., 1987, 
pp. 193-199; Michel Marineau. Les Faux Semblants d'un Dhrwrrage Economique. Agricullure et Dbrwgraphie en 
France au xvur Siecle. Cahier des Annales #30, Paris: Armand Colin 1970; and Philip Hoffman ''Institutions 
and Agriculture in Old-Regime France", Caltech mimeo, March 1988, forthcoming, Politics and Society , 1988. 
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Irrigation and drainage are ideal activities for an investigation of institutional change, 
because institutions were very important in determining the costs and revenues accruing to 
developers in irrigation and drainage. Because both drainage and irrigation demand speci fie 
property rights and feature extensive externalities, institutions will dictate to what extent the 
entrepreneur's costs and revenues will approximate the social costs and revenues of his project. 
At best institutions will allow bargaining between owners of property rights at low cost and the 
level of drainage and irrigation will be efficient in a Coasian sense. 8 At worst transaction costs 
will be so high that no development will occur independent of the social value of irrigation and 
drainage. 
Another important reason to investigate drainage and irrigation is the abundance of 
archival material. The state was always heavily involved with drainage and irrigation projects, 
during both the planning stages and the realization phase. Developers of drainage and irrigation 
always had to secure permits from the state, and the permit records contain detailed descrip-
tions of the costs and the technology both for projects that failed and for those that succeeded. 
Furthermore, because eighteenth-century developers were often involved in litigation even 
before the project started, judicial archives contain abundant information on projects. Finally, 
in the late eighteenth century the state began to monitor the performance of drainage and irri-
gation projects by keeping a file for each project, whether it was carried out or not, in the 
records of the Roads and Bridges Administration. Thus drainage and irrigation are good activi-
ties to investigate if one wants to test hypotheses about institutional change. 
Definitions 
For any economic activity, three sets of parameters are important: the environment, the 
8) Ronald Coase, 'The Problem of Social Cost," Journal of Law and Economics. 3 (1960), pp. 1-44. 
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technology, and institutions. The envirorunent is best defined as the physical state of the world. 
For this study, concerned as it is with agriculture, the most important parameters of the 
envirorunent are geography and population. Obviously in a general equilibrium framework the 
prices of inputs and outputs, as well as the level of output--and perhaps even the size of the 
population--are determined by the physical envirorunent, by the technology and by institutions. 
In this study, however, I only consider activities that were small relative to the total economy, 
and I thus assume that the institutional changes under consideration affected only drainage and 
irrigation. In other words, the effect of institutional change on prices should be negligible. For 
simplicity I will then take input and output prices as fixed and assume they are part of the 
envirorunent 
A technology is the set of methods that can be used to produce a set of goods. A tech-
nology is therefore the knowledge necessary to gather all the inputs--including plant, equip-
ment. capital, and labor at the appropriate skill levels--to produce a given set of outputs. 
Because a technology is a method for transforming a set of inputs into a set of outputs, techno-
logical change can take a number of forms. A different set of inputs can be used to produce the 
same output, or the same inputs can be used differently to produce the same output. In the case 
of irrigation and drainage, the empirical chapters will show that technology changed little 
between 1700 and 1850, and that fact makes the examination of institutional change easier. 
Institutions can be defined as the rules governing economic activity and the means of 
enforcing them. Such a definition is broad, and here we shall restrict ourselves to legal 
institutions--in other words, to the law governing economic activity. Clearly there are other, 
non-legal, constraints on economic activity--informal rules are but one example--but testing 
their economic impact would be extraordinarily difficult Limiting ourselves to legal institu-
tions is, in any case, hardly restrictive. Indeed, since my concern is how legal and political 
8 
changes during the French Revolution affected property rights, legal institutions, which are far 
better documented than less formal institutions are the obvious candidates for investigation. 
One final term used throughout the study demands definition: veto player. A veto 
player is an individual or a group of individuals who can either stop an activity altogether or 
raise its cost so high as to make it unprofitable regardless of its social value. Through strategic 
behavior a veto player can threaten all the surplus created by an activity, lay claim to a portion 
of it or even seize it entirely. 
Tools and Methods 
This study is distinguished not only by its novel focus on institutional change but by 
its use of game theory as a tool for historical investigation. Game theory has been somewhat 
ignored by economic historians. 9 Game theory, however, is fundamental to any investigation 
of institutional change by economic historians because it offers a set of hypotheses to guide 
their data gathering. 
Game theory offers the means of modeling the impact of specific institutions on tran-
saction costs and the responses of investors to changes in transaction costs. Institutions serve 
both economic and political goals, as a result they are often inefficient in terms of economic 
growth. The inefficiency of institutions gives individuals and groups incentives to avoid insti-
tutional constraints. Because of the incentives to shirk, enforcement is an important aspect of 
institutional constraints. Clearly, enforcement, institutional constraints and economic costs are 
interrelated. Game theory offers a method to analyze the relationship between institutional 
change and economic costs because it focuses explicitly on the incentives and decisions of 
individuals. For historians there exists, however, yet another problem: the game theoretic 
9) See however, John Umbeck, A Theory of Property Rig his with Application to the California Gold Rush. 
Ames: University oflowa Press, 1981. 
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models must bear directly on the set of institutions that constrain the economic activities under 
consideration, otherwise the conclusions may be quite difficult to test or irrelevant. 
Game theory is a natural tool to model the envirorunent, technology, and institutions of 
drainage and irrigation, and to understand why development did not occur before the Revolu-
tion. Indeed, the study will show that drainage and irrigation could have been profitably carried 
out long before the French Revolution. Moreover, eighteenth-century commentators, public 
servants and developers all agreed that drainage and irrigation were socially profitable, and in 
the interest of landowners. The oft observed lack of investtnent in improvement leads to an 
apparent dilemma. 10 Either eighteenth-century sources were lying and drainage and irrigation 
were in fact unprofitable, or developers and landowners were behaving inoptimally and more 
development of drainage and irrigation should have occurred. In fact the study shows that nei-
ther of these propositions explains the lack of development of irrigation and drainage in the 
eighteenth century. To explain the failure of improvements, institutions must be modeled. 
Game theory allows us to do so and explicitly consider the impact of institutional change. 
This study focuses directly on two regions in France, Provence in the southeast and 
Normandy in the northwest. I chose to focus on a selected set of regions because although the 
different regions of eighteenth-century France all recognized the same central authority, they 
each had a different institutional structure, 11 which led to different amounts of institutional 
change in the eighteenth century and different levels of development. For example, there 
existed two basic types of local institutional structures, the pays d' etats, and the pays 
10) See AN F10 261. 314-324, 627, 628 and 6391 for drainage and H1 1260. 1303, 1494-1499, 1512, for 
irrigation, also H1 1487 for improvements in general. Throughout the srudy AN will stand for Archives Nationales 
the central archives of France while AD will stand for Archives DepartemenJal.n or regional archives, and AC will 
stand for Archives Communales or municipal archives. AD and AC will always be followed by the origin of the ar-
chive, the serie, and the call number, e.g. AD Calvados, C 451 for the departmental archives of the Calvados, serie 
C, box 451. 
11) Pierre Goubert, L'Ancien Regime, Paris: Armand Colin, 1973, Chapters 1 and 2. 
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d' election. The pays d'etat enjoyed considerably more independence in fiscal and economic 
issues, than the pays d' election. Provence, a pays d'etat, was far more autonomous than Nor-
mandy, which as a pays d' election was directly under the rule of the French king. The auton-
omy of Provence was embodied in a set of mediating institutions that often opposed the king 
but also helped achieve some institutional change and some inigation development before the 
Revolution. In the directly admmistered province of Normandy such change proved impossible 
because local custom ruled property rights, and in the absence of mediating insitutions, the 
costs of amending local custom proved enormous. Because of the great institutional diversity 
of France, only local studies would capture the details of the institutions that mattered in water 
control before 1789. Of course Revolutionary reforms removed most of the institutional 
regionalism, but to judge the impact of such a reform it is important to clearly understand the 
prior institutional structure. 
Another set of issues made local studies unavoidable. France in the eighteenth century 
was not only an institutional quilt but also a collection of different markets and different 
agrarian economies. The most important difference can be distinguished between the North 
with its three field system and heavy plows, and the South, an area with few communal con-
straints on farming and with light plows. Investigating a large number of other regions would 
have demanded arduous archival research to gather the necessary information on the different 
institutional structures of eighteenth-century France and to? collect the quantitative data neces-
sary to test the hypothesis that improvements would have been profitable before the Revolu-
tion. The quantitative data alone would be difficult to gather. Consider price series: very few 
price series span 1700-1860 because most historians and economic historians have seen the 
French Revolution as such a dramatic break, and they have kept their studies focused on only 
one side of 1789. The gathering of such data is slow. For example, gathering enough data to 
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construct the wage and land price series for Provence for a total of only 128 data points 
required the better part of two months' archival research. Duplicating this procedure for a large 
number of areas in France would take a number of years. Yet this was not necessary to show 
the importance of institutional change during the French Revolution to investment in agricul-
ture, which was the goal of this study. Moreover, the conclusion of this study will show it is 
possible to apply a number of the results of the local research to all of France. 
An Outline 
After the introduction, two case studies are presented, one covering drainage in Nor-
mandy (Olapter 2) and the other irrigation in Provence (Olapter 3). The fourth chapter is a 
theoretical investigation of property rights litigation under asymmetric information. It is fol-
lowed by a general conclusion. 
Olapter 2 investigates the political economy of marsh drainage in Normandy. After 
investigating issues of technology and relative prices I show that drainage of marshes was actu-
ally profitable in the eighteenth century--when no drainage occurred. I then investigate the 
institutional causes for such a market failure. By the eighteenth century most marshes were 
owned both by communities and by feudal lords, but the rules of marsh division between com-
munity and lord were based on uncertain property rights. The uncertain rights over marsh pro-
perty led to a first round of litigation between community and lord. Then, because there existed 
no rule to divide the share of the community between villagers, this issue was also litigated. 
Finally I show that the institutional changes associated with the Revolution were responsible 
for the drainage that occurred between 1820 and 1848. 
Olapter 3 analyzes the development of irrigation in southeastern France. As early as 
1700, developers attempted to promote irrigation in Provence yet no development took place 
until after 1760. I first examine the questions of credit and technology to show that these 
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factors alone cannot explain the lack of irrigation before 1760. Then using data from canals 
built after 1760, I compute the hypothetical rates of return for canal projects. The rates of 
return lead to the conclusion that irrigation could have been profitably developed under the Old 
Regime in the absence of institutional obstacles. The obstacles lay with uncertain property 
rights. After these property rights were clarified and a number of veto players were eliminated, 
some development occurred. Eighteenth-century institutions also led to severe revenue short-
falls. Developers could not commit to announced prices for irrigation rights, and because irri-
gation rights are durable goods, developers competed against themselves over time. As a result, 
in the planning phase of the project, they could not sell contigent contracts for irrigation rights 
to secure credit. Similar problems occured after the project was built because of the very low 
marginal cost of irrigation. As a result many developers were faced with great losses. It was 
not until after the reforms of the French Revolution that the state was able to intervene to 
resolve revenue problems for irrigation canals. After 1815, the irrigation networks of Provence 
grew to the extent that all of the water available for irrigation was in use by 1860. 
Chapter 4 analyzes a game theoretic model of property rights litigation. The analysis 
of litigation was motivated by the important role played by the judiciary in the resolution of 
conflicts over property rights. The judiciary was called upon to resolve conflicts over uncertain 
property rights to land and water, and rights of eminent domain. Institutions also gave many 
individuals and groups veto power over projects. Veto power was exercised through strategic 
behavior and took the form of a judicial appeal against the drainage or irrigation developer's 
permit Therefore the impact of litigation on the cost of projects were modeled. Chapter 4 
presents the results of the theoretical effort. 
The theoretical research was also motivated by the prevalence of litigation in drainage 
projects in Normandy. Nor was the problem peculiar to Normandy, developers throughout 
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France complained that litigation costs were so high that they threatened the profitability of the 
project. Oearly out-of-court settlements would have been preferred by all parties. Curiously, 
they were rare in the eighteenth century. One explanation regarding this issue was offered by 
Lawrence Stone for England in the sixteenth century. 
Sixteenth century litigation combined the qualities of tedium, hardship, brutal-
ity and injustice that tested character and endurance, with the element of pure 
chance that appealed to the gambler, the fear of defeat and ruin, and the hope 
of victory and the humiliation of the enemy. It had everything that war can 
offer save the delight of shedding blood. It gave shape and purpose to many 
otherwise empty lives. 
Litigation, therefore, remained the most popular of indoor sports despite 
unanimous agreement upon the folly of such behavior and the rapacity of 
lawyers. No noblemen of the dar2 was without a string of suits against tenants 
or rivals, mostly about property. 
One could easily replace sixteenth century with eighteenth century and noblemen with French-
men for a possible explanation of litigation in Old-Regime France. 
Lawrence Stone's claim that litigation was nothing short of a sport suggests that litiga-
tion occurred under the Old Regime because people liked it. The essays that follow suggest 
otherwise. Litigation was prevalent in the eighteenth century because pervasive uncertainty in 
property rights made litigation attractive. Uncertain property rights allowed individuals to 
increase their wealth at the expense of others. Therefore owners of assets were also forced to 
defend them via litigation in the face of a giant prisoners' dilemma. Such litigation was natur-
ally unproductive because the redistribution it induced did not necessarily transfer assets from 
the hands of poor managers into the hands of superior ones. Furthermore, all the resources con-
sumed by litigation were wasted. 
Uncertain property rights also led to a second type of litigation. As technology and 
12) Lawrence Stone, The Crisis of the Aristocracy 1558-1641 . New York: Oxford. 1965, p. 242. 
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relative prices changed in the Old Regime it became profitable to reassign assets from old pro-
duction schemes (marshes for example) to n~w ones (drained pasture). As long as the marsh 
remained undrained, property rights were irrelevant because access and use were clearly 
defined. To effect the transition from marsh to drained pasture required clarifying property 
rights because the costs and benefits had to be assigned to owners not users. Since drainage 
increased productivity, the clarification of property rights, in this case, was socially useful, it 
was also achieved through judicial procedures. If court costs were not too high to preclude the 
transition from marsh to pasture altogether, and litigation could clarify property rights, judicial 
procedure would achieve productive ends. 
The empirical chapters show that the institutional costs induced by eighteenth century 
institutions blocked the development of drainage and irrigation. The study also shows that the 
reforms of the Revolutionary period were important to the supply of irrigation and drainage in 
the nineteenth century. The Revolution, in a few years, achieved far more in terms of institu-
tional change than the Old Regime had been able to in a century. Simplification of property 
rights, judicial reform, and the increases in administrative authority all decreased the costs of 
promoting drainage and irrigation, and in the long run fostered growth. 
15 
Chapter 2 
Drainage in the Pays d 'Auge 1700-1848: 
The Weight of Uncertain Property Rights 
16 
Set in a particular geographical area, this paper provides a striking example of the 
economic impact of institutions; it demonstrates how the institutions governing property rights 
affected the development of drainage in northern France. The paper begins with a description 
of the geographical area studied: the basin of the Dives, better known as the Pays d' Auge in the 
French Calvados, where drainage problems were severe. After describing drainage technology 
and proposing an operational definition of institutions, the paper analyzes the reasons for a 
marlcet failure in the Dives area and provides data to show that, between 1715 and the French 
Revolution, the equilibrium level of drainage was not responsive to changes in demand. After 
the Revolution, however, institutions did succeed in providing drainage and, it is argued, a new 
regime in property rights, not a change in technology or demand, was responsible for this evo-
lution. 
Geography, Technology and Institutions 
The Dives basin lies on the coast of the English Channel in Normandy, only a few 
miles east of Caen in the French departement of the Calvados (see map). It corresponds 
roughly to the present canton of Troam and is a very flat plain with small hills. Hydrologically 
the basin of the Dives can be divided between the areas south of the town of Troam and the 
areas north of it. North of the town, the river Dives runs in a flat basin where the surface of the 
plain is roughly at the level of the highest tides. The Dives has a difficult exit into the English 
Channel, and without human intervention it would periodically flood a large area north of 
Troam. In addition, south of Troam there are a number of marshes that also drain into the 
Dives. 
All these areas would have witnessed some economic activity without any drainage. A 
significant portion of the land is composed of small hills, which did not require drainage. The 
wet marshes themselves were the locus of productive activities. Nonetheless, by the 1700s the 
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owners of marshes had become convinced that draining marshes would be a profitable opera-
tion.13 They wanted to convert the marshes to year-round pasture, which they considered the 
most profitable way to exploit them. Year-round pasturing, though, required control of the 
entry and exit of water. During most of the year a farmer wanted to drain his pasture fields, but 
after mowing the pasture or in a particularly dry year he might want to flood it. Such water 
control required the construction of a set of levees and ditches. 
In the nineteenth century the marshes in the Dives belonged either to the state or to 
local communities. Individual peasants simply did not own marshes and rarely owned any pas-
ture. Before 1789, ownership was even more concentrated: although some marshes lay in the 
hands of the king, communities or various seigneurs, most of the marshes--and a considerable 
amount of pastures as well--were owned by the area's largest seigneuriallandlord, the abbey of 
Troarn. Only near the sea, in the communities of Varaville and Cabourg, did the abbey fail to 
dominate the ownership of pastures and marshes. 14 
For the conseil du Roi (the king's council), a committee that adjudicated property 
rights and issued drainage permits, the marshes in the area seemed, at least at first glance, to be 
devoid of economic value. 15 The truth was in fact quite different. Seigneurial owners derived 
small seigneurial rents from their marshes and also sold fishing rights, which were often 
economically significant Moreover, because marshes were the water reservoirs of local mills, 
the drainage of marsh could, by lowering the water level, have a significant impact on the pro-
ductivity of a mill. Mills were the property of the seigneurial lord and a significant source of 
revenue. 
13) See AD Calvados, C 4240-55. Between 1700 and 1789, it was proposed to drain almost every marsh 
in the area. 
14) Most pastures in the Dives area were marshes that had been drained in the Middle Ages. The provin-
cial adminstration used ownership rolls to tax landowners for uplceep costs. See AD Calvados, C 4073-4078. 
15) See AN H1 1495 for the opinions of staffers at the Icing's council and of the provincial administration. 
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Marshes were also of economic value to peasant communities because they provided 
mediocre but cheap pastures. The pasture they furnished was mediocre because of the lack of 
drainage, but it was cheap since the rent that the communities paid the seigneuriallords for the 
pasture rights had been frozen since the Middle Ages. In some cases the right to pasture had 
become customary, and the communities paid the seigneur nothing for their use. Even such 
free pasture, though, did not mean that the community owned the marsh. Typically the seig-
neuriallord retained certain rights to the marsh. The overlapping claims of the community and 
the seigneurial lord could be separated, however, if both parties accepted what was known as 
triage. The triage rule was a legal rule for dividing seigneurial property between community 
and lord. In the case of marsh pasture for which the community paid no seigneurial dues, the 
community received two-thirds of the marsh, while the lord retained one-third. In the case 
where the community did pay seigneurial rent for pasture rights to the marsh, triage (at least in 
Normandy) gave the lord two-thirds of the marshland and the community one-third.16 In any 
event, it is clear that for the community and the lord, settling questions of triage could raise 
obstacles to drainage. Conflicts over which rule of division applied to a marsh frequently pro-
voked litigation and added significantly to the cost of drainage. These conflicts would of course 
disappear with the abolition of seigneurial property rights during the French Revolution. 
In order to argue that it was the Revolution that removed obstacles to drainage, it is 
necessary to assume that the technology of drainage did not change between the eighteenth and 
the nineteenth centuries. Fortunately, between 1715 and 1850 drainage technology was nearly 
static. In 1850, as in 1715, the task was still a matter of digging ditches and putting up levees. 
Both of these tasked were accomplished by hand and demanded mostly unskilled labor. Flood 
16) See AD Calvados, C 4271. 
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gates did require skilled carpenters and masons and small amounts of wood and building 
materials. but the major input involved was .still labor, and there is no evidence of changing 
techniques in masonry or carpentry. 17 
Only after 1850 was the French industrial base sufficient to provide a new drainage 
technology based on concrete and steam power. 18 Before 1850, nearly all the work was 
accomplished by men, particularly unskilled men, with shovels. Although there was certainly 
some learning by doing in drainage projects, the basic techniques remained the same. In the 
basin of the Dives nearly every supervising civil engineer formulated some proposal aimed at 
improving drainage. Over the course of the eighteenth and the first half of the nineteenth cen-
turies, there was little change in what they proposed. From Remi Marquart in 1699 to Olivier, 
his counterpart of 1858, all the engineers in charge of the area offered essentially the same 
solution to the water control problem. Even in 1858, practically none of the ideas were new. 
Perhaps the only unique feature of Olivier's proposal was that it considered the area as a 
whole, and proposed both to increase drainage and to monitor how the increased flow of water 
in the river affected the rest of the area. Otherwise nothing had changed. The peripheral 
drainage canals that Olivier proposed in 1858 had first been proposed in the 1760s. Similarly 
his plan to straighten the bed of the Dives dated back to the 1770s. 19 
The solutions to the problem of drainage that were proposed in the eighteenth century 
were thus little different than those proposed after 1800. It was, therefore, not inadequate tech-
17) Although the financing methods vary from project to project, nearly all the expense of drainage was 
for laborers and for masons. In the two cases where separate accounts were kept for flood gate construction and 
ditch digging, the cost of flood gates, including the labor to built them, was no more than a sixth of the total cost of 
the drainage network. See AD Calvados, C 4262 and 6671 , S 1269-1272. 
18) See Gabriel Desert, Une SocieJe Rurale au XJJt!me siecle: Les Paysans du Calvados. New York: Amo 
Press Inc., 1977. p . 304. 
19) Olivier and Sallembert, ProjeJ de DessechemenJ des Marais de la Dives, Caen, 1856. See AD Calva-
dos, C 6771 and S 1004a and 1004b for earlier projects. 
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nology that was responsible for the lack of drainage before the Revolution. To be sure, 
drainage projects were expensive investments, but again the problem, as we shall see, was not 
their cost. Nor was it their revenues, for the evidence will indicate that drainage projects would 
have been profitable (had it not been for the cost of litigation) long before the Revolution. 
Rather it was the lack of institutions that would govern the distribution of the costs of a project 
among property rights holders. 
Those institutions can be thought of as constraints, or more precisely as rules that res-
trict economic activity and define the distribution of the profits from drainage. For simplicity 
these rules can be divided into three categories: those rules that (1) concern the exchange of 
property rights, (2) concern the resolution of conflicts over property rights of uncertain value 
and legitimacy, and (3) enforce the exchanges and the settlement of conflicts.20 
In the case of drainage in the Pays d 'Auge, the first set of institutions did not change 
significantly between 1700 and 1850. In other words, the rules that governed the sale of land or 
water rights did not change: there was always a marlcet for privately owned land or water 
rights. The third set of institutions--enforcement institutions--did not play a very important 
role in the development of drainage either. for the power to enforce contracts of sale and reso-
lution of disputes was available throughout the period. The primary institutional change con-
cemed the second type of institutions--the rules of litigation--and it was this change that 
brought about drainage in the nineteenth century. 
20) Cf. Douglas North and Lance Davis, lnstiJurional Change and American EcOIWmic Growth. Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press, 1971, which stresses the importance of institutions in economic development. 
However, the authors pay more attention to institutional arrangements that foster growth than to symptoms of insti-
tutional failure such as litigation. Underlying any institutional arrangement for production is a structure that en-
forces property rights. In the case of uncertain and overlapping property rights, as in Normandy, the courts are very 
important, perhaps more than in the American setting discussed by North and Davis. 
21 
A Simple Model of Drainage Production 
In a universe where populations are widely spread out, externalities are rare and public 
goods problems are almost nonexistent. This was not the case for Normandy--and as a matter 
of fact for most of Old-Regime Europe. The central argument of this paper is that the external-
ities and public goods problems of the Old Regime (and the lack of institutions to deal with 
them) were the main impediment to drainage. To test this crucial point we need a model of a 
null universe where these problems do not occur. 
The null universe is easiest to describe in a single period model. Assume that the glo-
bal production function for drained land has only two arguments, marshland and labor, and that 
it is strictly concave. Denote the production function of drained land H (m J ), where m is 
marshland and l is labor. Let the price of arable land be p", the opportunity cost of marshes 
p,., and the wage p1• Then we can write the profit function of drainage as : 
Denote the supply of drained land by d. Because ditches and canals must be built, the usable 
acreage of a drained marsh (d=H(mJ)) tends to be less than the marsh itself (m). Then if m·, 
I" solve the maximization problem, and d" is the quantity of land drained, then the compara-
tive static results yield: 
Thus, in an efficient market the supply of drained land depends on the price of arable land (p,) 
and the price of labor (p1 ). In that case an increase in the price of arable land should lead to an 
increase in drainage, while an increase in the price of labor should lead to less drainage. 
This model, of course, treats drainage as an instantaneous process, when in fact it is an 
investment. Supply therefore depends on rates of return. Moreover drainage is a discrete 
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good. To consider this more complex problem, let us index all the marshes by i. Assume that a 
fixed quantity of laoor /i will drain marsh i, which when drained yields di units of arable land 
and has opportunity cost mi. Assume that it takes T years to drain the marsh, that the labor 
[ . 
invested in each year is ~ , and that at time T the drained land is sold at a price of Pi. The 
price of drained land equals the price of arable land (pa) minus the discounted present value of 
maintenance costs per unit of surface. Then the internal rate of return is oi such that 
(1MJT 
_1 __ 1 
1+0i 
All projects with an internal rate of return higher than the interest rate will be carried out. To 
look at the impact of changes in relative prices, let us order the projects by their internal rates 
of return, for a given set of prices. It is easy to check that the internal rate of return rises as the 
price of arable rises and falls as the price of laoor increases. Thus, if the price of land rises 
sufficiently, a project whose rate of return was initially less than the rate of interest will 
become profitable. A rise in the interest rate has three effects on the supply of drainage: higher 
interest rates demand a higher rate of return for a project to be profitable, decrease the price of 
land and also decrease the opportunity cost of the marsh. The second effect must be larger than 
the first because drained land carries a higher price than marshland. Therefore the net effect is 
to make projects less attractive.21 
21) Choosing m appropriate rate of interest for comparisons proved to be more difficult than anticipated . 
Rental prices for land. from the notarial data I collected, rm at 5% of the sale prices throughout the period 1702-
1870. Tills points to a real interest rate of 5% if we ignore appreciation in the value of land. Mortgages point to the 
same stable rate of 5%. At the same time, however French interest rates in various capital markets fluctuated 
between 4.75 and 8.25% in the nineteenth century. Unfortunately there are no comparable rates of interest for the 
eighteenth century except for reflies (personal loans) which ranged between 3 and 5%. All of this suggest that 5% 
was a reasonable upper bound for French interest rates in the eighteenth century md something closer to a lower 
bound in the nineteenth century. Choosing a 5% interest rate for the entire period 1700-1848 seems a reasonable as -
sumption. which will bias my test against the profitability of drainage projects before 1800. This can only strengthen 
my findings. 
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The lack of supply of drainage in Normandy in the eighteenth century could have been 
the result of an unfavorable price of land relative to labor. A change in that relative price would 
then explain the abundance of projects that were carried out in the nineteenth century. How-
ever, the price ratio of land to labor, displayed in Figure 1 at the end of the chapter, suggests 
this was not the case. The small rise in the price ratio between 1700 and 1870 did make the 
price ratio more favorable in the nineteenth century. But the change is not sufficient to explain 
the dramatic increase in the supply of drainage after 1800. Conceivably, a significantly higher 
interest rate in the eighteenth century than in the nineteenth century could also explain why the 
development of drainage had to wait until after 1800. However as Figure 2 (at the end of the 
chapter) indicates, the data rejects such a hypothesis. Interest rates, except for the Revolution, 
are comparable across centuries.22 Despite this evidence, we can accept the hypothesis of a 
market failure only if it can be shown that some drainage could have earned positive economic 
As an alternative, I estimated French interest rates from British data by running a linear regression of 
nineteenth century French rates on British interest rates for consols and a constanL I then used the British rates 
(which are available throughout the eighteenth century) to extrapolate French rates. When available, actual French 
rates are always about 1% higher than the British rates. However when British interest rates are very low as in the 
middle of the eighteenth century the extrapolation yields French rates which are too close to British rates and prob-
ably unreliable. When calculating rates of return to drainage projects, I used both the 5% rate of interest and the 
rate estimated from British data for my comparisons. 
The French interest rate estimated from British data was computed as the predicted value of the regression 
of nineteenth-century French interest rates on British interest rates for consols (ruk) and a constant (one= 1 ). The re-
gression results were: 
Independent 
Variable 
one 
ruk 
Estimated 
Coefficient 
-9.41189 
4 .17690 
Standard 
Error 
2.30089 
0.59752 
N = 73 R2= 0.40767 R 2=0.39933. The interest rate data comes from S. Homer, A His-
tory oflnlerest Rates. New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1977, pp. 156-157, 172, 195-196, and 222-223 . 
Data on R rmles is available in Emmanuel Le Roy Ladurie, Les Paysans du Languedoc, Paris: S.E. V .P.E.N., 1966, 
pp. 1024-1025. 
22) The price data comes from a variety of sources: H. Hauser, Recherches et Docume/'lls sur I' H istoire 
des Prb: en France., Paris: Les Presses Modemes, 1936, pp. 160-194; G. Perrot, Caen: La Genese d'unt! Ville 
Moderne. Paris: Mouton, 1975, pp. 1026-1038; G. Desert, Une Societe Rurale au XIX Sieck, pp. 753-778. Figure 
2 depicts French interest rates estimated from British data, but none of the direct French evidence points to higher 
interest rates in the nineteenth century either. On this point, see note 21 above. 
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profits if undertaken in the eighteenth century. We will therefore examine drainage projects 
that were carried out in the eighteenth and th~ nineteenth century and determine when, if ever, 
these projects would have been profitable in the absence of court costs. 
Profitability 
The argument that changes in institutions facilitated the drainage of marshes carries 
with it the implicit assumption that, in the absence of institutional barriers, drainage projects 
would have been carried out in the eighteenth century. In particular, more marshes would have 
been drained if the cost of resolving conflicts over property rights had been lowered. In other 
words, the validity of the hypothesis of institutional failure depends on whether or not the rela-
tive prices of land and labor would have made drainage of marshes a profitable operation in the 
absence of litigation. Estimated rates of return for drainage projects in the eighteenth century 
demonstrate that this was the case. 
To estimate the rates of return, a set of price series is necessary. I constructed a wage 
series from published sources. The necessary land price series was more difficult to collect. 
Although historians of Normandy had published some land price data for the second half of the 
nineteenth century, there were no published land price series prior to 1850. To fill this gap I 
collected a sample of land sales and rental prices and constructed a price series from the 
notarial archives--the only source for land sale prices in the eighteenth and nineteenth centu-
ries. 23 I used the archives of the notary in Troarn to collect data on all the land sales and leases 
23) The French notaires have no pr-oper equivalent in the U.S. The etude de notaire was a recording 
office that was neither truly private nor truly public. The private narure of the office comes from the fact that public 
officials cannot request notarial records. The public nature of notaires comes from the fact that offices are sold by 
the state. To be enforceable in court, private contracts must be signed in front of. and deposited with. a notaire. In 
the rural world, both in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, notaires took down all son of contracts that 
transferred property rights between individuals. Loans, mongages, land sales and rentals, wills. estate inventories, 
public auctions and marriage contracts run one after the other in the minutes that only rarely offer much in the way 
of tables. The collection of land sale and rental data is therefore painfully slow. To conven Old-Regime surface 
measures to metric mtits I relied upon Henri Navel "Recherches sure les Anciennes Mesures Agraires Normandes, 
Acres, Vergees, Perches," Bulletin de Ia Societe des Antiquaires de Normandie, Caen, 1932; and Gabriel Desen 
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for every fourth year, from 1702 to 1870. The data set represents 1241 contracts over 41 sam-
ple years (the notarial archives are missing for 1778 and 1798. There were unfortunately not 
enough contracts to allow the construction of separate arable land and pasture time series. Nor 
could a time series be constructed for Norman marshland, because marshes were neither sold 
nor rented in a market context between 1700 and 1870. Although separate series for arable land 
and marshes would have been preferable, there is sufficient data to estimate the opportunity 
cost of specific marshes, and the average land price series can be used as a lower bound for the 
price of pasture, because pasture always commanded a higher price than arable land. The land 
price series then allows me to construct a conservative estimate for the revenues associated 
with drainage--the sale of the drained land as pasture. The estimated revenue is conservative 
because contemporaries agreed that drained marshland was the most productive kind of land, 
so in all likelihood revenues from drained land were actually higher. 
The issue of costs is more complex. An entrepreneur considering a drainage project in 
year (t) would confront three types of cost. First, the opportunity costs of the marsh (m,); 
second, the cost of labor required to dig trenches and raise levees (p1, L;) where L; is the number 
of man-days needed in each year while the network. is being built. Third, upkeep costs p1,l, 
where l is the expected number of man-days needed to maintain the network.. Both construc-
tion and upkeep costs will be assumed to be only labor costs. 
The revenueR depends on the price of land ( Pa1 ), and the surface area drained (n ): 
R=np, 
The estimated rate of return if the project is started at t, and finished at T, can be defined as ~~ 
such that: 
"Mesures Agraires Anciennes et Nouvelles dans le Calvados," Ann.ales th Normandie, 1962. 
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npa~ _ m1 _ f Pt1Li i _ L Pt1l i =0. E1+~~l i=O E1+~1F i=T+l E1+~1F 
We can test the profitability of drainage by estimating changes in ~~ over time as a result of 
changes in relative prices. 
To be sure, drainage of marshland did contain an element of risk, and we would expect 
the rate of return on risky investments to be higher than on riskless assets. We must keep this 
in mind when we compare ~~ to available interest rates for the period, such as those of the 
mortgage market. Except for the revolutionary period, the mortgage rates remained stable at 
5% and although they were not without risk, they were the safest form of investment available 
to eighteenth-century Frenchmen. I also calculate rates of return using an estimated rate of 
interest constructed from French nineteenth-century data and British interest rates. 
The first test of profitability uses the drainage project of the Marais des Terriers, a 
marsh that was drained between 1714 and 1717. The test relies on a series of assumptions. First 
we assume that the only input used was unskilled labor. Although there were skilled workers 
on all drainage projects, their wages are highly correlated with those of unskilled workers so 
this assumption will not carry too great a risk of error. The assumption that unskilled labor was 
the only input allows us to convert the cost of the drainage network as well its upkeep into 
man-days by dividing the 1714 cost of drainage by the 1714 wage for laborers. The estimated 
wage bill in other years is then computed by multiplying this number of man-days by the wage 
rate in the year in question. 
During the four years of the Marais des Terriers project, the developers spent 44,000 
livres.24 I will assume they spent equal amounts each year, or 11,000 livres in each year. With 
wages for an unskilled laborer in the decade 1710-1720 at 0.4 livres per day, the developers 
24) AD Calvados, C 4073. 
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used 27,500 man-days per year to build the drainage network. After 1718, the upkeep of the 
project ran at 2,000 livres a year, and since upkeep primarily involved maintaining the ditches 
and the main canal, it can also be regarded as a labor cost and converted into man-days. At the 
same 0.4 livres per man-day, 2,000 livres is equivalent to 5,000 man-days. 
The second set of assumptions for the project concerns the opportunity cost of the 
marsh that was drained. It belonged to the abbey of Troam and was drained under the technical 
direction of Remi Maquart, a royal engineer. After drainage it was divided among the abbey, as 
seigneur; the developers of the drainage project, who were Maquart and four Parisian nobles; 
and the communities with rights to the marsh.25 The abbey received one-third of the marsh, 
while the developers received half as payment for draining it The communities with rights to 
the marsh got one-sixth of the drained surface as compensation for their customary rights. I 
will assume that the one-sixth of the drained marsh that the communities received left them 
better off than their use right to the whole undrained marsh, and that the communities thus 
gained from drainage (after all they did accept, without a legal challenge, the whole drainage 
project). There is good evidence that the communities were indeed better off after drainage. 
Though smaller, their pasture was greatly improved, for the undrained marshland had been 
flooded too often to offer pasture except for the summer months. 26 
Draining the marsh also involved a decline in the value of fishing rights and of a mill. 
25) See AD Calvados, C 4295 for the original contract between all the parties of the drainage of the 
Marais des Terriers in 1699. 
26) According to AD Calvados, S 1270, the imputed change in the value of private pastures from in-
creased drainage was never less than 50%. The original drainage contract states that " the land of the marsh has 
never produced anything but reeds and bad grass" (AD Calvados, C 4295). Although the asswnption that drained 
land was three times as productive in terms of pasture as marshland is reasonable, the estimation does not depend on 
it. Because I wanted to calculate the rale of return to the project for the developers, I did not count in the revenue 
calculation some 300 arpents (150 hectares) that were the abbey's share (even though their drainage costs were 
counted) but I used the cost of draining the whole marsh as my cost estimate. In effect, half the land drained was set 
aside to compensate for lost pasture, thus clearly biasing revenues downward. 
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Fishing must have greatly declined, although it is clear that commercial fishing continued in 
the drainage ditches. The mill suffered a 50% loss of power. Although neither milling nor 
fishing completely disappeared, I make the assumption that drainage resulted in an end to both 
activities. That assumption should bias the estimated rate of return downward. In fact, the ren-
tal value of the mill was 1,000 livres a year and remained so throughout the period 1650-1766 
despite the completion of the drainage project in 1717. Hence, although the rental price did 
not increase in a period of general inflation, it did not decline, a clear indication that damage 
was limited. The fishing rights seem to have generated about the same revenue, but there is no 
certainty that the archives of the abbey of Troam contain the full set of rental contracts for any 
year. The best estimate is that those rights represented another 1,000 livres of yearly revenue. 
At worst then, the loss of fishing and milling rights would have amounted to 2,000 livres per 
year. Typically, assets like the milling and fishing rights could have been purchased for a price 
very close to the capitalized value of the rent they earned. This can be estimated using the rate 
of interest--either the 5% mortgage rate or the rate estimated from British data. In the 5% case 
40,000 livres is the estimated opportunity cost for the marsh from the capitalized value of the 
rents earned by the abbey from milling and fishing.27 
Although Maquart's widow and three of his associates sold their shares in the Marais 
des Terriers to the remaining developer, Oursin, the sales contracts were impossible to trace. 
We thus do not know how much the drained marsh was worth but we do know the surface area 
of the developers' share. Revenue estimates are computed assuming that the developers' 
45,000 ares (the are was the standard unit of surface measurement in nineteenth-century France 
27) Most of the data on mills comes from the AD Calvados, H 8160-8166 (Abbaye de Troarn). The abbey 
has a complete list of the rental contracts for the mill from 1665 to 1760. The rental price remained stable at 1,000 
livres per year even in the contracts for 1710-1730 when the abbot sued the developers arguing his mill had lost 
some of its power. 
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and is equal to 1/100 of an hectare or 0.0247 acre) were sold at the prevailing average price for 
naturally drained land minus the present dis~ounted value of future maintenance costs. Again, 
the use of such an average price for land understates the revenues since drained marshland was 
reputed to be the best in Normandy. 
To estimate the discounted value of the future maintenance costs, I will assume that 
having drained the marsh in four years the developers sell the land and create a sinking fund to 
deal with maintenance costs. The sinking fund is composed of bonds (rentes) with a yield 
equal to the interest rate. With these assumptions, the capital cost of future upkeep will equal 
the wage costs for 5,000 man-days of labor divided by the interest rate (in the case of the fixed 
interest rate it will be 100,000 times the wage). The expected rate of return 6, on the project if 
it had been started in year t thus solves: 
1 1 3 1 1 (45000p,--5,000w,) 4 27,500w,!: . 2,000-=0, 
r, (1+6,) 0 (1+6,)' r, 
where p,, w, ,r, are the price of land, wages, and the interest rate in year t. 
Table 1, Columns 2 and 5 give the hypothetical rates of return for the Marais des Ter-
riers broken down by periods. 28 Despite the conservative assumptions, all of which should 
bias the estimates downward, the project returned at least 20% per annum, assuming that the 
project was completed in four years. There are three years--1734, 1794 and 1806-- when rates 
of return are extreme, the result most likely of poor estimates of land prices in years when only 
a small number of land transactions were recorded by the notary of Troarn. With these years 
excepted, between 1718 and the French Revolution, the project's internal rate of return was 
never less than six times the rate of return on mortgages. If instead of 5% mortgage rates, we 
use interest rates derived from British data, then the rates of return are smaller but they remain 
28) Table 2, at the end of the chapter, gives the complete series of estimated rates of return. 
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very substantial: through the eighteenth century the project would have returned on average at 
least four times the estimated rate of return. Thus, regardless of what interest rates are used, 
significant profits could have been earned from this project, all the more so since the conserva-
tive assumptions probably lead to an underestimate of the rates of return. Moreover, although 
all the estimates for the eighteenth century are lower than in those for the nineteenth they leave 
us with the same conclusion: if the Marais des Terriers is any evidence, drainage ought to have 
been profitable as early on as the 1720s. 
5% Model Estimated Rate Model 
Return Return Interest Return Return Interest 
Terriers Troarn Rate Terriers Troarn Rate 
1702-1750 37 21 05 26 09 07 
1754-1786 52 25 05 40 12 05 
1790-1814 83 40 05 80 38 09 
1818-1850 69 31 05 73 34 08 
1854-1870 64 24 05 59 18 04 
Table 1: Average Rates of Return for Drainage Projects by Period 
(in percent per annum) 
A more convincing test of the market failure hypothesis involves computing the 
hypothetical rates of return to drainage projects that occurred in the nineteenth century. In the 
1830s, the government provided an institutional mechanism for the division of common lands 
that ultimately facilitated the drainage of marshes. The measure affected marshes because the 
Revolution transformed the marshes, which had been seigneurial property, into common lands 
owned by villages. Like other common land, marshes were divided equally between each 
household in the village . The entire operation was supervised by the government, and before 
the marshes were divided, a basic drainage system was put in. Households in the village had to 
pay for the share they received, and the price they paid was set to compensate the community 
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for revenues it had collected from the marsh and to pay for the drainage network. Sufficient 
data is available from one such division of a common marsh--in Troarn in the 1840s--to esti-
mate a crude rate of return.29 
In the division of the common marsh in Troarn, villagers received an average parcel of 
30.1 ares for the price of 100 francs. I will assume that the entire 100 francs went to pay for the 
drainage network. This assumption no doubt exaggerates the cost of the network because some 
of the money paid by the villagers reimbursed the village for lost revenue from the marsh. In 
Troarn these revenues came from pasture rights (there was no mill on the marsh), but we will 
use other evidence to estimate their magnitude. I shall also assume that yearly upkeep costs 
amounted to 5% of the cost of the drainage network. Actual upkeep costs for Troarn were not 
available in the archives, but account books of other drainage projects suggests this is an 
appropriate figure. 30 Both the cost of the drainage network and of its upkeep were estimated as 
labor costs. 
The most difficult cost to estimate is the opportunity cost of the pasture foregone by 
the villagers. Since undrained marshes were never sold, one cannot use sale prices. However, 
contemporary sources (the tax service, the state, and dividing communities) did estimate the 
value of marshes from their revenues before division. These estimates average eleven francs 
per are or 46% of the average price of land between 1838 and 1850. We will assume that the 
marsh in Troarn was worth slightly more than this--50% of the average price of land . Again 
this is a conservative assumption, for the Troarn marsh had no mill, and some of the value of 
the pasture foregone was actually part of the 100 francs per parcel that we assumed paid for the 
29) In the seventeenth century, the seigneurial owners of the marsh at Troam had attempted to exercise 
triage and drain the marsh. In the eighteenth century, the communities who then owned the marsh also attem~ted to 
have the marsh drained. Yet, as we shall see later, litigation prevented the realization of any drainage. AN H 1692 
30) See AD Calvados, S 1269 (syndical de Ia Dives). 
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drainage network. Once again we have biased the rate of return downward. 31 
The project was carried out in only o.ne year, a fact that makes the calculation of rates 
of return very easy. As the third and sixth columns of Table 1 indicate, this project also would 
have earned significant profits independently of the time it was carried out. Like the Terrier 
project, the Troarn project would have been profitable in the eighteenth century. The average 
rate of return for the eighteenth century ( 1702-1789) was 23%, more than four times the rate of 
return on mortgages. For the period 1750-1786, when drainage became an important policy 
issue, the rate of return is near 25% or five times the mortgage rate. With interest rates 
estimated from British sources, profits are much smaller. However in the second half of the 
eighteenth century, the project would have been quite profitable (it returned two and a half 
times the rate of interest). Clearly some marshes that were not drained before the nineteenth 
century could have been profitably drained 50 or 100 years before. 
Both estimated rate-of-return series (displayed in Figures 3 and 4 at the end of the text) 
were calculated in a conservative fashion, yet both lead to the same conclusion: without litiga-
tion costs drainage projects would have given an entrepreneur sizable profits. With the excep-
tion of one year, the estimated rates of return for both projects in the eighteenth century 
exceeded 5%--the mortgage rate--by a wide margin (Table 2). With the interest rates estimated 
from British sources, the rates of return were almost always favorable except in the 1740s 
when the British interest rates fall below 4% a year and the linear form of the estimated French 
rates may make them unreliable. Of course, one could imagine that even higher rates of return 
would have been necessary to compensate eighteenth century entrepreneurs for the risks they 
took. Yet risks were actually limited, for the marsh retained its value in case of failure. 
31) One problem with using such drainage projects as measures of profitability is that commercial exploi-
tation only started after drainage took place. 
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Furthermore, the technology involved with drainage was simple. Typically a drainage network 
failed, as did the one in the Marais des Terriers, not because the network failed to drain the 
marsh, but because of lack of upkeep.32 If the developer sold the land, he would not face that 
risk. In any event, the estimated rates of return for drainage projects in the eighteenth century 
seem high even for risky ventures. They were almost always well above 15%, a figure that 
compares very favorably with the estimated 18% rate of return for contemporary French slave 
trade ventures, which were notoriously risky. 33 Finally, because these rates of return were con-
structed in a conservative fashion--one that would produce high costs and low returns--it seems 
safe to assume that the true rate of return would in all likelihood have been even higher in the 
eighteenth century. The conclusion that the market for drainage was very inefficient in the 
eighteenth century thus seems inescapable. The fact that a great deal of attention was focused 
on drainage in the later eighteenth century (as we shall see in the last two Sections ) suggests 
that the problem was not due to the lack of economic acumen of Norman landowners. Rather, 
marshes remained undrained because of a market failure. 
Market Failure 
For the student of eighteenth-century French agriculture, the presence of externalities 
and public good provision problems is no surprise. One might even argue that since they per-
sisted into the nineteenth century, the supply of drainage was far from optimal even then. How-
ever, I will concentrate on the eighteenth-century situation. This focus will be a first step in 
evaluating whether or not the Revolution improved the institutional structure for the provision 
of drainage. 
32) AD Calvados, H 8163. 
33) Cf. Robert Forster, Merchants, Landords and Magistrates, The Deponl Family in the Eighteenlh Cen-
tury, Baltimore: The Jolms Hopkins University Press, 1980, p. 5 and note 7. Robert Stein, The French Slave Trade . 
Maidson: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1979, suggests that average profits in the slave trade were in fact much 
lower, at least in the 1780s. 
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Eighteenth-century administrators and investors were well aware of the potential for 
high returns to drainage and the relative lac~ of drainage. The most important administrators 
in drainage affairs were the intendants, the k.ing's special representatives in a particular area 
called a gbteraiite. The intendant not only had executive power over taxes, military matters, 
and roads and bridges, but he was also the judge for extraordinary affairs. The intendants' sup-
port for drainage schemes was very strong and tempered only by their knowledge of the 
difficulty of carrying drainage projects through. In 1770, the intendant of Caen, Esmangard, 
remarked in connection with marshes not far from the Dives: 
These marshes have, in their present state [undrained], produced nearly no 
revenue, even though the soil is good and could become through drainage one 
of the most fertile of the region ... There is no kind of obstacle a portion of the 
village has not created to prevent the division of the marshes and their 
drainage ... The Count of Langeron and the Marquee of Lambert [the promoters 
of a project to drain the marshes in question] have been progressing only step 
by step because everything has been done under duress and the different legal 
proced~s that have become indispensable have brought about considerable 
delays. 
Esmangard 's attitude exemplifies the interest that intendants had in drainage and also their ina-
bility to accelerate judicial procedures. Developers shared their belief in the potential high 
return to and high social value of drainage. A would-be developer concluded in 1765: 
An operation conducted with such generosity should necessarily return pre-
cious land to agriculture. The important affair is to drain some land, an opera-
tion deeply desired in a province suc~_gs lower Normandy, where the inhabi-
tants suffer much from stagnant water. 
He went on to discuss the problems that he had faced in finding land that could be drained 
34)AN H 1 1496 (62), September 17, 1770. A similar example comes from the South of France, where the 
inlendanl of Montpellier in 1760 discussed the drainage of a marsh. After approving the project from an economic 
and a technical point of view, the inlendanl came to the issue of property rights. He discussed the demands made by 
the developers for eminent domain privileges, but concluded ruat the privileges requested by the developers were 
probably too weak to insure realization of the project.( AN F 1 318.) 
35) A. D. Calvados, C 4200 (62), 1780; C 4203, June 1765. That local communities or landowners were 
often opposed to drainage has surprised a number of historians. Staunch opposition, though, could result in higher 
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without litigation. 
Intendants and developers worried about litigation over drainage not only because 
drainage would be difficult to provide in any market, but also because the distribution of pro-
perty rights under the Old Regime exacerbated the problems associated with drainage. The 
difficulties that drainage would pose in any market, even those where property rights are cer-
tain and litigation not an issue, are obvious, for drainage enjoys very significant positive exter-
nalities and economies of scale: it would have been impossible to drain part of the Marais des 
Terriers without draining it all. Furthermore, drainage also imposes negative externalities on 
all lower lands, for each new drainage project forces owners of lower lands to raise their 
levees. If the drainage of a whole hydrographic basin is contemplated, this latter issue is 
largely irrelevant, because the developers will have to take into account the costs associated 
with the negative externalities. In France, however, the scale of suggested projects remained 
much smaller than a whole hydrographic basin. In such a situation the institution that allocates 
the costs of the externalities among landowners is crucial for the successful development of 
any drainage project. In eighteenth-century France, conflicts between developers and owners of 
land affected by drainage were handled by the courts, and there was no clear precedent to lead 
the courts to rule that developers were liable, say, for downstream damages due to increased 
water flow. Thus the downstream landowners were often opposed to projects from the start, 
and their opposition significantly raised the cost of drainage. 
When there are many participants to a project. the costs of drainage also depend on the 
institution that resolves conflicts between participants over the distribution of cost and benefits. 
If marsh ownership is sufficiently dispersed, no drainage can occur without an rule to allocate 
levels of compensation. In many cases the developers attempted to avoid compensating communities for customary 
rights. For example, see Robert Forster, Merchanls, Landlords, Magistrates, pp. 77-78. 
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costs among owners. Moreover, whether the development is undertaken by someone exterior to 
the group of landowners, by some subset of the landowners, or by the landowners collectively, 
a rule of profit division is necessary. An entrepreneur who undertakes the project will have to 
be paid and the landowners will have to divide the remaining benefits. Oearly, the rule that 
transfers a portion of the benefits from the landowners to the entrepreneur will determine the 
profitability of the projects for the entrepreneur. Division rules thus become important parame-
ters in the equilibrium quantity of land drained, even though they do not affect the social value 
of the project because they address purely redistributive issues. 
In the case of well-defined property rights and certain rent valuations, a simple institu-
tional structure (having the state set the rule for sharing costs and benefits, for instance), would 
presumably avoid litigation. In the case of property rights over a marsh, though, litigation is 
almost inevitable because of informational asymmetries. The price of the property right in 
question--pasture rights over a marsh slated for drainage, for example--is in fact private infor-
mation to the owner because he, better than anyone else, knows the nature of the marsh, the 
quality of its pasture, the problems of flooding, and thus the profits it can be expected to gen-
erate. None of this information is truly private, but clearly it is expensive to acquire, especially 
in the case of marshes that were generally not sold. The landowner obtains this information 
readily because he observes the returns of using or renting out his property rights to the marsh, 
but the state or an entrepreneur trying to reimburse a landowner for the loss of the property 
right would have difficulty estimating what the undrained marsh is worth. Even if the 
entrepreneur used unbiased methods to estimate the costs and benefits to improvement it would 
be difficult to devise a compensation rule that would leave all property rights owners Pareto 
indifferent When property rights owners are improperly compensated, they could appeal the 
contract in court. Hence, costly litigation is also likely when there are significant informational 
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asymmetries between the developers and the owners of property rights to a marsh. 
The asymmetric information proble~ also effects the case of the negative externalities 
associated with drainage. For example, the value of damages to a mill suffered from drainage 
is better known to the owner of the mill than to the entrepreneur. The mill's rental contracts are 
private information, hence any damage suffered is private information. Thus the uncertainty in 
the value of damages or benefits is yet another cause for litigation, adding to the cost of supply-
ing drainage. 
Another source of litigation is overlapping or uncertain property rights. When pro-
perty rights are overlapping or uncertain the entrepreneur will face yet another problem: whom 
to compensate for damages. When property rights are uncertain litigation is often the only way 
to determine who owns the right to compensation. Under the Old Regime, a large number of 
individuals often had some title to the same piece of land. The list could include landowners, 
farmers, religious institutions, seigneuriallords or the state. In Normandy, where marshes were 
most often common lands, claims to the property were often divided between the lord, the 
king, and the community. In a world where property rights were uncertain, projects could not 
start until they had been attributed, and the attribution of property rights over marshes was the 
source of numerous suits. 
The supply of drainage thus depends not only on such normal market forces as the 
relative prices of land and labor or the interest rate, but also on institutions. Because it is a pub-
lic good, drainage requires rules for the division of costs and benefits, and when asymmetric 
information or uncertain property rights pose problems, drainage is likely to give rise to litiga-
tion. Only when institutions resolve these difficulties is drainage likely to proceed, but in Old-
Regime France institutions failed to do so. As we shall see, it was not until after the Revolu-
tion, when institutions had completely changed, that drainage could be successfully pursued. 
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1715-1789: The Failures of the Old-Regime Institutions 
France in the eighteenth century experienced significant economic growth as well as 
general inflation in agricultural prices. After 1750, state agents, intellectuals and agronomists 
became concerned with improving French agriculture. 36 They focused partly on improving 
productivity per acre and partly on increasing the cultivated area. One way to increase the cul-
tivated area was to drain marshes, and in the second half of the eighteenth century, government 
officials enacted a set of reforms that they believed would promote drainage. In order to 
explain the failure of these reforms, I will first describe the institutions of drainage in the last 
days of the reign of Louis XIV. Then, to illustrate the importance of litigation, I will analyze 
the history of three marshes and the attempts to drain them between 1700 and 1789. Finally, I 
will examine belated efforts by the royal government to reduce litigation and thereby 
encourage drainage. 
The institutional structure that governed drainage in the eighteenth century was pri-
marily judicial. Conflicts were resolved in court. Two types of institutions governed litigation 
over property rights. The first were regional rules about the distribution of common or seig-
neuriallands. 37 1be second were royal laws. Conflicts over either regional rules or royal laws, 
as well as over royal permits to drain, were handled in royal courts, and because all marshes 
were in fact common lands, the rules of triage, that I described earlier, generally prevailed. 
The only exception concerned royal land. While technically royal marshes could not be sold, 
rights to them could be leased in perpetuity. Although in theory, at least, individuals would 
have had weaker claims to land drained if it was royal land, this land was particularly attractive 
36) See, for example, state attempts to promote enclosures, division of the commons and drainage AN H 1 
1482-1492. 
37) A good introduction to the instirutional rules of eighteenth-century France is Pierre Goubert, L'Ancien 
Regime, vol. 1. Chapters 1-3. A more detailed presentation of the issues appears in Roland Mousnier, The Institu-
tions of France under the AbsoluJe Monarchy, 2 vols., Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1979. 
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to developers, because the property rights in question concerned only the king. 
The primary cause of litigation ove.r marshes in the eighteenth century was conflict 
over property rights. By 1700, communities and seigneurial lords had accumulated overlap-
ping property rights to most marshes. Drainage, though, required that marshes be divided and 
that the overlapping property rights be sorted out for the allocation of costs and benefits. 
Uncertainty in property rights led to three sorts of litigation. The first pitted king against seig-
neur over the determination of seigneurial property. At issue was who held the seigneurial 
rights to the marsh. In Normandy the seigneur almost always won these suits, because, as we 
saw earlier, most marshes were not part of the royal domain. The second type of suits involved 
seigneurs and communities and focused on the form of triage rule that should be used for divi-
sion. 38 The third type of litigation was due to conflicts over division of the surplus when the 
communities had strong use rights to the marsh. 
It was only the last set of suits that prevented drainage in eighteenth-century Nor-
mandy. In communities with strong use rights access to the marsh was determined by local 
custom. Changing the way the marsh was used in effect required changing customary law. 
Because the marsh was ruled by customary law individual villagers had standing before the 
courts if they wished to appeal drainage projects. Because drainage changed access to the 
marsh by dividing the drained land into parcels for private rather than communal use, villagers 
could credibly argue that their customary rights were violated. Because customary law was 
part of privileges, a complex set of personal and group franchises granted by the king, royal 
courts were unable to dictate reform of customary law. Theroretically the king could have 
38) The Abbey of Troam presents a telling example of the complexity of suits. In the case of the Marais 
des Terriers, the abbey was seigneuriallord and owner and thus had two-thirds of the marsh. In the case of the 
marsh ofTroam, it was seigneur ofTroF. but not the owner of the marsh. The abbey would therefore receive only 
a third of tfe marsh under triage AN H 1496 and AD Calvados, C 4293. For a contemporary view of the issue. 
see AN H 1496, Marais de Chaumont 
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modified customary law but such action would have involved great cost as it would have faced 
the opposition of judicial officers. As a result if communities had strong use rights the unani-
mous consent of all villagers involved was necessary. Many landowners attempted to use their 
effective veto power to appeal the drainage projects and demand larger shares of the drained 
land. Faced with appeals by landowners, royal courts neither enforced the drainage grants nor 
decided on a new allocation of the drained land. As a result there was no judicial finality in 
conflicts over drainage grants. 
The suits almost inevitably ended up in the king's council, the highest royal court. 
Drainage projects were involved in the high court even in the absence of suits because they 
changed the flow of water, and all projects that changed the flow of water required a royal grant 
from the council. The royal grants were, at least in theory, contracts that divided costs and 
benefits between the different parties in drainage projects. They also awarded the monopoly 
right to carry out projects to a specific individual called the developer. Except for legal costs, 
these grants were supposed to be free; however, entrepreneurs were well aware of the need for 
political influence in order to obtain a speedy and favorable verdict from the council. In the 
case of the Marais des Terriers, for example, Maquart, who was the originator of the drainage 
project, found four Parisian nobles who became his associates and who presumably had some 
influence in the king's council. 39 The abbot of Troarn, the seigneurial lord of the Marais des 
Terriers and the opponent of Maquart in nearly every suit, wielded considerable influence him-
self. 
Anyone dissatisfied with a proposed royal grant could oppose it by filing a brief with a 
royal court. Although technically an appeal of a royal decision, the brief took the form of a suit 
39) AC Vimont (Saint-Pierre Oursin), 9E 761(75. 
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against the developers. The suit could be pursued before the bail/age (the local court) or the 
Parlement (the regional royal court of appeals) in Rouen and then go back to the king's coun-
cil for another appeal. If the opponent found the prospects of the regular court system unsatis-
factory, he could file with the Eaux et Forets (Water and Forestry) courts because in the case of 
marshes the jurisdiction of the regular court system overlapped with the jurisdiction of the 
Eaux et Forets. Here, too, final appeals could always be sent to the council. Any court that 
accepted the appeal would automatically grant a staying order, thus preventing the realization 
of any drainage network until all suits had been resolved. The process of court enforcement of 
drainage grants was very complex, lengthy and expensive, and it could delay a drainage project 
for a long time. 
The royal governments in the eighteenth century were well aware of the severe 
economic costs associated with court delays. A number of ministers attempted to centralize 
judicial authority not only to reinforce royal power but also to reduce delays. Beginning in the 
1740s, some new drainage grants issued by the king's council contained a clause that stated 
that they could be reviewed only by the intendant or the council itself. Unfortunately, because 
such direct appeal clauses were not automatically included in all new drainage grants the 
effects of this reform were limited. Developers had to request the privilege of such a direct 
appeal clause in their grant Soon though, almost all developers began to seek direct appeal 
clauses. As de Blossac, the intendant in Poitier, remarked, 
Such an edict [that only allowed appeals directly to the council for a particular 
drainage project] would not be unique in its kind, and all those who have 
started drainage projects have obtained similar ones so they could avoid the 
length !Bd formalities of the procedures that are nefarious to enterprises of this 
nature. 
The result was that the king's council became overloaded with appeals, and they took longer 
40) AN H1 1497, (1776). 
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and longer to process. For Normandy in particular, this reform meant longer rather than shorter 
litigation time. Unlike other provinces where the Parlements and other local institutions 
played important economic and judicial roles, Normandy was the domain of direct royal 
power, at least insofar as drainage was concerned. Indeed, as early as 1711, court cases over 
marshes were going directly to the king's council.41 The centralization of judicial authority 
into the council did not facilitate drainage in Normandy. After 1740, litigation before the 
king's council took four or more years to settle. The delays affected all the drainage projects of 
which we have records, for all were in some way involved in litigation before the council. It is 
no wonder then, that of the numerous drainage projects proposed in the eighteenth century, 
most were failures . 
Three examples illustrate the problems with litigation that thwarted many eighteenth-
century drainage projects. The first example is the marsh of Troarn and all the unsuccessful 
attempts to divide it and drain it. The legal battle over property rights to this marsh started in 
the seventeenth century and it was still in the courts a hundred years later when the Revolution 
finally brought the litigation to an end. In a first phase, the Abbey attempted to drain the marsh, 
no doubt in order to convert it to pasture and arable land.42 The four communities (Troam, 
Saint-Samson, paint-luen~e-Bures and Barneville) that enjoyed use rights over the marsh 
sued the abbey, arguing that their rights were customary and that the abbey had no right to 
drain the marsh. The communities won their suit against the abbey in the king's council in 
1667. As a result, the abbey's claims of ownership were invalidated and the abbey was forced 
to destroy whatever drainage it had begun The four communities with rights to the marsh also 
41) AD Calvados, C 4293. 
42) The attempts to drain the marsh are documented in the archives of the central government (AN 
H 11492), the inlendanl (AD Calvados, C 4263, 4293), and the communities (AC Bures, Marais). 
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won possession, a form of property that gave them two-thirds of the marsh in the case of 
triage, as well as veto power over any future division. 
A second phase of litigation erupted in 1711 when the same communities attempted to 
divide the land among themselves and to drain the marsh. Although the king's council was 
solicited twice for a division edict, no cost sharing rule could be agreed upon. The intendant 
was either unwilling or unable to enforce the decision of the council. The project was once 
again abandoned. In the 1770s the issue of drainage surfaced again, and the battle over which 
method should be used to divide the marsh was renewed. The three smaller communities 
demanded equal shares, whereas the larger community of Troam stuck by the 1711 proposal. 
Although Troam later abandoned its position, the case was still in the courts at the Revolution. 
Oearly what kept this marsh from being drained was not a question of profits or of technology 
but rather the absence of any precedent or other rule to divide the land between the different 
title holders. In fact, after the Revolution when institutional structure had changed, the marsh 
was divided between the communities, drained and then split up among the villagers. 
The second example involves the Marais des Terriers.43 Although it was ultimately 
drained, the project provides a telling example of the length and extent oflitigation. The origi-
nal contract between the entrepreneur Maquart and the abbey of Troarn dates from 1699, but 
the royal grant permitting drainage was not enacted until 1711. By 1711, Maquart had formed 
a partnership with four Parisian nobles who provided capital and political influence while he 
offered technical expertise. Despite a legal contract reinforced by a royal grant, Maquart and 
his associates became involved in suits with the abbot ofTroam. By 1717, the king's council 
43) AD Calvados, H 8163-8166 and C 4293 and AC Yimont, 9E 761n5. There were actually a number of 
suits over the question of maintenance. It is unclear whether the network of ditches and canals was improperly main-
tained or whether the abbot attempted to renege on his financial obligations. 
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was examining two different suits brought by the abbot In the first, the abbot sued Maquart 
and his associates claiming his mill was le.ss productive as result of the drainage they had 
undertaken. The abbot claimed that both the royal grant and the original contract between him-
self and Maquart had promised to leave the waterfall of the mill intact The second suit, also 
between the abbot and Maquart, concerned the quality of the drainage. The abbot won the first 
suit and was awarded 1,000 livres as damages. He was also given the opportunity to sell his 
mill to Maquart and his associates at the capitalized value of the rent before drainage affected 
the water flow. He lost the second suit over the quality of drainage, and work on the drainage 
network continued. In 1723 the network was declared complete, and, as in the grant of 1711, 
each landowner was to be taxed for upkeep costs according to the surface he owned. A new 
contract that provided for the distribution of future maintenance costs was written between all 
the owners of drained land and Maquart and his associates. 
The legality of this new contract was tested in 1726 when the abbot was back in court 
arguing that the developers (Maquart and his associates) had broken both the 1711 and the 
1723 contracts because they so poorly maintained the drainage network. The intendant agreed 
with the abbot that work had to be done, but he also forced the abbot to pay his share of the 
costs, which the abbot had hitherto resisted. Despite the customary appeal by the abbot, this 
issue was one of the rare occasions when the Icing's council refused to review the intendant's 
decision. Litigation, however, was not over. In 1740 one of Marquart's associates who had 
bought all the other developers' land, a Monsieur Oursin, brought suit against the abbot Our-
sin appealed to the council because the abbot had raised the floor of the drainage canal to 
increase the fall at his mill. Again the abbot lost, but the developers of the marsh faced other 
suits from seigneurs who claimed rights to the marsh and who attempted to impose seigneu-
rial dues or exercise triage. Although Oursin managed to win all these trials , the legal costs 
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were quite large, and there is only one mention of reparatory damages. 
The final case comes from the village of Ranville, a parish that spent 645 livres 
between 1747 and 1748 to defend their lease on a marsh.44 The marsh was part of the royal 
domain (the property of the king), and the domain officials attempted to lease it at a higher rent 
to an individual. The villagers won their suit only to face a renewed threat in 1765 from a 
developer named d'Avenel, who had received a royal grant of the marsh for drainage. The vil-
lage opposed the grant on the basis that their tenure had become customary, but it lost on 
appeal to the Icing's council. The council wanted to encourage drainage and leased the marsh 
to d 'Avenel. He promised to drain the marsh, while the village wanted to use it at as common 
pasture. D' Avenel, however, never even began to drain the marsh. In a final suit waged during 
the Revolution, the villagers argued that the corruption of an intendant's delegate had allowed 
such an injustice to take place. This case dramatically demonstrates that not even royal pro-
perty rights were sufficiently well established to avoid litigation. 
The complication, length, and dates of the lawsuits, make it clear that the Old Regime 
had failed utterly to limit lawsuits over the property and administration of marshes. The prob-
lem worsened in the 1760s when fiscal difficulties forced the monarchy to increase the revenue 
from the king's domain. As a result. leases on royal possessions, including marshes, were 
revised upward. This revision led to renewed attempts to auction leases to royal possessions 
instead of renewing the old contracts. D 'Avenel was able to rent the marsh at Ranville in such 
an auction. Royal officials were particularly fond of schemes like d'Avenel's, because they 
would raise the value of the royal domain without any royal investment. In the long run 
drainage would increase the value the marsh and increase the rent the state could earn. The 
44) AD Calvados, C 4288 and AC Ranville, Marais. 
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fiscal difficulties of the 1760s also led to an effort to recapture parts of the domain that had 
been appropriated by other seigneurial lords. In fact, because of increased fiscal needs, the cen-
tra1 government became more concerned with economic prosperity. In order to increase the 
cultivated acreage, the government enacted a series of reforms that aimed to promote drainage. 
These included reforms of the judicial system, subsidies, and a streamlining of the process of 
granting out marshes to developers. All of these measures should have lowered the cost of 
drainage, but the economic record of the reforms was mixed, at best. 
Consider, for example, the judicial reforms. As we have seen, the attempts at judicial 
centralization did not reduce--and perhaps increased--the delays associated with litigation over 
drainage. The delays, of course, had a significant impact on the profitability of the ventures. 
Moreover, the amount of litigation over edicts from the king's council suggests that the real 
problem lay with the state's inability to make contracts binding. More radical attempts at judi-
cial centralization like Maupeou's (the minister of justice) in the 1770s were short-lived. Their 
only effect was to increase the uncertainty of the judicial process, and they brought no gains for 
drainage entrepreneurs.45 
Ministers concerned with agricultural development also attempted to subsidize 
drainage and other agricultural improvements. The subsidy laws were enacted in 1765 and 
1766 and received the nearly unanimous support of all intendants.46 According to 
entrepreneurs, the subsidies were in fact valuable for agricultural improvements that did not 
lead to externalities and did not involve public goods problems. For drainage, though, 
profitability was not the issue. The problem was litigation, and it could not be resolved by the 
45) See D.M.G. Sutherland, Frana 1789-1815, RevoluJion and CoiUilerrevoluJion, p. 23. Sutherland in 
fact argues that the judicial reforms brought no gains for anyone whether entrepreneurs (because the reforms failed), 
judicial officials, or agents of the state (because the prestige ~fall civil servants was badly damaged). 
46) Edit de Compiegne, August 13 1766 (in AN H 1499). See also AN H1 1496-1497. 
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sort of subsidies the reformers had in mind--chiefly tax rebates.47 Subsidies could not reduce 
the time needed to resolve property rights conflicts, and since the subsidies only became effec-
tive after the project was carried out their impact was minimal. Even as powerful a figure as 
Bertin, the minister of finance and a staunch supporter of agricultural development, could not 
use the subsidies to avoid litigation. Bertin spent 150,000 livres on litigation in the 1780s on a 
marsh that would have been worth little over a million livres drained. Furthermore, he spent 
the money over a space of ten years. It is clear that the 150,000 was probably not the total sum 
he would have spent on legal fees to drain his marsh because his suits were still in court in 
1789. Tile subsidies Bertin was eligible for would have increased Bertin's profits had he been 
able to drain his marsh, but they had no impact on the delays that prevented him from draining 
it 48 As Bertin no doubt found out himself, in the absence of a clear rule for compensating cus-
tomary right, lawsuits were almost inevitable, and the subsidies were worth very little. 
A final set of reforms undertaken to raise royal revenue actually increased the number 
of lawsuits. Liberal interpretations of a point of medieval law known as the vacance rule led 
nearly every community in Normandy into lawsuits.49 The vacance rule was a medieval law 
that gave all abandoned (vaine et vague) land to the king. It had been used by the medieval 
kings to repopulate deserted areas, but in the modem period little land was sufficiently devoid 
of activity to be legally recognized as abandoned. Entrepreneurs could, however, attempt to 
have a marsh or a fen recognized as abandoned in order to secure their property rights. Indeed, 
once land had been recognized as abandoned, the king could grant it out again. If a piece of 
land could be found that was vacant, the subsidies offered to developers became very attrac-
47) See AN H1 1487-1490. 
48) Cf. R. Forster, Merclumts, Landlords, Magistrates, p. 77. 
49) The suits over the vacance rule left a mass of archives in AD Calvados, C 4190-4203. 
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tive, because only a small purchase price would be paid and no taxes were due for the first 20 
years. Several individuals attempted to use this clause to secure marshes that were in fact the 
common lands of villages. They argued that the lands were not under cultivation, but lack of 
cultivation did not mean lack of use, for village communities owned strong customary use 
rights to most marshes. As the intendant's delegate in Caen remarked: 
there is not one foot of commons, fen or marsh in the hand of the King due to 
lack of cultivation. These lands are not abandoned, nor deserted. Since time 
immemorial all the communities enjoy thei~Mommunal property privately and pasture them each year without interruption. 
One of the most extreme attempts to liberally interpret the vacance rule was launched 
in 1761 by M. de Boullonmoranges, a refugee from Turkey who had converted to Catholicism 
and was the protege of high court nobles. Under the vacance rule Boullonmoranges was able to 
secure a royal grant of 12,240 hectares of land. Of that 1,600 were marshes, in over a hundred 
parishes in the generalite of Caen. The royal grant gave him the rights to all the 12,400 hec-
tares unless other individuals could prove ownership. Not surprisingly the grant gave rise to 
scores of lawsuits, as all the concerned (parishes and their lords) marshaled evidence on behalf 
of their title to the land claimed by M. de Boullorunoranges. 51 This was litigation on a scale 
previously unthought of. Bures, a parish whose only interest was a small share of 500 hectares 
of fens and marshes, spent over 3,000 livres in just four years over the Boullonmoranges affair. 
And during the same four years, Bures actually paid a total of 4,571 livres defending its rights 
to the marsh in other suits. The total amount of money expended by Bures against Boullon-
moranges is not available because the accounts of the community are incomplete, however, 
because litigation lasted over 22 years it is safe to assume that Bures spent significantly more 
50) AD Calvados, C 4203 (June 1765). 
51) AD Calvados, C 4195-4203. 
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than the 3,000 livres it went through in the four years for which there is data. Boullon-
moranges himself spent an enormous sum on litigation. Precisely how much is difficult lo 
evaluate, but Boullonmorangcs suggested that his cost had run to more than 300,000 livrcs. 
And one can only guess how much the other parishes in the genera/ire spent. 52 
The trials over the vacance rule lasted until 1783 when an edict was published forbid-
ding concessions of the sort given to Boullonmoranges.53 But for 20 years the validity of pro-
perty rights over marshes had been so shaken that no one would have dared to drain a marsh. 
And while by 1783 the litigation over the Boullonmoranges affair had fmally clarified property 
rights to marshes, the Revolution imervened before anyone could take advantage of the legal 
calm. 
The Old-Regime reforms had thus failed to reduce litigation costs, and no changes 
were made to the institutional structure to facilitate private ventures in drainage. So many over-
lapping property rights over marshes existed that no development could take place without liti-
gation. The reform attempts of the second half of the eighLccnth century were thus doomed to 
failure occause they failed to address the central issues: overlapping property rights and endless 
litigation. As I shall argue later, the Old-Regime moJHU"chy simply could not resolve these 
central issues. The simplification of the property rights structure would have demanded deep 
social change, for much of the economic and political power of the Church, the nobility, and 
other elite groups came from seigneurial rights. The Coase "theorem" would suggest that they 
could have sold their seigneurial rights to individuals but transaction costs made this process 
impossible. Alternatively the state could have bought these seigncurial rights, but the process 
would have raised up insurmountable political obstacles because of the distributional 
52) Sec AC Bures, 563 EDT/15. For Boullomoranges' expenditures, see AD Cavaldos, C 4200. 
53) AD Calvados, C 4200 (62). 
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consequences. Only a revolutionary government could have effected institutional change of 
such magnitude. 
The fiasco of the Boullonmoranges episode did not deter the government from the pro-
motion of drainage. But because private enterprise had failed, in the last years of the Old 
Regime the intendants resorted to using a Royal agency: the Ponts et Chaussees. It drew up 
plans for the Divette canal, which improved drainage in about a fifth of the basin.54 The Ponts 
et Chaussees then built the canal and administered it between 1783 and the Revolution. To pay 
for the cost of the canal, landowners were taxed on the basis of acreage. Communities, near 
the canal, did sue to reduce their share of the burden, but the amount of litigation was far less 
than it had been with the Marais des Terriers. Suits were rare because the project demanded no 
redistribution of land, and because the entrepreneur was the state, and the state clearly had a 
strong hand against plaintiffs. A public agency had thus replaced private enterprise. In 
nineteenth-century Normandy, even stronger public institutions would play the dominant role 
in dividing and draining the common lands, and administrative decision would replace litiga-
tion. 
1789-1850: After the Revolution, Continuity and Contrast 
The French Revolution and the Napoleonic regime left France with a strong central 
authority, reduced uncertainty about property rights, and a strengthened administrative agency 
(Ponts ~~ Chaussees) capable of handling all the technical aspects of drainage. As a result, 
drainage flourished with two types of projects undertaken in the first half of the nineteenth 
century. First, common lands were drained and sold to local landowners. Second, the Ponts et 
Chaussees worked to increase the flow of the Dives, for as more and more drainage took place, 
54) AD Calvados, C 6771 and S 1004 a. 
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more and more water had to be moved out to sea. The institutional challenge was to allocate 
the costs of both of types of projects among landowners. 
None of these projects took place during the revolutionary period (1790-1814 ). These 
were slack years for drainage despite the fact that the estimated rates of return were higher 
than either before or after: between 40% and 38% for Troam, 83% and 80% for the Marais des 
Terriers. During the same period no drainage occurred, and there is significant evidence sug-
gesting that existing networks fell into disrepair. The lack of development and upkeep sug-
gests that despite the marked demand for drainage as evidenced by the high rates of return, the 
institutional structure had failed. The absence of drainage is not surprising, for the period of 
the French Revolution was a time of widespread uncertainty in property rights. The 
Napoleonic period that followed replaced the uncertainties of institutional reform with those of 
war. Thus, it was not until after 1815 that the supply of drainage in Normandy could adjust to 
the new institutional structure. 
While the period between 1789 and 1815 was a period of inactivity in drainage, the 
Revolution did recast the institutional constraints on the supply of drainage. Foremost among 
the reforms was the creation of a powerful executive that wielded far more power than even the 
absolute monarchy. The Revolution, in fact, achieved the centralization of power that the 
monarchy desired but could never obtain. The new power of the executive meant that its deci-
sions about drainage matters would carry far more weight because there could be little doubt 
about their legality. At the same time, the judicial system was completely reformed. The Revo-
lution ended the tensions between judicial authorities and the executive, and the likelihood of 
winning a judicial appeal of an administrative decision declined dramatically.55 The judiciary 
55) A basic introduction to the Napoleonic administration can also be found in R. Holunan. The Na-
poleonic Revolution, Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1967, chapter 4. A more elaborate description 
of the administrative power of post-Revolutionary governments can be found in F. Ponteil, Les Institutions de Ia 
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also lost jurisdiction over a host of economic matters; henceforth these matters were attributed 
to the prefects--the nineteenth century counterparts to the intendants--and to the Ministry of 
Interior. Such reforms alone would have been enough to reduce the institutional costs of 
drainage significantly, but the revolutionary governments also gave greater coherence to vil-
lage government. Municipal councils became executive and legislative bodies whose decisions 
were subject to the approval of the prefect. Once the administration had approved municipal 
council resolutions, they could not be opposed by villagers. Hence, developers after 1815 
found a state that was more cooperative than the Old Regime and able to wield much greater 
power. 56 
Beyond the institutional reforms, the Revolution also rewrote property rights. All seig-
neurial property rights were destroyed. Church property was nationalized and what land was 
under cultivation--either arable or pasture--was sold to the public. The sale of biens nationaux 
(land that was confiscated from the Church or from nobles who fled France during the Revolu-
tion) put on the market large amounts of property and completely redrew the distribution of 
landownership. Before the Revolution the abbey of Troarn had been the largest landowner in 
the area. After the sale of the biens nationau.x large secular landowners took its place. The 
nationalization of Church property and the end of seigneurial privileges also gave the state and 
local communities exclusive ownership of the marshes that had once belonged to seigneurs. 
Where customary rights existed, as in the Dives basin, the municipalities received all the 
undrained marshland. In effect, the end of "feudal privileges" as well as the sale of Church 
France de 1814 a 1870, Paris: P.U.F. 1965, part 1, chapter 3, and part 2, chapter 2. The regimes of the Restoration 
never relinquished this authority. 
56) Cf. D.M.G. Sutherland France 1789-1815, Revolution and CounJerrevolution, pp. 344-347; and Jean 
Petot, Histoire de l'AdministraJion des Ponts et Chau.ssies de 1599 a 1815. Paris: Marcel Rivieesre et Cie., 1958. 
Petot, among other historians stresses the centralization and administrative logic achieved by the Revolution and the 
Napoleonic era. 
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property swept away all overlapping property rights and secured the villages' title to the 
marshes they used for pasture. The Revolution had eliminated one of the major parties to 
Old-Regime litigation--the seigneuriallord. Once he was gone litigation subsided. 
The Revolution also facilitated the division of village commons, including marshes. 
Subject to the approval of the prefect, a favorable vote in the municipal council was now 
enough to divide and drain a common marsh. Projects were subject to the review of both the 
prefect and the Ministry of the Interior, but once the central government agreed to a scheme, 
individuals had little power to resist drainage. The state could enforce whatever rule it chose 
for allocating costs and benefits while offering few avenues for judicial appeal by property 
rights owners. The effect was to eliminate much of the uncertainty that had hung over drainage 
projects. 
One problem remained: finding a set of rules that would promote drainage and 
preserve the new structure of property rights. It is clear that prefects and ministers alike saw 
the division of the commons not only as a an economic task--a means of increasing the cui-
tivated acreage--but also as a political one--as a mean of increasing the number of grateful and 
conservative landowners. Furthennore, just as the intendant had controlled the budgets of 
communities, so prefects controlled the budgets of municipalities and they did so with political 
goals in mind. They exercised the same control over the syndicats, the associations of lan-
downers that administered drainage projects. The Restoration governments of Louis XVIII and 
Charles X had created these associations, which resembled Old-Regime associations charged 
with the care of levees.57 One key difference between the syndicats and their Old-Regime 
predecessors was that the decisions reached by the syndicat could not be appealed once 
57) If the projects were very large it required the approval of the ministry of interior. See AD Calvados, S 
1269 for the role of the Ponls e1 Chau.ssees and the municipalities in the administration of the syndicats. 
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authorized by the prefect 58 This applied in particular to decisions about allocating costs and it 
allowed the syndicats to divide up the cost and benefits without the risk of paralyzing opposi-
tion. 
The laws governing the division of common lands and the creation of syndicats were 
enacted between 1800 and 1823. They had a substantial impact in Normandy. Between 1820 
and 1848, most villages in the Dives basin secured royal edicts authorizing the division of their 
commons, including marshes, which now belonged to the villages. The marshes and other 
commons were to be sold in equal portions to village households, and the edicts allowed 
households to mortgage their portions to the village at 5% for 20 years.59 Drainage of the 
marshes was accomplished at the time of the division. The engineers of the Ponts et Chaussees 
drew up plans, and the prefect made sure that they were carried out. A syndicat was also 
created to insure upkeep of the drainage network. 
The creation of a larger, supra-village syndicat contributed to the solution of the peren-
nial problems with the Dives' exit into the English Channel and with maintaining levees on its 
banks. Created in 1821 by a decision of the central government, the syndicat de Ia Dives over-
saw all drainage in the basin.60 Each village had a least one representative on the syndicat' s 
council, but the real power lay with the prefect and the engineer of the Ponts et Chaussees. The 
engineer proposed improvements and the prefect approved the budgets. This syndicat provided, 
for the first time, an institution that collected funds from all concerned parties (landowners and 
S8) See AC Janville, 9 E 344/46 for an interesting exchange between the village council and the prefect 
over division rules for the village marsh. The prefect forces the village concil to accept the rules laid down by the 
central government within a year and without litigation. Moreover he alone decides whether individuals are eligible 
to receive a share of the marsh or noL (1831-1832) 
59) All the localities in the Dives area that owned some marshland seem to have divided their commons 
between 1820 and 1848. One cannot be completely sure, however, because of the loss of village archives during the 
fighting in 1944. 
60) AD Calvados, S 1269 '"Refiexions de M. Pfistre-Duvant Ancien President du Syndicat'" (1829). 
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communities) for the maintenance of levees through out the Dives. Although the syndicat was 
unable to raise funding for a general drainage project, it did reduce flooding in the Dives area 
because now levees were built and maintained by a single agency.61 
The achievements of the first half of the nineteenth century may well appear limited: a 
couple thousand hectares' worth of drainage in Calvados and only a few hundred in the Dives. 
But if we discount the period between 1789 and 1820 as too tormented politically for long-
term investments, the new institutional structure was able to achieve in three decades what the 
eighteenth-century regime had failed to do in a hundred. The governments which succeeded 
the Old Regime demonstrated remarkable continuity where drainage was concerned. They all 
promoted drainage, and they did so effectively. Their effectiveness resulted from a new distri-
bution of property rights and a new set of political and judicial institutions, and the institutions 
that mattered were the product of revolutionary reform. Thus drainage in Normandy stresses 
the institutional and economic importance of the Revolution of 1789. 
Conclusion 
Throughout the eighteenth century, administrators and investors had tried to increase 
agricultural output by promoting drainage. The record shows the extent of their failure: 
between 1714 and 1783 no significant drainage projects were realized in the generalite of 
Caen. Yet drainage would have been profitable if the market failures had not intervened. In this 
situation. recourse to an administrative solution of the sort adopted after 1789 would have been 
more efficient than the existing legal process. The problem lay with litigation over overlapping 
property rights and the inability of property rights owners to write binding contracts. In theory, 
property rights owners could have bargained among themselves to resolve the externalities, but 
61) AD Calvados, S 1270-1271. 
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any agreement that brought their bargaining to a close could be attacked in court. Because of 
the lack of finality of judicial decisions over customary, law resources were expended on 
repeated attempts to redistribute property rights rather than on making improvements. 
In eighteenth-century Normandy resources were effectively expended on litigation that 
did not foster economic growth. Everyone--except the lawyers of course--was made worse off. 
The Old-Regime government could not resolve the problem, for the government itself could 
not write binding contracts, because drainage concessions could be appealed by private indivi-
duals. Simplifying the property rights that had accumulated since the Middle Ages was politi-
cally impossible within the institutional structure of the Old Regime. Thus the reforms that the 
Old-Regime government undertook to promote drainage simply failed, even though many of 
the problems associated with drainage were well known. Only after 1789 was the resolution of 
the problem within the government's grasp, and then only because of the Revolution's institu-
tional change. 
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Appendix 1 
Maps, Tables and Figures for Chapter 2 
Date 
1702 
1706 
1710 
1714 
1718 
1722 
1726 
1730 
1734 
1738 
1742 
1746 
1750 
1754 
1758 
1762 
1766 
1770 
1774 
1782 
1786 
1790 
1794 
1802 
1806 
1810 
1814 
1818 
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Mortgage Rate Model Estimated Rate Model 
Return Return Return Return Wages Land Number Estimated 
Terriers Troam Terriers Troam Price of Land Interest 
Contracts Rate 
0.21 0.08 0.40 4.45 27 
0.31 0.18 0.40 5.55 30 
0.33 0.21 0.53 0.39 0.40 5.86 13 0.252 
0.29 0.17 0.47 0.27 0.40 5.34 16 0.177 
0.41 0.29 0.46 0.30 0.40 6.94 51 0.093 
0.59 0.40 0.36 0.21 0.50 11.31 10 0.031 
0.44 0.27 0.19 0.04 0.50 8.38 12 0.031 
0.46 0.29 0.32 0.15 0.50 8.63 50 0.043 
0.04 -0.14 -0.13 -0.29 0.50 3.55 7 0.039 
0.38 0 .21 0.06 -0.09 0.50 7.38 32 0.025 
0.60 0.41 0.32 0.17 0.50 11.50 29 0.031 
034 0.17 0.17 -0.01 0.50 6.72 36 0.048 
0.36 0.14 0.17 -0.01 0.66 8.35 28 0.031 
0.39 0.14 0.08 -0.13 0.75 9.61 36 0.027 
0.51 0.25 0.32 0.08 0.75 11.99 17 0.039 
0.56 0.30 0.40 0.15 0.75 13.39 25 0.043 
0.40 0.14 0.33 0.08 0.78 9.99 10 0.047 
0.56 0.27 0.44 0.17 0.87 14.67 10 0.057 
0.61 0.30 0.43 0.14 0.94 16.80 24 0.049 
0.66 0.33 0.68 0.36 1.01 19.40 6 0.125 
0.64 0.31 0.51 0.21 1.06 19.35 17 0.075 
0.78 0.42 0.67 0.34 1.06 25.03 5 0.068 
1.22 0.78 1.57 0.72 1.10 40.17 7 0.089 
0.76 0.39 0.77 0.41 1.19 26.10 14 0.082 
0.23 -0.07 0.39 0.08 1.23 10.04 12 0.109 
0.91 0.48 1.05 0.58 1.27 35 .40 12 0.092 
0.74 0.36 0.89 0.49 1.32 26.69 2 0.111 
0.56 0.21 0.63 0.28 1.36 19.98 7 0.067 
Table 2: Hypothetical Annual Rates of Return for Drainage Projects, 
Wage and Land Price Series 
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Mortgage Rate Model Estimated Rate Model 
Date Rerum Return Return Return Wages Land Number Estimated 
Terriers Troam Terriers Troam Price of Land Interest 
Contracts Rate 
1822 0.88 0.45 0.94 0.50 1.37 35 .05 13 0.064 
1826 0.72 0.33 0.77 0.39 1.40 26.80 24 0.064 
1830 0.84 0.42 0.85 0.43 1.40 33.21 18 0.051 
1834 0.73 0.34 0.70 0.31 1.40 27.36 29 0.044 
1838 0.62 0.25 0.57 0.20 1.41 22.75 43 0.040 
1842 0.74 0.35 0.70 0.31 1.42 28.15 41 0.042 
1846 0.55 0.18 0.50 0.13 1.58 21.99 135 0.036 
1850 0.58 0.22 0.48 0.11 1.44 21.47 32 0.036 
1854 0.75 0.35 0.73 0.32 1.58 31.19 46 0.042 
1858 0.72 0.30 0.66 0.24 1.83 32.75 79 O.Q35 
1862 0.65 0.23 0.62 0.20 2.15 32.87 36 0.040 
1866 0.63 0.22 0.63 0.21 2.19 32.60 41 0.048 
1870 0.50 0.11 0.42 0.23 2.08 24.82 35 0.041 
Table 2 (Continued) 
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SOURCES AND UNITS FORT ABLE 2 
The price of labor is one day's wage for an unfed, unskilled laborer in francs. 
The price of land is in francs per acre (100 square meters). The number of contracts is the 
number of contracts in the notarial records that were used to construct the price average. These 
contracts contained both price and surface data, while others only contained price or suface 
data. 
Footnote 21 explains the construction of the interest rates. 
The price data comes from a variety of sources: 
H. Hauser, Recherches et Documents sur l' Histoire des Prix en France, pp. 160-194. For 
wages from 1700 to 1750. 
G. Perrot, Caen: La Genese d' une Ville Moderne, pp. 1026-1038, for wages from 1750 to 
1789. 
G. Desert, Une Societe Rurale au XIX Siecle, pp. 753-778, for wages from 1805 to 1870. 
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Figure 1 
Land Labor Price Ratio, 1702-1870 
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Figure 2 
Estimated French Interest Rates, 1710-1870, 
in% per year 
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Figure 3 
Rates of Return in the 5% Mortgage Rate Model, 1702-1870, 
in % per vear62 
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Figure 4 
Rates of Return in the Estimated Interest Rate Model, 1710-1870, 
in% per year 
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Chapter 3 
Irrigation in Provence 1700-1860: 
The Costs of Divided Authority 
67 
Introduction 
In this chapter I argue that institutions rather than technology or relative prices blocked 
the development of agriculture in southeastern France, and I show how specific political and 
judicial institutions throttled economic growth. Institutions were important to irrigation for 
two reasons. First, property rights were uncertain and the judicial system was responsible for 
resolving problems with overlapping or conflicting property rights. Second, irrigation projects 
faced severe revenue problems independent of their social profitability. These revenue prob-
lems were due to the inability of developers to commit to announced prices for irrigation rights 
and they are best modeled in terms of a durable goods monopolist problem. 
The first section of the chapter presents the issue and argues that irrigation networks 
built after 1765 significantly raised agricultural output in southeastern France--specifically. in 
the area of Provence that is today the departments of the Vaucluse and the Bouches du Rhone. 
The second part confronts the question of technology and demonstrates that such irrigation net-
works could have been built profitably prior to 1765. the third part analyzes the market failure 
of the early eighteenth century, and the fourth traces institutional changes in the second half of 
the eighteenth century that permitted limited irrigation development before the French Revolu-
tion. The fifth part examines the institutional changes associated with the French Revolution 
and their consequences: the significant development of irrigation in the nineteenth century. 
For the agriculture of southeastern France, irrigation may well have been the most 
important improvement of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.63 Promoters, public 
63) For other parts of France other improvements, such as drainage or enclosures, might have been more 
important. Even in Provence other productivity·increasing innovations may have been available, but irrigation was 
the one most often promoted in the eighteenth and in the nineteenth cenrury. 
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officials, and commentators, both in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, agreed that the 
prosperity of southeastern France depended on irrigation. An eighteenth-century historian, For-
nery, wrote: 
There is in Cavaillon [a small town in southeastern France] considerable com-
merce in artichokes, green peas, garlic and very beautiful fruits . The water of 
the Durance is responsible for this rich produce. This water, as we said above, 
admirably enriches the soil and the inhabitants [of Cavaillon] make a great 
profit from it. .. If the river itself [the Durance] is dangerous, its water by con-
trast is excellent. It carries silt so rich that it makes the most meager lands fer-
tile. The canal of Oppede, which distributes water [from the Durance] to a 
good share of the territory of Cavaillon, is responsible for the best produce in 
the region, and this justifies what I said a~ut the extreme utility of building a 
great irrigation canal across the province. 
In fact, the example of Cavaillon was frequently used to argue for further irrigation develop-
ment both in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Fornery's praise of irrigation was echoed 
by Villeneuve, the prefect of the Bouches du Rhone in the early nineteenth century: 
The advantageous results of this operation [the building of an irrigation canal] 
can not be doubted. The fact that the territory of eighteen communities has 
been fertilized to such an extent that the value of their land has doubled is a 
striking proof of its value .. . Under a burning climate where sometimes nine 
months go by without rain, where the northwest winds blow so frequently, 
where the limestone or sandy soils are made even dryer by the deforestation of 
the mountains, irrigation is a necessity. This is something one cannot repeat 
enough: all the efforts of farmers tend g:swarct irrigation and it should be the 
goal of every improvement in Provence. 
Irrigation increased agricultural productivity by allowing farmers to abandon the tradi-
tiona! one year-crop, one year-fallow rotation. With irrigation farmers could grow crops every 
year because the silt carried in the irrigation canals is a natural fertilizer. Alternatively, if the 
64) Joseph Fomery, Histoire du ComJaJ Venaissin, vol. ill, Dictionaire Geographique. Avignon: Seguin et 
Rownanille, 1903, pp. 501 -502. Fernery's words were echoed in the regional assembly when a new irrigation canal 
was proposed, cf. AC Vaucluse, C 48. 
65) Villeneuve, Encyclopedie des Bouches du Rhone. vol. ill, MliDeille: Ricard, 1825-1829, p. 714. 
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fallow is abandoned and fertilizer increases, one can have two crops a year instead of one. 
Furthermore there is a greater choice of crops that can be grown when irrigation is available 
than when it is not. Thus productivity per acre should double. The land price series also bear 
this out--the price ratio of improved land to unimproved land averages 1.8 between 1815 and 
1855.66 
When land becomes irrigated total factor productivity increases less than productivity 
per acre, for farming methods do not change substantially and as a result inputs other than land 
also double to produce two crops a year. Using sharecropping contracts we can get an estimate 
of the factor shares of all inputs. 67 Sharecropping contracts, for both irrigated and unimproved 
land assigned half of the output to the renter, who provided the labor, and the other half to the 
owner of the land. In these contracts the shares of the other variable inputs (capital) provided 
by renter and landowner is uncertain. If we assume that the renter provided all the capital, we 
can get an upper bound on total factor productivity change. If the renter provided all the capi-
tal, even split share contracts imply that the value of all other inputs is equal to the value of 
land. The proportions of output assigned to renter and owner were the same whether land was 
improved or not suggest that inputs other than land increased by the same proportion as output. 
Total factor productivity can be calculated using different formulas corresponding to 
different assumptions about the production function under study.68 Here I report the result for 
66) The land price ratio was calculiUed from a sample of data from rental and sale contracts for land that I 
collected. The sample will be discussed further in the second section. One should note that eighteenth- and 
nineteenth-century supporters of increased irrigation estimated the rent increase to be 100%. Biases in the sampling 
method lead to a low estimate of the price ratio for two reasons. First, the prices were collected from land sale 
records and sorted according to location, an imperfect measure of irrigation, thus some unirrigated land appears in 
the irrigated series and vice versa. Second, irrigated land prices are gross of capitalized maintenance fees (10% of 
the value of land historically). Thus the actual price of irrigated land was higher than it appears, for more details cf. 
Part 2. 
67) Data from a small sample of share contracts was collected along with the land price data. This sample 
as well as the cash rental contracts give much information on agricultural practices, if when land was not irrigated 
the rule was to fallow every other year, when was irrigated (ferrage), it was cultivated continuously. 
68) See Robert Allen, "Recent Developments in Production Cost and Index Number Theory, with an Ap-
plication to International Differences in the Cost and Efficiency of Steel Making in l907t9," Historish Sozialwissen-
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two such assumptions. If we assume that the production function for agricultural output is 
Leontief then the total factor productivity change due to irrigation was 33%. If we assume that 
the production function for agricultural output is Cobb-Douglas, and that the factor shares were 
one-half for variable inputs and one-half for land, then the total factor productivity change due 
to irrigation was 41%. Oearly in agriculture land is a substitute for labor, a fact that gives 
weight to the second estimate. Therefore the total factor productivity change due to irrigation 
was probably above 33%, a very substantial figure. 
To understand the effect irrigation had on total output we must look at the geography 
of what is today the two departments of the Vaucluse and the Bouches du Rhone in 
southeastern France (see Map 1 in Appendix 3). The river Durance flows between the two 
departments with the Vaucluse to its north and the Bouches du Rhone to its south. The south-
em and western parts of both departments are composed of alluvial plains which are easily 
irrigable. In the middle of this area and on the northern bank of the Durance is the town of 
Cavaillon, from which much of the data--in particular, the land price series--are drawn. 
The single most important source of water in the area for irrigation was, and remains, 
the Durance river. Although the much larger Rhone rivers flows through the area, it cuts below 
too much of Provence to provide affordable irrigation. That leaves the Durance, which pro-
vided roughly 92 cubic meters per second at its lowest point in the summer and often flooded 
in the winter. In the twentieth century the French electrical utility built a large number of dams 
that regularized the flow of water, and increased capacity during the dry months. Such modem 
investments have allowed further development of the irrigated area, but while they were avail-
able before 1900, they were not used in the nineteenth century because they were too 
schaftliche Forclumgen des Zenlrumfur Historische Sozialforschungen. Baud 15, Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1983. pp. 
90-99. 
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expensive. As a result, the area irrigated in the 1860s was close to the maximum.69 
Barral's studies of irrigation in the Vaucluse and the Bouches du Rhone, published in 
1876 and 1878 respectively, offer good data to analyze the chronology of irrigation in the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. In 1875, the total area irrigated for both departments was 
estimated at at least 57,000 hectares, or 16% of the total cultivated area?0 In 1760, the Vau-
cluse had less than 12,000 hectares of irrigated land and this area had been irrigated since the 
late Middle Ages. However, by 1789, irrigated land had increased to 14,600 hectares and by 
1870, to over 20,500 hectares. Nearly all these increases were achieved by drawing from the 
Durance. Thus the area irrigated from the Durance more than doubled between 1760 to 1850, 
going from under 4,000 hectares to 12,400 hectares.71 The data on the Durance is reliable 
because at the Revolution the canals were all organized into associations. In case of drought, 
the priority of claims on water from the Durance was based on the date of construction of the 
canals, with the oldest receiving his allocation first.72 The standard allocation was a liter of 
water per minute per hectare, thus both date of construction and area of irrigation were care-
fully recorded. 
The data allows us to estimate the change in agricultural output as a result of the 
69) After the Revolution, the French government began to closely monitor water use through the Ponls et 
Chaussds administration. Barral used their data to compile his two books on irrigation in the region in the 1870s. 
See Jean Auguste Barral, Lu JrrigaJions dans le DepartemenJ de Vaucluse , 2 vols, Paris: Imprimerie Nationale, 
1877-1878 and, idem, Lu lrrigaJions dans le DepartemenJ des Bouches du Rhone. Paris: Imprimerie Nationale, 
1876. See also Villeneuve, EN:yclopidie, vol. ill, and AD Vaucluse, I Doc., 121. Dams were first built in the South 
of France for the canal of Languedoc in the late seventeenth century and in Provence for an urban canal between 
1857 and 1860 (see Paul Masson, "Le Canal de Provence," in Revue Historiqw de Provence 1. 1901, pp. 350-359 
and 421-437; and Andr~ Maistre, Le Canal De$ Dewc Mus, Canal Royal du Languedoc, J666.J8/0. Toulouse: 
Privat, 1968), but they were not used for irrigation until the twentieth century. 
70) 140,000 American acres. Total cultivated area in the Bouches du Rhone and the Vaucluse was 
356,000 hectares or 880,000 American acres. Barral Les JrrigaJions dans le Vaucluse, pp. 323-334, idem, Les lr-
rigaJions dans les Bouches du Rhone, pp. 83-87, 511 -512. 
71) The irrigated areas for 1789, and 1760, were calculated by subtracting from the lcnown 1870 totals, the 
area irrigated from canals built between 1789 and 1870, and again from those built from 1760 to 1789. 
72) AD Vaucluse, I doc. 221. 
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development of irrigation after 1760. To evaluate total output changes we must know the 
increase in area irrigated, not only for the Durance in the Vaucluse (a figure that is available), 
but also from other sources, and in the Bouches du Rhone. The increase in irrigation from other 
sources is not known precisely, but it can be estimated. I did so under three different 
hypotheses, the first being the most conservative and the last the most optimistic. The conser-
vative estimate assumes that increases in irrigation other than from the Durance in the Vau-
cluse were negligible. This scenario is unduly pessimistic--it underestimates the increases in 
irrigation because a number of other projects did occur. The second assumes that the Durance 
was the only source of increases in irrigation and that the Bouches du Rhone's increases were 
of the same proportion as those in the Vaucluse. This hypothesis is still conservative because 
most of the irrigation development in the Bouches du Rhone, except for the canal of Craponne, 
occurred after 1760, but it is oo doubt closest to the truth. The final estimate assumes that the 
ratio of irrigation from the Durance developed after 1760 to all irrigation from the Durance in 
the Vaucluse is the true measure of the growth in irrigated area in the whole area. This last esti-
mate is optimistic because other sources of water, such as the Sorgues, were already well used 
in the early eighteenth century. The other necessary data are the increases in output per hectare 
due to irrigation, they can be taken to be either 80% (using land price ratio estimates) or 100% 
(from eighteenth- and nineteenth-century sources). Table 3 below displays the output change 
calculated as the change in output per hectare times the ratio of increases in irrigated area to 
total cultivated area. 
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Total output Change 
Hypothesis Acreage Acreage Irrigation Irrigation 
Change Change Output/Hectare Output/Hectare 
In Hectares In Percent Increase=80% Increase= 100% 
Total Increase Equal 14,500 4 .0% 3.2% 4.0% 
to Known Increase 
Total Increase in Proportion 23,630 6.5% 5.2% 6.5% 
to Increase in the Vaucluse 
Total Increase in Proportion 38,850 10.8% 8.7% 10.8% 
to Increase in Durance use 
Table 3 
Estimates of Output Increases due to Irrigation 
Output over all the cultivated area of the region thus seems to have increased from 5% 
to 7% as a result of the extension of irrigation between 1760 and 1860. Qualitatively it is 
important to note that land improved as well, for irrigation allowed farmers a wider variety of 
crops. Most important of all, in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, irrigation was the only 
improvement that eliminated the biennial fallow in southern France. It is no wonder that the 
productivity increases that came in irrigation's wake were quite significant. 
The benefits of irrigation were well known long before 1765, when the development of 
irrigation began to accelerate. Indeed, some of the canals of southeastern France dated back to 
the Middle Ages?3 Ignorance could not have been the obstacle to irrigation in the early 
eighteenth century, and we thus must look elsewhere to explain why it developed so slowly 
before 1765. One simple answer is it was simply not profitable to carry out irrigation schemes 
before 1765. To examine this hypothesis, we must tum to the issue of hypothetical rates of 
return. 
73) The canals of Saint-Julien in Cavaillon and l 'Hopital in Avignon were built in the thirteenth and four-
teenth centuries. See Map 2 in Appendix 3. 
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Relative Prices and Profitability 
The most plausible explanation to the lack of irrigation in the early eighteenth century 
was that the returns to irrigation were low before 1760 and rose thereafter because of relative 
price changes or institutional refonn. Using data from projects built both in the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries, we shall see that relative price changes were not the detennining factor in 
the timing of irrigation development, but before doing so, we must first examine the issues of 
technological change and credit 
Technology 
The technology of irrigation raises three important issues. First, we must define what 
were the important inputs in canal construction. Second, we must detennine whether the tech-
niques of irrigation canal building changed between 1700 and 1860. If there were signi tic ant 
changes in canal construction techniques, then the effects of that change on costs would have 
to be taken into account when estimating hypothetical rates of return. Third, we must examine 
the risks involved in canal building. If risks were high, premiums might be necessary to attract 
investors to the development of irrigation networks 
The level of technological sophistication of irrigation projects in use today varies 
greatly, but in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries the technology of irrigation was 
quite simple. Throughout the period, the primary inputs to canal construction were land, 
unskilled labor, and skilled labor. Although after 1880, dams and lined main canals (to avoid 
seepage losses) were increasingly used in water projects in southeastern France, before this 
date canals were unlined, and all water flowed by gravity. It also seems that the technology 
used to build irrigation canals was very simple, and had little to do with the sophisticated tech-
niques that evolved with the rise of transportation canals. Indeed by the middle of the 
eighteenth century transportation canals in France involved locks, dams, bridges and complex 
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water management.14 None of these techniques affected irrigation, even in the nineteenth cen-
tury. One reason was that as late as 1870, m~ch more land could have been irrigated using such 
simple technologies, had there been water in the Durance to draw. Thus, except for a few 
bridges where skilled labor and other inputs were required for stone masonry, irrigation pro-
jects thus required mostly unskilled labor for digging ditches. 
As one might gather from the simplicity of the inputs, technical change in irrigation 
canal construction was insignificant. For irrigation canals, construction techniques changed 
very little until late in the nineteenth century. Other techniques were available, but they were 
not used in irrigation construction because they were too costly. The technological stasis in 
canal construction may well have extended back well before the eighteenth century. The tech-
niques used in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries were, from a technological perspective, 
similar to those used to build the canals of Saint-Julien and l'Hopital, both constructed in the 
thirteenth century, or the canal of Craponne built in the sixteenth century_75 From the thir-
teenth to the nineteenth century, all these canals were unlined dirt ditches, where water flowed 
by gravity alone. The only dams in use, which captured the water from the Durance river, were 
flimsy dirt levees, and they had be rebuilt frequently. These dams only diverted part of the flow 
of the river but made no attempt to retain water behind a reservoir. Stone masonry was used 
only for bridges. 
Further proof of the absence of technical constraints on irrigation development is the 
canal of Boisgelin. Begun in 1773, it was to become over a fifty year span of intermittent con-
struction the largest project in the Bouches du Rhone during the early nineteenth century. 
74) A valuable contemporary source on eighteenth-cenrury canal technology is Delalande, Des Canaux de 
NavigaJion. Paris: Dessaint, l n7. See also Andre Maistre, Le Canal des Deux Mers chapter 3. 
75) Jean Rigaud, Le Canal de Crapone. Etude Historique et Juridique RelaJive aux Concessions 
Complexes des Arrosage Comnuutaux d'/stre et Grans. Aix en Provence, 1934; Roget Caillet, Le Canal de 
Carpentras. Carpentras: Imprimerie Batailler, 1925, chapters II and ill. 
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Politics demanded that the canal go through the rock of Orgon in a long tunnel that took ten 
years to build and was extremely expensive.16 By the French Revolution no significant amount 
of water had flowed beyond Orgon, although some irrigation did occur above the town. The 
architect and director of the project, Brun, resigned over the issue of the building of the tunnel. 
In the nineteenth century, promoters of further development ascribed the canal 's disastrous 
financial situation to the ill-advised decision to continue digging through the rock of Orgon. 
Indeed, a slightly longer route would have allowed the canal to bypass Orgon and made the 
project much cheaper.17 Until 1860, no other irrigation canal ever made use of tunnels or 
dams, in fact none were necessary as there was much land that could be irrigated without such 
expensive investments. 
The returns to agricultural development could probably not have supported very 
expensive and innovative technologies. In contrast to the low levels of technological sophisti-
cation utilized in agricultural projects stands a set of urban projects that overlap both geograph-
ically and temporally with those under study. As urbanization progressed in the nineteenth cen-
tury, the demands on the water supply outside agriculture increased and some projects had two 
functions: one agricultural and the other urban. The construction of the canal of Marseille 
(1840-1848), a joint urban and rural water supply project, offers a good example of the techno-
logies that were available in the middle of the nineteenth century but that were not used in agri-
culture. The canal of Marseille featured a large dam and a permanent reservoir, many bridges, 
and was underground for 25% of its length. The project was financed by the city of Marseille, 
which attempted to sell excess water to landowners. The city also wanted the farmers to pay a 
76) The runnel swallowed over 50% of all the expenditure on the canal prior to the French Revolution. 
BM Mejanes, Ms. 834(848) and AN H1 1261 
77) Villeneuve, Encyclopedie, vol. 3, pp. 714-718. 
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share of the building costs equivalent to their share of the water. This led to a price for water 
15 times the cost of water on other agricultural projects. As a result, the scheme to retail excess 
water to farmers failed and the only buyers were produce growers who supplied the town 
market.78 
The final issue concerns technological risk. Although irrigation technology did not 
change, it is possible that over time learning by doing led to smaller engineering errors. The 
resulting reduction in technological risk would affect investor's decisions because investors 
might have demanded premiums if the technological risks were high. Yet, if we define techno-
logical risk as the risks associated with the construction phase of the project, then that risk was 
very limited. Even in the eighteenth century, the relationship between technology and cost was 
well established. Engineering costs could be predicted with a good deal of confidence because 
of the experience gained from transportation canals, which were much more demanding tech-
nologically and thus riskier. Irrigation projects were by contrast quite simple, even when there 
. . d d 1 d 'th . 79 were unanuc1pate e ays an costs WI proJects, 
It thus appears that between 1700 and 1860 technological change in irrigation canal 
construction was limited, and the canals developed from 1760 to 1860 are all similar techno-
logically. Technological risk did not threaten irrigation projects. Neither risk nor technology 
therefore constrained the supply of irrigation. Why then did water remain unused until past the 
1850s? The answer clearly lies beyond the simple issue of technology. 
78) Paul Masson, Encyclopidie des Bouches dw Rhone, Vol. 7, Paris: Honore Champion, 1929-1930, pp. 
162-167. The total length of the canal was 100 kilometers and it was underground for over 25 kilometers. This ca-
nal ran through the most rugged pan of eastern Provence to deliver water to Marseille. 
79) The history of the canal de Boisgelin shows that risk was small. 1be canal of Boisgelin was the most 
ambitious canal realized Jrior to the Revolution. The engineer, Brun, had warned of the very large costs associated 
with the tunnel necessary to go through the rock of Orgon. He did not, however, doubt that the tunnel could be 
built. a later section will discuss the political and institutional factors that raised costs on the canal of Boisgelin, cf. 
BM Mejanes, Ms. 840(853). 
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Credit 
Since the construction of irrigation canals involves significant outlays of capital, credit 
was very important for irrigation development One reason for the lack of canal building in the 
eighteenth century might therefore be insufficiently developed capital markets. This argument 
appears plausible because Old-Regime France lacked a well-developed, centralized, govern-
ment credit market, and there were nearly no banks. 80 The absence of a well-established 
government credit market raises questions out of the scope of this paper. Yet the absence of 
institutions commonly associated with credit markets suggests an institutional failure--in the 
case of the absence of a government bond market, the unreliability of state as a borrower--
rather than the absence of capital. Furthennore, I want to argue that the credit problem is 
largely moot in the case of irrigation. 
Although the French state found it increasingly difficult to borrow money in the late 
eighteenth century, some local institutions, such as estates and city councils, were successful in 
bonding themselves and they could borrow significant amounts of money. They could gather 
credit for the state and for public works projects, as the case of the canal of the Midi demon-
strates. 81 Similar institutions existed in southeastern France in the eighteenth century, and they 
did play an important role in the financing of some irrigation canals. 
In addition to public sources of capital, well-developed credit markets existed in rural 
80) See Pierre Goubert, iDAnc~n Regime, vol. II. chapter 7 for an introduction to French finance in the 
eighteenth century. For a deeper investigation of eighteenth-century credit, see Guy Chaussinant-Nogaret. us 
cinanc~rs dM iang~~Kedoc cw usff~ Siecle. Pllris: S.E.Y.P.E.N. 1976. 
81) The cmal. of the Midi was primarily financed by the estates of Languedoc through loans. The project 
was promoted by the state, which negotiated with the estates for their support. The state did not have the capital to 
support the construction of the canal and its credit reputation was poor. The estates by contrast could easily borrow 
the money necessary to build the canal. See Robert Forster, The Nobility o{Tou.lowse in the EighletmJh Ctmlu.ry: A 
Social and Economic Stll.dy. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1960, pp. 66-74; William Beilc, Absolu.tism 
and Society in Sevtmleenth Centu.ry France, State Power and Provincial Aristocracy in Langu.edoc. New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 1985, pp. 292-297; Andre Maistre, Le Canal des Deii.X Mers, Chapter 4 . 
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France. These marlcets were based on mortgages of land and other immovables, which had low 
default risk. Furthermore, in the case of southeastern France, there were at least two other 
sources of funds for irrigation projects: Jews and the high nobility. There is evidence that Jews 
were directly involved in making loans to at least one developer. These loans did not have the 
collateral of land, and the developer paid an interest rate double that of the mortgage rate--10 
to 11% as compared to 5%. The high nobility was also able to finance projects directly in the 
case of many of the smaller projects. The high nobility put its vast wealth resources at the 
disposal of canal developers in other instances as well, perhaps because irrigation development 
did not carry the stigma attached to many other forms of investment. 82 
Fmally, in the case of agricultural improvements it is important to note that the single 
largest source of capital in France, landowners, could be mobilized outside any credit market. 
Indeed there existed a number of contract alternatives that avoided Old-Regime institutional 
problems such as state confiscation. The most obvious of these alternatives were joint stock 
arrangements that were attempted in the case of irrigation. 83 The reasons for the failure of 
these alternatives can not be ascribed directly to issues of credit availability and will thus be 
explored in the third part of this paper. Therefore, it appears reasonable to assume in the 
hypothetical profit calculations that there were sufficient sources of capital (though not neces-
sarily market sources) to carry out the irrigation projects. 
Data 
82) See Paul Masson, "Le Canal de Provence·• pp. 423-425; Elie .. La Speculation sous la Regence: 
I' Affaire du Canal d' Avignon ~laMerI .. in Provence Historique. 3 (1953), pp. 112-113; Reboulet .. Construction du 
Canal de Crillon, .. in Mimoires de l'Acadhnie d" s~luKseK 1914, pp. 46-47 in the case of the canal ofCrillon, 25% 
the construction costs were loaned by Jews and another 25% by nobles, bourgeois and landowners. 
83) Landowners were the largest source of credit in France because they could borrow money through 
mortgages. Had developers been able to interest more than a small number of landowners ex ante, the credit problem 
would never have existed. 
80 
To establish that irrigation projects would have been profitable before 1760, I have 
estimated the level of hypothetical profits th~t projects, realized after 1760, would have earned 
had they been started earlier. The results will be presented under two forms: rates of return and 
cost benefit ratios. The calculations require two kinds of data--price series for the inputs and 
outputs of canal construction and factor shares for each canal. The data for factor shares is 
available from published sources on canal construction. These sources give sufficiently 
detailed accounts of the costs that it is unnecessary to go to the archival records, while the 
necessary wage and land price series were constructed from original archival data. The only 
other series necessary is one of interest rates. Unfortunately, time series of interest rates are 
lacking for the eighteenth and nineteenth century. One possible source of data is the mortgage 
market. Notarial records of land sales often contained mortgage rates. Since land sales were 
rarely paid in full, the seller would extend a mortgage to the buyer and the mortgage was often 
directly included in the sales contract. The mortgage rates from these land sales contracts 
remain stable at 5% through the period 1700-1855. An alternative method of estimating 
interest rates involves shadow interest rates constructed from nineteenth-century French data 
and from British consol rates that span the period. 84 I ran the calculations of rates of return and 
cost benefit ratios using both sets of interest rates, and the results do not depend on which 
series of interest rates is used in the calculations. 
I was able to construct two different wage series for labor. The data is centered on 
Avignon, a town 15 miles from Cavaillon where the land price series was collected. 85 The 
labor data consists of wage bills from the account books of religious institutions and municipal 
84) cf. Chapter 2, p. 22, footnote 21. 
85) For any year the wages are identical across sources in the area. This correlation suggests a consider-
able labor mobility and allows me to use data from two different towns. 
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offices for unfed labor. 86 The data are relevant for this study because they are drawn from the 
very professions involved in canal construction and maintenance. Religious institutions, 
whose account books I used, were part owners of medieval canals and they hired some of the 
labor used for maintenance work on these canals. The data have been sorted into two series: 
skilled and unskilled workers (see Figure 5 and Table 7, at the end of the text). The first , 
unskilled labor, is composed of agricultural laborers, road gangs and levee maintenance work-
ers. The second is composed of skilled workers: masons, carpenters, miners, and gang 
bosses.87 
Because canal and other construction accounts do not break down the costs in a very 
detailed fashion (except in the case of labor where the accounts are more specific) it is difficult 
to get time series for such things as quarried stone, lime, wood and other material inputs. How-
ever the since material inputs other than labor were only used on bridges and other necessary 
buildings, land and labor composed nearly all the costs of canal construction. Therefore, wages 
will be our deflators of the input costs of canal construction other than land. Our deflator for 
the price of output (revenue) will be the difference between the price of irrigated land and the 
price of dry land. The series come from Cavaillon, the community with the largest amount of 
irrigated land in southeastern France both in the eighteenth and in the nineteenth century. The 
choice of Cavaillon allows us to ignore any local market effects on the price of improved land. 
If anything, the fact that Cavaillon had more land irrigated than other areas should lead to a 
86) Ma.t of the workers we:re employed by religious institutions that received food was paid not on a per 
diem basis, bu1 on a monthly or yearly basis. Not knowing how many days a year's wages consisted of for any 
given year I did not use wage bills of workers who received food as part of their compensation. 
87) The data also reflects partially at least the extraordinary levels of inflation associated with the French 
Revolution. unlike most series previously published. One excellent source for wage data is Rene Baehrel, Ul'll! 
Croissance, La Basse Provence Rwale (1650-1789), Paris: S.E.V.P.E.N., 1962. Baehrel's data unfortunately stop in 
1789. The sources used for wages we:re AC Avignon. CC 550 to CC 805; AD Vaucluse, H Bompas 182-185; H Cor-
deliers Avignon 62-64; E Ste Marthe E 103, BM Cecano, Ms 5659; and A. Chabert, Essais sw II! Mouvemenl d£s 
ReveruLS er d£ I' Activite Economique en France d£ 1789 a 1820. Paris: De Medicis, 1930, pp. 250-260. 
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downward bias in the price of land irrigated and thus to an underestimate of potential canal 
revenues. 
88 
The data for the land price series are taken from a sample of land-sale and land-lease 
contracts that were negotiated between 1700 and 1855. The sample comes from notarial 
archives. This kind of data has already been described in Chapter 2 but the series for irrigation 
are superior because the notarial archives are more plentiful in the Vaucluse than in Calvados. 
Indeed, although the area of Cavaillon is smaller than the area covered by the sample in Calva-
dos, the local notary always had more contracts in every year than the one for Troam.89 
There were at least four active notarial etudes (practices) in Cavaillon between 1700 
and 1855. However, gathering the complete set of land contracts for Cavaillon from 1700 to 
1855 would have taken at least two years' research. Sampling was therefore necessary. The 
data is a complete sample of both land sale and land rental contracts from one etude once every 
five years from 1700 to 1855. From 1700 to 1720 I sampled two etudes because the first had 
too few land contracts. The total sample of observations contains 1781 contracts. 
To obtain both an irrigated and a non-irrigated land price series, it was necessary to 
distinguish sales and rental of irrigated land. Until 1800, such sorting was relatively easy since 
the contracts all contained detailed information about the quality of the land. However, during 
the French Revolution, notaries ceased recording such information regularly. What I had to do 
therefore was to rely on location data to distinguish between irrigated and dry land after 1800. 
88)In eighteenth-a21tury France transponation costs were high, if irrigation projects delivered water to 
areas that b.d none, goods that had to be imponed at a high costs might become produced locally. These goods, 
such as fodder, might have commanded a very high price. At least 15% of the area of Cavaillon was irrigated before 
the eighteenth century. The large area irrigated suggests that most irrigation specific goods would have commanded 
only a competitive price. 
89) The relative abWldance of data in Provence can be ascribed to two factors. First, notarial activity was 
older and better established in the South than in the Nonh of France. Second, the average field was smaller in the 
South (an area of diversified agriculture) than in the Nonh (an area primarily devoted to cattle raising), and there 
were a series of large estate break ups in Cavaillon in the middle of the eighteenth century. 
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Such sorting by location is imperfect, making the irrigated series a downward estimate of irri-
gated land prices and the dry series an upward estimate of the price of dry land after 1800. 
The land prices were estimated using a simple procedure that allowed to take into 
account data from both the rental contracts--that predominated in the eighteenth century--and 
the sales contracts--that predominated in the nineteenth century. For rental contracts the value 
of a transaction was computed by capitalizing the rent using the mortgage rate. For sales the 
value was simply the price. For each year and for each type of land (dry or irrigated), average 
prices were calculated as the sum of the value of all transactions divided by the sum of the 
number of ares (0.024 acres) sold for each type of land. Each of the 64 estimated prices rely on 
at least 15 contracts. The series are displayed in Figure 6.90 
To calculate hypothetical profits I also needed data on the specific costs and revenues 
of the canals that were built in both the eighteenth and the nineteenth century. The costs 
include both the amount of labor expended and the amount of land used. The revenues associ-
ated with the supply of irrigation are equal to the increase in the value of all the newly irrigated 
parcels. The data is available for two eighteenth-century projects (Cabedan-Neuf and Crillon) 
and for two projects proposed in the eighteenth century but not realized until the nineteenth 
(Plan Oriental, Carpentras).91 While there is insufficient data to estimate profit from most 
other eighteenth- and nineteenth-century projects, the canals for which data is available are 
representative of all canals built in the eighteenth and nineteenth century, in terms of size, loca-
tion, and timing. The canal of Carpentras is as large as any other canal in Provence and the 
90) Figures and maps are displayed in Appendix 2, all the data appears also in tables in Appendix 
2. 
91) The canal of Cabedan-Neuf irrigated 600 hectares in and around Cavaillon and was built from 1764 to 
1766; the canal of Crill on irrigated 1,000 hectares around Avignon and was completed in 1777. The canal of Plan 
Oriental was another canal in Cavaillon it watered 800 hectares to the north of Cavaillon, and was built in 1823. 
Carpentras was a very large canal built in the 1850s that irrigated more than 4,500 hectares. 
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smaller Cabedan, Crillon and Plan Oriental are representative of most other projects, all the 
canals are displayed in Maps 2 and 3, in Appe~dix 2. 92 
Actual cost figures were allocated, between construction, digging and land. Oearly, 
land and labor (skilled and unskilled) were not the only inputs of canal construction, however 
these three inputs were the most significant, and they were the only ones for which price series 
could be constructed. Moreover canal construction accounts rarely itemized costs beyond 
excavation (terracement) and skilled construction (ouvrages d' arts). As the former was done 
by unskilled labor, I divided the those costs by the wage for unskilled labor for the period in 
which the project was carried out to get an an estimate of the quantity of labor employed. 
Skilled construction involved the building of bridges for roads over the canals and aqueducts 
for the canal over small rivers and valley, such jobs were clearly the domain of skilled masons 
and stone cutters. I assigned all skilled construction and administrative costs to skilled labor, 
an assignment that greatly simplified the rates of return calculations. The simplification is 
acceptable--if we assume that there were no significant changes in the demand for stone--
because the primary input of skilled construction other than labor was quarried stone. Quarry-
ing was an extractive industry that required only skilled labor, and some transportation, thus 
the cost of quarried stone should closely follow the price of labor. An estimate for the quantity 
of skilled labor employed was derived in the same fashion as for unskilled labor except that the 
wages of skilled labor were used. 
1be amount of land required for canal construction was found by calculating the area 
covered by a band 15 meters wide and as long as the canal and its main branches. This pro-
cedure simplified our calculations, of the area occupied by canals. Canals decrease in width 
92) The complete description of all the irrigation canals appears in J.A Barral's two works on irrigation in 
Provence: Les Irrigations dans le saucl~Me and Les Irrigations dans les Bouches du Rhont!. 
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from beginning to end. The land occupied by a canal is the sum of the section of the canal plus 
the width of its banks. The choice of 15 m~ters as the width of the band occupied by canals 
biases profit estimates downward because even the main canal of Carpentras--the largest canal 
in my sample--was only 7.5 meters wide, and it occupied an area less than 17 meters across for 
the first quarter of its length. All the rest of the main canal was under five meters across, and 
occupied an area less than ten meters wide, and its branches were even smaller. All of the other 
canals were less than four meters at their widest and their branches were much smaller than 
that. The assumption that all canals were of the same width simplified calculations greatly. 
Moreover this simplifying assumption, by reducing the estimated profits, can only strengthen 
any finding that irrigation was indeed profitable before 1760. 
Canal 
(date of 
completion) 
Cabedan Neuf (1767) 
Cabedan Neuf ( 1767) 
Crillon ( 1779) 
Plan Oriental (1821) 
Carpentras (1857) 
Land Total 
Irrigated Construction 
In Ares Costs 
50,000 822,300 
27,000 172,490 
100,000 400,000 
59,000 138,595 
500,000 5,297,011 
Table 4 
Canal Cost Data93 
l Canal Costs (in nominal terms) 
Capitalized 
Maintenance 
Costs 
97,200 
97,200 
400,000 
100,000 
100,000 
93) Sources for T8ble 3 are as follows. For the first estimate of the costs of Cabedan Neuf, J. A. Barral, 
Les lrrigalicM dans le Vauchue, pp. 539-544. For the second estimate of the costs of Cabedan Neuf, Syndicat du 
Canal de Cabedan-Neuf, Archives et Documenls 1230·1883, Cavaillon: Imprimerie Mistral, 1883 pp. 45-52. For 
the canal of Crillon. Reboulet, Le Canal de Crillon pp. 37 40; and J. A. Barral, Les Irrigations dans le Vaucluse, 
pp. 326-327. For Plan Oriental, Andre Martel, "Les Origines du Canal de Plan Oriental," in Actes du Congres des 
Societis Savanles. 1955, pp. 394-395; and J. A. Barral, Les Irrigations dans le Vaucluse , pp. 545-547. For Carpen-
tras, R. Caillet, Le Canal de Carpentras, vol. 2, pp. 199-201 ; and J. A. Barral, Les Irrigations dans le Vaucluse , pp. 
326. 
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I ITEMIZED COSTS 
Canal Years Skilled Unskilled Land 
(date of Under Man-days Man-days Requirements 
completion) Construction per year per year in Are 
Cabedan Neuf (1767) 2 88,815 73,053 2,700 
Cabedan Neuf (1767) 2 21,410 19,824 2,700 
Crillon ( 1779) 3 35,088 41,190 4,950 
Plan Oriental ( 1821) 2 63,561 46,631 975 
Carpentras ( 1857) S~ - - -
first 3 years 61,341 224,242 9,666 
last 3 years 221,852 112,403 7,329 
TableS 
Canal Construction Accounts 
Tables 4 and 5 display in condensed form all the project specific data used in the con-
struction of hypothetical profit streams. Although there are only four canals surveyed, they 
represent between 20% and 30% of the newly irrigated area. 
Two more assumptions are necessary to simplify the calculation of profit rates. In the 
first place I disregarded certain revenues accruing to canals that are difficult to estimate. I also 
double-counted certain costs that are already partially taken into account in the price series. 
Both these assumptions bias the rates of return downward and make it more difficult to show 
that there was a market failure in irrigation and thus strengthen my findings. 
The revenues I disregarded came from accruing from the sale of water power rights on 
the canal to mill owners. To be sure mills were an important source of revenues for some 
canals. They brought in revenues equal to one-sixth of maintenance costs on the canal of Cril-
lon. Each large mill was itself worth alx>ve 20,000 livres in the eighteenth century or more 
than 5% of the cost of the canal.95 The size and value of mills varied greatly and the value of a 
94) Carpentras was a very large canal, for the first three years work was focused on the main canal and 
only in the next three years were branches built. Cf. R. Caillet, Le Canal de Carpentras, vol. 1, pp. 69-70. 
96) AD Vaucluse, S Usines et CoiUs d'Eau, Avignon, canal de Crillon (1820). The series S was being 
classified and sorted at the time I looked through it thus no precise references can be given, however the canal of 
Crillon's archives in that series amounted to one box and Cavaillon's to six. 
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mill is only a panial indicator for the rent of the fall, which accrues to the canal owner. There-
fore one would need not only the rental contracts of the mill but also their agreement with the 
canal, to know what they paid for the fall. The archival research effort to secure rental contracts 
would thus be very large for little gain. Obviously the omission will push my hypothetical rates 
of return downward. 
The costs I double-counted were maintenance costs. Some maintenance costs already 
appear in the price of irrigated land. Indeed the price of a particular piece of irrigated land is 
equal to the discounted stream of profits from using that land minus the capitalized value of 
whatever maintenance costs are assessed on that land. If all canal organizations assessed all 
land uniformly there would be no need to double count maintenance costs. Such uniformity, 
though, was far from prevalent in Cavaillon, where each canal had a different organization 
dealing with maintenance. Each organization assessed landowners on a yearly basis for contri-
butions, but they did not assess land uniformly, either over time or across parcels. Thus the 
land price series only reflect maintenance costs as assessed by the institutions governing canals 
in Cavaillon. It was clearly wrong to assume that the maintenance costs already affecting the 
irrigated price series are the correct ones for all projects. As a result it seemed best to assume 
that the price series reflected the discounted future revenues from land and account for mainte-
nance costs explicitly. To do this and to simplify the calculation of internal rates of return I 
assumed that the developers created a sinking fund to pay for the future maintenance costs. 
One reason for this procedure is that it greatly simplifies the calculation of internal rates of 
return. The double counting of maintenance costs also created a downward bias in the rate of 
return estimates. 
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Hypothetical Cost-Benefit Calculations 
The hypothetical cost-benefit calculations are displayed in Tables 8, 9, and 10 and in 
Figures 7, 8, and 9 in Appendix 2. I estimated both benefit-cost ratios and internal rates of 
return. The conclusions are identical and do not depend on which interest rate series was used 
for the calculations. 
All projects were profitable during nearly the entire period under study. But, the pro-
jects were more profitable in the early eighteenth century when they were not carried out than 
in the nineteenth century when they were. Although some projects are always more profitable 
than others, changes in profit rates are similar over the entire period for each project so that the 
profitability of an irrigation canal did not seem to depend on the scale of the project. Because 
the hypothetical profits of projects built in the eighteenth century are similar to those of pro-
jects built in the nineteenth century, it is unlikely that changes in technology played a major 
role in irrigation development Otherwise the later projects should have been much more 
profitable. 
The highest profits come in the early eighteenth century ( 1700-1730). In fact, the pro-
jects were hypothetically more profitable during this period than during any subsequent one, as 
Table 6 below shows. 
Average Hypothetical Internal Rates of Return 
in Percent per Annum 
Period 1700-30 1735-55 1760-85 1790-1820 1820-55 
Cabedan-Neuf (1767) 113.0 32.5 77.8 11.0 63.3 
Cabedan Neuf (1767) 60.0 2.1 35.3 -16.0 24.2 
Crill on ( 1779) 91.8 33.8 68.6 10.7 57.8 
Plan Oriental (1821) 126.9 49.9 104.0 25.3 78.9 
Carpentras (1857) 32.0 13.4 30.0 -1.4 25.0 
Estimated Interest Rate 10.7 3.8 7.1 7.8 4 .3 
Table 6 
Hypothetical Internal Rates of Return by Period 
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In the middle of the eighteenth century, (1735-1755) projects were less profitable than at any 
other time except for the Revolutionary period. Yet a number of projects built after 1760 were 
proposed during this period, suggesting that investors, at least, found it profitable to participate 
in irrigation development. The last decades of the Old Regime (1760-1785) show high internal 
rates of return and high benefit-cost ratios. The rates of the late eighteenth century were in fact 
on average higher than those of the nineteenth century when most of the development actually 
took place. After 1785, the rates of return dropped until 1820, no doubt because of the uncer-
tainties provoked by the Revolution. 
The hypothetical rates of return all suggest that a low level of profits cannot explain 
why more irrigation canals were not built before the late eighteenth century. The presence of 
significant profits through most of the eighteenth century, and in particular during the years 
1700-1730 suggest that changes in relative prices were not responsible for the late development 
of irrigation in southeastern France. During most of the eighteenth century, rates of return were 
in fact higher than those of the nineteenth century. Yet irrigation development was much more 
limited from 1700 to 1789 than it was from 1820 to 1860. Some sort of a market failure in the 
supply of irrigation must have been at work in the eighteenth century. Indeed, despite the fact 
that hypothetical rates of return before 1760 were well above both the estimated interest rate 
and the mortgage rate, no project was undertaken before that date. The discrepancy is even 
greater before 1730. The market failure cannot be ascribed to a lack of acumen on the part of 
eighteenth-century French investors, for as we shall see, entrepreneurs, landowners and the 
wealthy elites proposed a number of irrigation projects in this period. 
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History and Institutions: the Early Eighteenth Century 
The real obstacle to irrigation lay with gathering property rights and internalizing 
benefits. As with drainage in Normandy, irrigation required a very specific set of property 
rights. To gather these property rights, eighteenth-century developers needed to bargain with a 
large number of institutions and individuals. The absence of eminent domain made the task 
more difficult because organizations or individuals had effective veto power over their projects. 
The number of veto players led in tum to problems of strategic behavior and litigation. The 
problem with veto players was aggravated by the fact that both property rights and the author-
ity of institutions were uncertain. 
Nor were these the only problems. Irrigation is plagued by the durable goods mono-
polist problem, which makes it difficult to entice future beneficiaries (landowners) to bear con-
struction risks. The problem lies in the difficulty of devising a time-consistent price path that 
gives landowners incentives to join an irrigation project before construction is finished. Irriga-
tion developers thus faced a morass of institutional problems that the state was powerless to 
resolve. 
Gathering Property Rights 
Let us examine the problems one by one beginning with property rights. Obviously, 
the developer of an irrigation project has to have the right to draw a minimum amount of water 
from a specific location on a river for consumptive use. He also has to install the network of 
canals that will carry the water from the river to potential users, and building the network will 
require some form of right of eminent domain. One often assumes the existence of either a 
unique source of property rights to water or many competing sources for such property rights. 
In eighteenth-century France, however, property rights were highly dispersed, and a developer 
often had to bargain with several monopolists before he had a 'usable' property right. 
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In Provence, the problems of bargaining over water rights and eminent domain rights 
were severe. Let us first examine the question of water rights. In the eighteenth century, the 
primary source of water for irrigation in the region was the Durance river. The king of France 
had a monopoly right to grant new irrigation rights from the Durance. The king's right was 
limited by those of individuals and institutions who in the Middle Ages had acquired inherit-
able monopoly rights to draw water from various points on the river. In the seventeenth and 
eighteenth century the monopoly nature of these rights was challenged by new royal grants of 
water in the same area.96 The validity and extent of grants was a legal question, and expensive 
suits were fought by owners of grants in the early eighteenth century. Significant transaction 
costs were involved with settling uncertain property rights in the rent-seeking court system of 
the eighteenth century. Until the issue was decided (in 1733) the validity of both medieval and 
more recent royal grants was uncertain. 
A related set of transaction costs involved eminent domain rights. If the eminent 
domain rights belong to overlapping authorities--as was the case in eighteenth century 
Provence--each authority has a credible veto power, and each may attempt to appropriate the 
entire surplus generated by a potential irrigation project. This very thing occurred frequently in 
Old-Regime Provence and led to significant transaction costs. In such a setting the Coase 
"theorem" no longer holds and there is no guarantee that an efficient outcome will be reached . 
In fact the allocation of authority and property rights in eighteenth-century France prevented 
the efficient development of irrigation as the historical section will show. 
Irrigation and Commitment 
96) On ownership of usable water see Andre Maistre, Le Canal des Deux Mers, pp. 51-52. On conflicts 
over monopoly rights see AC Cavaillon, BB 20, 21. 
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The second set of problems faced by potential suppliers of irrigation is inherent to the 
industry itself. To secure credit before a project occurs, a developer prefers to make landown-
ers sign contingent contracts committing them to buying irrigation rights once the project goes 
through. Associated with this commitment contract is an announced price path that consists of 
a price charged for water bought before the project is built and another price--or set of prices--
charged after the project is finished. Theoretically, however, there exist no credible price 
announcements that make it a dominant strategy for landowners to sign the commitment con-
tract. Quite to the contrary, in the absence of institutions committing the developer to time-
inconsistent price paths, the developer will sell no contracts before building his cana1.97 The 
problems faced by irrigation developers have been modeled in an extensive theoretical litera-
ture on time consistency, commitment. Models of the durable goods monopoly problem are 
closest to the problems faced by irrigation. 98 
Models of the durable goods monopolist are set in discrete time. At each period the 
monopolist must announce a vector of prices, which he claims will prevail from now until the 
end of the game. The question then is what vectors of prices are credible, if the game goes on 
for a large number of periods, and if the monopolist cannot commit to any announced price for 
any future period? The theoretical results are as follows, for a monopolist producing a durable 
good at constant marginal cost and who faces a downward sloping demand curve. If the 
97) The developer's original announcement is a pair of prices. The first price will be charged to those who 
buy wala' before the canal is built and the second is promised to be the price of water rights after the canal is built. 
A pair of prices are time inconsistent; if landowners naively believe the prices announced and act accordingly the 
developer would not want to set the price of water rights after the canal is built at the second price of his original an-
nouncement. 
98) SeeR. H. Coase, "Durability and Monopoly," Journal of Law and Economics. 15 (1972), pp. 143-149. 
More recent work in the field includes Charles Kahn, 'The Durable Goods Monopolists and Consistency with In-
creasing Costs," Econometrica. 54 (1886), pp. 275-294; Faruk Gul, Hugo Sonnenschein and David Wilson, "Foun-
dations of Dynamic Monopoly and the Coase Conjecture," Journal of Economic Theory. 39 (1986), pp. 155-190; 
Nancy Stokey, "Rational Expectations and Durable Goods Pricing," Bell Journal of Economics. 12 (1982), pp. 
112-128. 
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monopolist has no institutional mechanism to commit to a price path, then prices will fall over 
time. Furthermore, under certain demand conditions--namely that there is at least one buyer 
with a reservation price equal to the marginal cost--the monopolist will in the long run charge 
marginal cost. Prices will converge to marginal cost faster as the length of each period falls or 
alternatively as the interest rate falls. 
The models appear to fit irrigation rights in eighteenth- and nineteenth-century France. 
Such rights are clearly a durable good, since in the eighteenth and nineteenth century contracts 
were--and remain--one-shot sales of permanent access to water from a canal. The marginal cost 
of an irrigation right was either small or zero until the capacity of a main canal was reached. If 
we assume that by the second period the entire distribution network was built, then marginal 
cost was zero. If by the second period only the main part of the network was complete, then 
marginal cost was low because only a small ditch is needed to connect the canal to any particu-
lar field. Demand for irrigation rights was also (weakly) downward sloping, as some parcels 
derived greater benefits from irrigation than others because of the differential quality of land 
and some were located closer to the canal. In the absence of institutions that allow commitment 
in contracts, it is not credible to have an ex ante price that is lower than the ex post price. 
This result can be made explicit in a simple two-period model. Let there be n landown-
ers all indexed by the value of discounted profits accruing to them if they irrigated their plots 
for free, ni, so if J>lc then npn.,. Assume further that all plots are of the same size and that 
irrigation rights are simply the right to as much water as one wants for a particular plot and that 
enforcement of these contracts is both costless and perfect At the beginning of Period 1, the 
developer announces two prices p 1 and p 2 as the prices he will charge for irrigation rights in 
Periods I and 2. Let r be the interest rate. In Period 2, given that k landowners remain, the 
developer will maximize his profits when marginal cost equals marginal revenue. Let m be the 
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number of landowners who remain without irrigation rights at the end of the game. Then by 
the definition of m, p:z=0,.._1. In this setting the monopolist cannot credibly announce a rising 
pair of prices, yet falling prices will lead all landowners to wait until after the canal is built. 
Indeed, rising prices paths that lead to positive sales in Period 1 are not credible. Sup-
pose that in Period 1 the developer announces a pair of prices such that p 1$.-'!.2.._. Then it is a (l+r) 
dominant strategy for anyone willing to pay p2 in Period 2 to buy the irrigation right in Period 
1. Indeed, landowners who buy an irrigation right in Period 1 and borrow the money for one 
Period at the going rate of interest save over buying in Period 2. So all the landowners willing 
to buy irrigation rights in Period 2 do so in Period 1. Then at the beginning of Period 2, there 
remain m landowners who have no irrigation rights. Their profits are all t n,... By definition, 
n,.. <.P 2, so if p 2 is actually announced again there will be no Period 2 sales of irrigation rights. 
This is clearly not optimal for the developer. A better strategy would be for the developer to 
charge n,.. or less, sell at least one irrigation right and earn positive profits in Period 2. There-
fore a profit maximizing developer will not charge p 2 in Period 2. Rather, at the beginning of 
Period 2 time the developer will announce a new price which will be lower than p 2• Thus the 
original announcement is not credible. 
The developers problems do not stop there. It turns out that there exists no credible 
P2 prices that can induce landowners to buy in Period 2. Assume p 1>-(--) . Let us then look at l+r 
the problem of landowner j in Period 1. He wants to maximize: 
max:{ 0 i -plt-1-max[o.n -p2J}· (l+r (l+r) 1 
He can either buy in Period 1 or wait to Period 2 when he will chose again whether or not to 
buy an irrigation right Independent of when the irrigation right is bought, the benefits are only 
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enjoyed in Period 2, when the canal is complete, so benefits are always discounted. First 
assume that nrp 2>0. Then landowner j would want to buy the irrigation right in Period 2 if he 
h d air d h d · · P ·od 1 H ill b · P · d 1 ·f ni ni-p 2 >O Thi a not ea y pure ase It m en . e w uy m eno 1 -(---p 1--(--)- . s l+r) l+r 
condition is equivalent to (l+r)p 1<p 2, which contradicts our assumption. Therefore landowner 
j will not buy any irrigation rights in Period 1. 
Now assume that nrp2<0. Then landowner j will not buy the irrigation right in Period 
n . 
2 under any circumstance. He will buy in Period 1 if and only if -( ') -p 1>0. However, l+r 
because he does not buy in Period 2, ni <p 2 and ( ni ) <~K which in tum is less than p 1 by l+r (l+r) 
assumption. Thus the landowner will not buy an irrigation right in Period 1 either. More impor-
tant there exists no credible price path that the developer can announce such that some Ian-
downers will buy irrigation rights in Period 1. 
The simple model explored above suggests that without commitment, only price paths 
where no ex ante buying occurs are credible.99 In the absence of commitment landowners will 
simply not buy irrigation rights ex ante. Furthermore, the argument outlined above does not 
make use of the fact that landowners have no incentive to bear the risks associated with buying 
ex ante contracts, since ex post contracts will always dominate them. For this reason too, they 
would rather wait until after the project is built to buy their contracts from the developer. But, 
because the construction costs are sunk after the project is built, marginal cost is always very 
99) 'J'ha'e 1re other types of contracts that get around part of the durable goods monopoly problem. For 
example, the monopolist could offer contracts that promise anyone that their price will be the lowest prices he 
charges at any time. Then in equililrium the amount of rights sold is exactly that which would be sold if the market 
only opened for one Period. These contracts would however be quite costly to enforce, as each buyer must monitor 
prices forever. 1be same monitoring costs are encountered whenever the quantity of irrigation rights that maximizes 
the developer's one-shot profits is Jess than the total quantity available, because landowners know the developer has 
a long run incentive to sell everything. Not surprisingly, these contracts were never offered in the eighteenth centu-
ry. 
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low, and even the monopolistic developer would find it nearly impossible to break even 
without the ability to commit to time inconsistent price paths. 
Beyond the problem of commitment, the developer may face revenue problems after 
the canal has been built. Indeed, the overwhelming share of the costs lies in the construction 
and that ex post marginal cost is nearly zero. The low marginal cost may act against the 
developer in two ways. First, landowners know that marginal cost is the developer's reserva-
tion price and, in the context of bargaining, they may decide to wait to let the price fall . 
Second, once the canal is built the developer has not one but many periods in which to sell his 
water rights, and as a result, the problem of commitment plagues him over and over. In fact if 
he can reconsider his prices frequently--i.e. periods are short--the developer may set his prices 
very low soon after the project is built. 
In such a situation lenders would not offer credit without other collateral, because the 
expected revenues after the canal is built may not be high enough to cover all the costs. If 
creditors are unable to estimate the relationship between expected revenues and total costs, 
they will prefer signed ex ante contingent contracts as sources of collateral. Thus we can con-
clude that, in the absence of institutional mechanisms to commit. the credit problem is less one 
of credit markets than a contracting problem between developers and landowners. 
The importance of the theoretical exercise outlined above becomes obvious in light of 
the fact that most canal developers in the eighteenth century were unable to sell more than a 
few contingent contracts. Other developers whose personal wealth allowed them to proceed 
without outside source of credit never recouped more than a small amount of the construction 
costs from water sales. In fact, although the total profitability of irrigation was never doubted, 
it was always a problem to get landowners to pay for projects in the eighteenth and the 
nineteenth centuries. This difficulty was often explained by the lack of foresight and "the 
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backwardness," of peasants, however it seems that those backward peasants understood the 
nature of the game much better than the developers did. 
Geography and Institutions 
Given the lack of success of canal developers before 1765 when irrigation would have 
been highly profitable, it seems obvious there was an institutional failure. But did eighteenth-
century institutions make any progress at providing developers with the property rights they 
needed? Did it become possible for eighteenth-century developers to commit to price paths that 
would have made credit possible? And was the state willing to provide the financial insurance 
necessary for the projects to get under way? The answer to the first question is that litigation 
during the early eighteenth century firmly established ownership of property rights and author-
ity over these rights, and by 1765 most of the problems associated with property rights had 
been eliminated, at least for small projects. For larger projects, however, problems with veto 
players were not addressed until the French Revolution. The late eighteenth century also wit-
nessed some limited progress in solving the credit problem associated with irrigation. The state 
was still unable or unwilling to force developers to commit to announced prices for irrigation 
rights and thereby constrain the problem of revenues. In the absence of national reforms, local 
institutions successfully stepped in and provided the insurance required if lenders were to make 
capital for irrigation projects available. Local involvement did lead to limited development of 
irrigation between 1765 and 1789, but large scale projects still faced credit problems until after 
the Revolution of 1789. 
To understand this progress in the late eighteenth century, we must take a detailed look 
at the political and judicial geography of southeastern France under the Old Regime. In partic-
ular we must examine the institutions that blocked irrigation before 1765. We can then 
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understand the institutional change of the late eighteenth century and the relative success of 
irrigation in the period from 1765 to 1789. 
The political and judicial authority in southeastern France in the eighteenth century 
can be best explained in terms of the medieval division of the region, known as Provence, and 
its subsequent partial appropriation by France. Provence in the early Middle Ages was part of 
the Holy Roman Empire, but by the fourteenth century it had become virtually independent. 
Medieval Provence was divided into three distinct areas that led to three different Old-Regime 
judicial and political systems: the Comtat Venaissin, the Comte of Provence, and the Terres 
Adjacentes (see Map 2 in the appendix). The Old-Regime Comtat Venaissin (hereafter the 
Comtat) is geographically equivalent to the present day Vaucluse. The western half of the 
Comte of Provence (hereafter the Comte) and the Terres Adjacentes, make up what is now the 
Bouches du Rhone. The existence of three different sets of institutions was a legacy of 
medieval state building. The most important phase of this process was the division of Pro-
vence between the Pope--whose share was the Comtat--and the counts of Provence who con-
trolled the Comte. Subsequently the king of France inherited the Comte. The Terres Adja-
centes were a set of administratively independent communities that included Marseille, Aries 
and a number of communities on the border of the Comte and the Comtat. These communities 
had never been directly incorporated into Provence. In fact, until they became part of France, 
the Te"es Adjacentes only recognized the direct authority of the count of Provence. 100 
The geographic divisions outlined above corresponded to institutional divisions that 
determined the transaction costs of irrigation. Although the Comtat was an independent 
100) The best reference to the political divisions of Provence is Edouard Baratier, Histoire de Ia Provence. 
Toulouse: Privat, 1969. lbe issue is treated in more detail in Paul Masson. Encyclopedie des Bouches du Rhone and 
Villeneuve, Encyclopedie des Bouches du Rhont!. 
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enclave inside France, the king of France controlled its water supply. Prior to the Revolution of 
1789, the Comtat had a legislative body in charge of taxes: the Estates of the Comtat. Like 
most Estates in France it was composed of representatives of the nobility, the clergy and the 
leaders of each major community in the region. The approval of the Estates was necessary to 
secure the financial or legal support of any public institutions for irrigation projects, but the 
Pope and his local representative (the vice legate) had veto power over decisions by the 
Estates, a veto power they regularly exercised. The Comtat also had a more or less final court 
of appeals (the Apostolic Chamber), but some cases were ultimately argued in Rome. Those 
institutions were by and large poorly centralized, and any one of them could hold an irrigation 
project hostage. 
Beyond the institutions specific to the Comtat, French institutions also had an impact 
on transaction costs in region because the Comtat was economically tied to the rest of 
southeastern France. Among the regions bordering France, the Comtat enjoyed a privileged 
status. The king of France had granted the inhabitants of the Comtat the status of regnicoles, 
which removed any French tariffs on goods produced in the Comtat. The status was very valu-
able to the Comtat's agriculture and industry, because, it was a major exporter of grain and silk 
textiles. The preservation of this special economic relationship was contingent upon a good 
knowledge of Provencal institutions, as local powers in the Comte (such as the assembtee or 
village governments) often attempted to interfere with the royal privilege.101 Because of the 
complex institutional history of the area, jurisdiction over civil suits that affected both Comtat 
and Comte was uncertain; however, most of these suits were fought in French royal courts. In 
101) One should also note that the armies of the king of France occupied the Comtal twice in the 
eighteenth century in order to put pressure on the Pope over a larger set of issues. On the same issue it is also im-
portant to note that the elites of the Comtal had economic, political and familial ties with the elites of Provence and 
many had served the French crown for which they were sometimes rewarded with water rights for their Comtal 
estates. BM Cecano, Ms 2435-2436 on the litigation between Comte and Comtal on trade issues. 
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fact, officials of the Comtat had frequent recourse to the French judicial system to preserve the 
privileges of the region. 
The Comte of Provence had institutions similar to those of the Comtat. In terms of 
eighteenth-century French political institutions, the Comte was a Pays d'Etat. As a Pays d'Etat 
it had a fiscal and legislative body--often known as an Estate--the Assemblee du Pays. The 
Assemblee du Pays had suffered a long eclipse between 1660 and 1760, due to its participation 
in the seventeenth-century rebellions. In the late 1770s the Assemblee du Pays became more 
active and helped the royal government promote irrigation. The importance of the Assembtee 
du Pays rests more in the fact that it provided a locus of bargaining for institutional change 
than its role as a motor of economic development. As far as the judicial system in the Comte 
was concerned, the final court of appeals was the Parlement of Aix. Whereas the Assembtee du 
Pays was dominated by the clergy, the Parlement was the realm of the Provencal nobility. 
Both the Assemblee du Pays and the Parlement often resisted royal reform, if only to bargain 
for better terms with the crown. 102 
The third and final area under study, the Terres Adjacentes were as set of communities 
that were classified as a Pays d' Election. These communities were directly under the authority 
of the king and had no Estate. Even here, however, the division of eminent domain authority 
between king and communities was ambiguous. Particularly ambiguous was the division of 
judicial authority between king, communities and the Parlement of Aix, which exercised cer-
tain judicial powers in the Terres Adjacentes. In practice, the uncertainty of authority gave both 
local institutions and the king veto power over irrigation projects. 
102) Paul Masson Encycwpedie de Ia Provence, vol. 3, and Rene Pillorget, Les Mouvemenls lnsurrec-
tiOflels en Provence enlre 1596 et 1715. Paris: Editions A. Pedone, 1975, pp. 864-STI. 
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Despite this confusion there were certain institutions that may have reduced the tran-
saction costs associated with irrigation. The judicial system in southeastern France operated 
under Roman rather than customary law, and Roman law facilitated the enforcement of written 
contracts. For example, it recognized private property more clearly than did the customary law 
that prevailed in regions such as Normandy. Furthermore village and local organization were 
very well developed and not subject to the same unanimity rules as their counterparts in north-
em France. Each village or town had at its head a council headed by three consuls. The first 
consul was almost always a noble, and he effectively ran the town government. Because 
developers could write contracts with the consuls, this form of municipal organization made it 
easier for them to bargain with villagers. The same municipal organization, however, also 
made strategic behavior easier for villages in the south than in regions like Normandy. Despite 
the benefits of Roman law and village government, irrigation developers still faced a formid-
able array of obstacles. In particular, the tangle of different legal and political authorities and 
overlapping jurisdictions made it very costly to sort out conflicting property rights. 
Property Rights Over Water 
On both banks of the Durance river, communities, religious institutions, and individu-
als claimed monopoly rights to draw water from certain sites, but only seven sites were highly 
desirable, four on the Comte' s bank of the Durance and three on the Comtat's side. 103 To 
develop a new irrigation networlc one had either to find an unused site or to increase the draw 
103) One site on the Comlal' s side of the river was occupied by the Medieval canal Saint-Julien in Cavail-
lon. Another was the future site of the canal of Cabedan-Neuf, this site would then also feed the canals of Carpen-
tras, L 'Isle, and Plan Oriental. Finally, one site was used for the medieval canal of l'Hopital in Avignon, the same 
site would also feed other canals in Avignon and the canal of Crillon. On the south bank of the river, one site was 
used for the canal of Craponne, another would used be for the canal of Boisgelin and the last two for smaller canals. 
Desirable sites were rare because the low teclmology of irrigation canals demanded rapid current in the river to 
avoid silting and hard rock on the banks to avoid erosion. On the issue of sites, see Villeneuve, Encyclopedie, pp. 
697-698. 
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from a site already in use. In the early eighteenth century, three of the four desirable sites 
were already in use, and proprietary claims v.:ere made for all of them. Claims of ownership of 
sites were based on royal grants that dated back to the Middle Ages. The medieval grants 
tended to be monopolistic and perpetual grants of a site rather than of a certain amount of 
water. Owners of property rights over water drawn from a site argued that hereditary and 
transferable title to water rights had been granted to them by the king. They also claimed that 
the medieval titles also gave them monopoly rights over all water from their site, even beyond 
what they used. New and overlapping property rights were granted by the king in the seven-
teenth and eighteenth centuries to developers. In the eighteenth century developers with new 
royal grants to water from the Durance were challenged by the owners of medieval property 
rights in court. In fact, in the early eighteenth century, any developer who had secured new 
rights from the crown and wanted to build a new network. invariably faced court challenges.104 
The royal courts that handled the suits over water rights were faced with a dilemma. If 
they affirmed the medieval grants it would have been impossible for the king to grant any more 
water rights, and many of the water rights granted by the king in the eighteenth century would 
have been invalidated. 1be legitimacy of medieval water rights, however, was not really in 
doubt by the courts as the parchment rolls on which the grants were written were among the 
most prized possessions of religious institutions and cities. Both sides had received their 
grants from the king and had solid but conflicting legal rights. 
At the same time, the crown had considerable incentive to invalidate the medieval 
grants. The medieval grants were old and to a large extent outdated, because they artificially 
limited irrigation development. The Crown recognized that economic growth depended on 
104) See AC Cavaillon, BB 20-21, AD Vaucluse, B Concessioi'IS d' Eau. See also Archives dl.l Canal de 
Cabedan, pp. 7-61 ; and Rene Caillet, Le Canal de CarpenJras, Vol. 2. 
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wider usage of water than the medieval monopolists would allow. Moreover, it had become a 
standard practice for the king to default on monopoly grants. In every sector of the economy, 
from judicial offices to water rights, the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries witnessed royal 
sales of monopoly titles. Soon however, the king attempted to renege on these monopoly 
grants, in order to resell a part of the title to raise further revenue. In the case of water rights, 
the invalidation of medieval grants would have allowed the Crown to pay off favors it owed to 
the local nobility. 
One legal case decided the issue: the lawsuit that pitted the bishop of Cavaillon and the 
community thereof against the Baron Forbin-Maynier d'Oppede. The Oppede105 family 
owned considerable property in both the Comtat and the Comte. They were ardent speculators 
in water rights. The first water grant to the family dated to the early sixteenth century, and it 
had been given to a family member by the Pope for services as ambassador to Venice. In the 
mid-sixteenth century, they became royal servants and purchased an office of president (chief 
justice) at the Parlement of Aix. As a result additional water grants were acquired in the 
seventeenth century as recompense for their support during Provencal unrest. 106 
Litigation over water rights pitted the Oppede family against the bishop and the city of 
Cavaillon from the early seventeenth century to the middle of the eighteenth. The bishop's 
water rights dated back to 1180, when the count of Toulouse as count of Provence, and thereby 
owner of the Durance river, gave the bishop a monopoly to draw water from the river. In the 
thirteenth century, the bishop used his water rights to build both a canal--known as the canal 
Saint-Julien--and Cavaillon's first water mill. Both the city and the bishop quickly realized 
105) Oppede came from a long and distinguished Provencal line. who more than others straddled the bord-
er between Comle and ComlaJ. 1be Oppede family had become one of the most powerful families of the region. 
lbeir power was a recompense for their sta\Dlch support of the king in the civil wars of the seventeenth centuries. 
See Rene Pillorget, Les Mouvements /nsurrectioTU!ls en Provence, pp. 759-770, 784-790, and 856-862. 
106) Rene Caillet, Le Canal de Carpenlras, part 1, pp. 30-66. 
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that the canal could be used for irrigation. The bishop gave the city the right to use the canal 
for irrigation in return for a significant participation to the building costs. Over the course of 
the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, the bishop alienated most of the canal to Cavaillon in 
return for a greater participation in maintenance by the city, but he retained his monopoly 
water right to draw water from the Durance. Cavaillon only had rights to the water in the canal 
Saint-Julien. Until the seventeenth century this arrangement suited everyone involved, even 
the Maynier d'Oppede family, who, as the largest landowner in Cavaillon, greatly benefited 
from the canal. 107 
In the seventeenth century, however, the arrangement began to fall apart. in the 1620s 
a financially strapped bishop sold his mill twice, once to the Oppede family and once to the 
city. To determine which purchaser really did own the mill required a long suit apparently 
resolved late in the seventeenth century. Then, in the 1690s the Oppede family, allied with 
other important French nobles, attempted to build a canal through the Comtat, part of their pro-
ject was to use a new royal grant to draw water from the Durance. The new royal grant allowed 
the Oppede to draw water from the site that was owned by the bishop; thus it conflicted with 
the bishop's monopoly property rights. 
Although judicially long lived, the Oppedes' attempt to build what would eventually 
become the canal of Carpentras, never succeeded. The main problem was that the bishop had 
maintained complete ownership to his monopoly rights. Since the property rights of the bishop 
and those of the Oppede clearly overlapped, both parties headed to the courts. Yet there was a 
further problem: what court was to hear the case? Oppede wanted the suit resolved in the 
Parlement of Aix, where he sat on the court, while the bishop preferred the Apostolic 
107) AC Cavaillon, BB 22 and BB 23. 
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Chamber, a court where religious institutions held sway. 
The uncertainty over jurisdiction was compounded by uncertain authority. Although 
the Durance belonged to the king, the authority over water granted to individuals in the Comrar 
was unclear. No doubt unable to bear the high costs of litigation alone, the bishop sold his 
monopoly water right to the city along with complete ownership of the canal Saint-Julien. The 
city then laid claim to the mill and canal network that had been sold to Oppede in the seven-
teenth century. After over 30 years of court battles, the issue was finally resolved by arbitra-
tion in 1733. The bishop's right was upheld; however, it was no longer to be a strict monopoly 
water right. Owners of the bishop's water right had unlimited access to unused water in the 
Durance, but they could not prevent others from using Durance water. Second, the Oppede 
family was confirmed in all the property rights they had acquired in the seventeenth century. 
The family was freed to pursue their trans-Comtat canal, a canal that Cavaillon had decided to 
fight by other--political--means. 108 
The court challenges were costly not only because they consumed resources but also 
because for three decades it was unclear whether the new or the old rights would be upheld. 
Until the issue of the validity of property rights was decided no development could occur. 
From the point of view of water development, however, the event was important: medieval 
grants could no longer be interpreted as monopolies, they only secured high priority access to 
water in the case of scarcity. More importantly, owners of medieval grants could no longer 
hold projects up for ransom. Clearly, development was more likely to occur with one fewer 
veto player. 
1 08) The importance of political support for political projects can be undc:rscored by a number of exam-
ples. The most striking of these is the Oppede canal project, where high court nobles were to get one-third of future 
profits in return for 'protection'. The baron of Oppede was also promised one-third of the profits for his water right 
and his local 'protection'. Investors would have to be content with the final third of the elusive future profits . BM 
Cecano, Ms 1632.1633 and Ms 2512 (circa 1710). 
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Property Rights Over Land 
To build a canal one needed a right of eminent domain. In the Comte rights of eminent 
domain could be granted by the Estates or the king, but they had to be ratified by the Parle-
ment. Each of the three organizations could thus veto, or threaten to veto, a canal. In the case 
of the Comtat, the Estates, the Apostolic Chamber, the Pope's representative (the vice legate) 
and the Pope himself all held effective veto power as well. Securing eminent domain rights 
was thus expensive and extremely difficult in the early eighteenth century, for there were a 
very large number of veto players. 
Consider rights of eminent domain in the Comte. Since any canal on the southern side 
of the river would irrigate land mostly in Provence, the king, the Estates and the Parlement 
were also veto players; however, the need to cross the Te"es Adjacentes added a further cost. 
In the Comte, the best site to draw water from the Durance were in the Terres Adjacentes or led 
into them, thus the organizations that regulated eminent domain in the Terres Adjacentes had 
the ability to veto projects. In the Terres Adjacentes the king of France had sole power over 
water grants, and at least in theory he decided all issues of eminent domain. In fact, each local 
community had effective veto power over eminent domain rights as well. In the Middle Ages 
the Te"es Adjacentes had been very autonomous and had in fact decided issues of eminent 
domain alone. 109 Although the extent of local autonomy was uncertain and subject to con-
tinual disputes during the eighteenth century, the communities were well-organized, and they 
could credibly threaten to sue anyone who did not secure rights of eminent domain from them. 
The credibility of their threat had been verified at least once in the sixteenth century 
when Adam de Craponne, a Provencal nobleman and an engineer who enjoyed the favor of the 
109) J.-B. Bertin and P. Audier, Adam de Craponne et son Canal. Paris: Honore Champion, 1904, p . 113 . 
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king and had solid political support from both the Parlement and the Estates, attempted to 
build a large irrigation canal in the Comte. He secured a grant from the king to draw water 
from the Durance, and a grant of eminent domain rights from the Estates. Both were registered 
in Parlement. His grant for water made it necessary for his canal to go through a number of 
Te"es Adjacentes communities. They, however, did not come under the jurisdiction of the 
Estates as far as eminent domain was concerned; and they delayed the project until Craporme 
gave them what they wanted: free access to all the canal's water that they desired. 110 
Despite these outlandish concessions, Craponne not only proceeded to build his canal 
in 1520 but he also succeeded in selling a number of irrigation rights below the Terres Adja-
centes. In dry years, however, the Terres Adjacentes communities used up most of the canal's 
capacity, and with no water, Craponne had to to renege on his other contracts. The resulting 
suits led Craponne to an early bankruptcy and discouraged other investors from pursuing irri-
gation projects. From the standpoint of the communities in the Terres Adjacentes, the whole 
affair was a free ride. Although Craponne's bankruptcy saddled them with part of the mainte-
nance costs, they had gotten their irrigation water without having to pay any construction costs. 
The example of Craponne and his sixteenth-century canal underscore the costs of securing ade-
quate rights of eminent domain in southeastern France. 
The history of the canal of Boisgelin is another example of the costs of the division of 
authority. The canal of Boisgelin was a large-scale project that was built in the Comte under 
the financial authority of the Assemblee du Pays after a number of other attempts had failed to 
secure the approval of a sufficient coalition. The proposed canal had two possible routes, one 
110) On the canal of Craponne, J.-B. Bertin and P. Audier, Adam de Craponne et son canal, Jean Rigoud, 
Le canal de Craponne, Villeneuve, Encyclopeaie vol. III. pp. 698-714. Paul Masson 
EfiC'Jclopeaie vol. Yll pp. 148-152. 
108 
through the Comte alone, while the other crossed the Terres adjacentes. While the latter would 
have been cheaper it involved bargaining with the Terres Adjacentes for rights of eminent 
domain. Rather than bargain with each community in the Terres Adjacentes, the Assemblee du 
Pays avoided the issue but at a very high cost. The Assemb/ee decided in favor of the much 
more expensive route that was completely in the Comte and involved tunneling through the 
rock of Organ. Indeed, piercing the rock of Organ allowed the developers to avoid the Terres 
Adjacentes communities of Senas and Salon, where the cheaper routes lay. 111 Once the tunnel 
was built, the Assembtee had the ability to exclude the Terres Adjacentes from the benefits of 
the new canal if they did not contribute to its cost. Not surprisingly, the Terres Adjacentes 
communities did purchase a significant amount of water from the canal just before the French 
Revolution. 112 
In short the institutions inherited from the Middle Ages significantly raised the cost of 
building canals in southeastern France. One either had to pay off the veto players, as Craponne 
did, or one had to bear much higher construction costs as did the developers of the canal 
through Organ. The presence of active organizations like the Estates and the Parlement did 
allow for some institutional change. It was, after all, possible to build the canal of Boisgelin, 
but the sort of institutional change that would have substantially reduced costs lay outside the 
authority of these organizations, for neither the king, the Parlement nor the Assemblee could 
reform the status of the Te"es Adjacentes. The peculiar status of the Terres Adjacentes was 
indeed a privilege, something only the Revolution would change. 113 The problems of eminent 
111) The issue of the costs associated with the tunnel at Orgon have already been discussed in the section 
on technology. One should also note that any challenge to the claims of the Terres Adjacentes would have taken the 
form of a suit, no doubt lengthy and expensive. Thus when the Assemblu dv. Pays decided to bear the costs of tun-
nelling at Orgon. it may well have chosen the cheaper of the two alternatives. 
112) Villeneuve, Encyclopedie, vol. 3, pp. 714-721. 
113)The Te"es Adjacentes used their peculiar status to free ride on the rest of Provence for much more 
than irrigation: Villeneuve, Encyclopedie, Vol. 2, pp. 755-761. 
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domain were never clearly worked out before the French Revolution, and the lack of clear-cut 
eminent domain rights had a hampered the the development of irrigation. 
Through the examination of the histories of a few projects it has become clear that the 
institutional envirorunent blocked irrigation. The obstacles had their origins in the long-tenn 
development of the institutional structures in the Comtat and the Comte. At the basis of these 
institutions was a set of medieval political decisions that led to uncertain property rights and a 
large numbers of veto players. 
The institutions of the eighteenth century led to high transaction costs both in the case 
of water rights and in the case of rights of eminent domain. These transaction costs were much 
higher than they would have been, had authority been centralized in the national government. 
Judicial proceedings threatened projects with extraordinary delays, in some cases over half a 
century, and they could result in the complete loss of one's property rights. Moreover, the 
ambiguous establishment of authority within the judicial structures led to an even higher level 
of uncertainty. Not only were contracts and property rights uncertain, but the weight that a 
court decision carried was uncertain as well. There was no institution capable of constraining 
the strategic play that is inherent to such a bargaining process. The next section explores why a 
number of irrigation projects failed (testimony of the limitations of institutional change) and a 
small number succeeded (testimony to its reality). 
The Eighteenth Century: Failures, Change, and Success 
The eighteenth century is distinguished from previous centuries because for the first 
time investors attempted to irrigate major parts of southeastern France. Some attempts failed, 
chiefly large ones and those undertaken at the beginning of the eighteenth century, other suc-
ceeded, chiefly at the end of the century. In this section I examine first failures, then successes . 
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The pattern of failures and successes is explained in tenns of institutions. 
Failures 
A number of projects failed, and they all had one common characteristic--they were 
all very large even by nineteenth-century standards. They failed in a large measure because 
their scale gave too many individuals and groups a veto power. The large set of veto players 
responded to political necessity rather than to questions of profitability. The most interesting 
of these failures was the canal of Provence promoted by the Baron d 'Oppede and an engineer 
named Cyprian. It would have crossed both the Comtat and the Comte from Donzere--north of 
Orange--to Marseille (see Map 3), and it would have been used both for transportation and for 
irrigation. As a transportation canal, it would have been a competitor of the Rhone river. which 
was full of tolls. It was one of many attempts to use the water rights of the Oppede family, all 
of which failed. 
The failure of the canal of Provence, which would have been the match of 
Languedoc's canal of the Midi, has fascinated a number of historians. 114 It would have gone 
through the Comrat and the Comte, and it could have been vetoed by the Estates of either 
region, the Pope, or the king. In fact, because the canal was to be used for transportation, the 
king had final say both over both water grants and rights of eminent domain in the Comte and 
the Te"es Adjacentes. His assent and backing was secured through lobbying by the highest 
nobles of France, the project still required the approval of the political and administrative 
powers of the Comtat, where veto lay with the vice legate (the papal representative in Avig-
non), the Apostolic Chamber, and the Estates of the Comtat. The communities and religious 
institutions represented in the Estates were divided on the question of the canal. Not 
114) Hubert Elie, "Une Affaire de Speculation"; Paul Masson. "Le Canal de Provence"; Roger Caillet, Le 
Canal de Carpentras, chapter 1. 
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surprisingly, those communities which would directly benefit from the canal were all in favor. 
Other communities, though, would lose if the canal were built and they opposed the project. 
A vignon, would be bypassed by the canal and its trade would thereby suffer. Cavaillon, a town 
that already had invested heavily in irrigation, faced a decline in the value of already irrigated 
land. 115 Many religious institutions also opposed the canal, although their publicly-stated 
reasons--the financial burden on the province and the fear of French invasion-- are difficult to 
believe. The real reason for their opposition was their fear that goods transported on the canal 
would escape the tolls on the Rhone river, tolls that they themselves owned. The private 
correspondence of between the Prior and the Abbot of a monastery near A vignon makes these 
fears explicit: 
They [the promoters of the canal of Provence] want to built a canal that, after 
crossing the Comtat, will go directly to the sea and will avoid all the dangers 
of the mouth of the Rhone. . . If this [project] succeeds we can forget about 
our toll at Tarrascon [on the Rhone] ... Twenty two ecclesiastical communi-
ties or hospitals that own the salt toll [also on the Rhone] in A vignon have also 
protested [to the Pope], and if thi18anal occurs we alone would lose more than 
a 1,000 livres of annual income. 
Economic and political issues loomed large in the fate of the canal of Provence. The Pope 
made the final decision against the canal and his decision reflected the fears of religious institu-
tions. The Pope was undoubtedly also concerned with the purely political issue of preserving 
the Comtat's independence from France. Opponents of the project had claimed--somewhat 
disingenuously--that the canal would be an ideal route for invading French troops. 117 Of real 
115) See AD Vaucluse, C 43 folio 520. 
116) AD Vaucluse, H Celestins d'Avignon. Correspondence Inutile. (February 4 and March 22, 1717). On 
the canal of Provence, see also Rogel Caillet, Le Canal ofCarpentras, vol. 2, Pieces lustificaJives. 
117) French soldiers had no need for such a route when they occupied the ComlaJ in the 1760s. The Com· 
tat, which was surrounded by France, could be invaded by infantry from the North or the East where the were no 
major rivers. On the debate over the value of the canal, see Roger Caillet, Le Canal de CarpeTIIras, vol. 1 chapter 1, 
and vol. 2, Pieces JustificaJives 1-12. See also Hubert Elie, La SpeculaJion sous la Regence, pp. 117-118. 
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concern was the fact that the canal, while increasing the Comtat's economic well-being, would 
have made the Comtat dangerously dependent on French water and French markets. The 
Pope's fear was undoubtedly that the loyalty of the Comtat would weaken in the face of 
increased dependence on French water. 
In any event. the canal of Provence did not fail because of inadequate financing. To be 
sure it would have required expensive bridges and much more complex water management 
than a simple irrigation canal, but contemporaries believed the higher costs could be repaid 
because of it would be used for transportation. They pointed out that other transportation 
canals used similar expensive technologies and had fared well financially. It was not the lack of 
anticipated profits that stopped the canal of Provence, rather it was the political structure of 
southeastern France. Had Provence not been divided in the Middle Ages, the canal might well 
have been built. 
The institutional structure favored decisions made for political rather than economic 
motives. Although the Pope was aware of the economic benefits of the canal, it was the politi-
cal costs that decided the issue. Despite intense lobbying by the French government and by the 
promoters of the canal, the Pope went against the recommendation of both the Estates and the 
vice legate and vetoed the project. The fate of irrigation development in the eighteenth century 
was decided on the basis of a political calculus, which took little account of the benefits of 
increased economic activity. 
Institutional Change and Irrigation Successes (1765-1789) 
The years between 1765 and 1789 witnessed an increase in irrigation, and for the first 
time in the eighteenth century a number of projects were actually realized. The new projects 
were of two types: those that served local purposes, and those that aimed to irrigate larger 
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areas. 1be smaller projects were much more likely to succeed because they faced fewer institu-
tional challenges. Larger canals did face higher transaction costs because they fell prey to the 
veto power of more groups. 
At least four small projects were completed in the late eighteenth century. Three of the 
small canals were in the Comtat and the fourth was in the Comte. Each of the four project dis-
tributed water to at most a few communities. They did not cross any important institutional 
boundaries and remained small because larger projects were plagued by a variety of institu-
tional problems, and even among the four projects, delays and transaction costs rose with size. 
The two smallest canals, Janson and Cambis, were only a few kilometers long at most, 
and they faced only minor transaction costs. Both were entirely financed by the principal lan-
downer in the area they irrigated. Both the Marquis of Janson and the Duke of Cambis, the 
two noblemen who built the canals, wanted to irrigate their estates, which were very large. 
They both maintained strong political ties to the French royal court, and they successfully lob-
bied for water grants. The size of their estates eliminated the free rider problem and allowed 
each nobleman to internalize most of the benefits of his irrigation canal. In his grant applica-
tion, the Marquis of Janson argued that the benefits to his estates would more than suffice to 
cover the construction costs.118 He did allow the neighboring community to use the canal for 
irrigation purposes--no doubt to facilitate his use of rights of eminent domain-- but there is no 
evidence exists to show that he or Cambis failed to make a profit from the canals. In any case, 
unlike other examples, these two small canals were completed swiftly and gave rise to little in 
the way of transaction costs. 
The third project actually completed was the canal of Cabedan-Neuf built in 1765. 
118) AN H1 1515 (March 1780). 
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Although it affected only Cavaillon and two neighboring communities ('The Taillades and Mer-
indo!), it was large enough to create problems with the enforcement of contracts. The canal was 
built by an association of landowners under the tutelage of the city of Cavaillon. The associa-
tion made use of Cavaillon's rights of eminent domain as well as the bishop's medieval water 
grant that had been validated in 1733. Because most of the land irrigated from the canal was in 
either the territory of Cavaillon or that of The Taillades, the costs of the canal were appor-
tioned to each community according to the area irrigated, and the communities' debt responsi-
bilities were calculated in the same way. Predictably, soon after the canal was completed The 
Taillades attempted to escape from its financial responsibilities. This maneuver forced Cavail-
lon, which had underwritten all the loans for the canal, to sign a new contract with The Tail-
lades. In return for the complete repayment of outstanding debts by the village of The Tail-
lades (a third of construction costs), Cavaillon agreed to assume a larger portion of the mainte-
nance costs. The third community involved, Merindol, enjoyed an even more generous free 
ride. Much of the canal passed through Merindol, which, unlike Cavaillon, lay in the Cornu! 
not in the Comtat. Merindol undoubtedly derived benefits from the canal, but it did not contri-
bute anything to the project. 
Except for their redistributive implications, the free ridding by Merindol and the shirk-
ing by The Taillades were relatively unimportant. Neither stopped the project. In particular, 
the shirking by The Taillades only occurred after the project was built and the benefits were 
captured. Moreover litigation was avoided because Cavaillon alone could have paid for the 
entire canal and and still benefited from the project. 119 Yet the history of Cabedan-Neuf 
demonstrates that the involvement of a mere three communities was enough to drive institu-
119) Archives de l'AssociaJion dJ4 Canal de Cabedan Neuf, pp. 48-69. 
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tional costs higher than when only one community was involved. In addition to the costs 
incurred after the project was completed, there were significant delays associated with getting 
rights of way through Merindol since Merindol was in the Comte and thus not covered in the 
original grant of rights of eminent domain from the Comtat institutions. Once again these 
costs were associated with scale because of the extreme division of authority in the region. 
The final canal, the canal of Crillon, delivered irrigation water to Avignon and sur-
rounding communities. It was built by the Duke of Crillon, descendant of an old line of Comtat 
noblemen who led the French king's armies. Using his favor at court, Crillon secured a grant 
to draw water from the Durance and he then had the grant registered in the Aix Parlement. He 
negotiated with the Comtat's institutions--the vice legate, the city of Avignon and the Apos-
tolic Chamber--and secured rights of way from them. The canal, however, ran through several 
communities and challenged the water monopolies of a number of seigneurs and religious 
institutions, who all held the project up for ransom by attacking it in court. Two types of suits 
were fought. The first concerned Crillon's right to cross other canals, an absurd point of law in 
terms of economic growth but potentially a very profitable one for the owners of the other 
canals. The most important of these suits was brought by the Duke of Gadagne, Lord of 
Vedene, one of the communities traversed by the canal. Gadagne contested both the right to 
cross V edene without his authorization and the right to cross his own irrigation canal in 
Vedene. The suit was temporarily settled out of court in 1777, and in the settlement Gadagne 
granted rights of way in return for water rights. The settlement was not fully executed by either 
party and the case was still being litigated long after the French Revolution.u120 
The second set of suits were more serious. In 1778 fourteen ecclesiastical institutions 
120) BM Cecano, Ms. 2459. 
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and several communities charged that the canal increased the incidence of malaria, a disease 
endemic in the lower Comtat. The claim about malaria was hardly sincere and was probably 
no more than a strategic maneuver aimed at extracting profits from the canal builders. One 
sign that malaria was a mere pretext was the fact the religious institutions tilling the suit them-
selves owned other irrigation canals, which presumably were just as likely to spread malaria. 
They and the other plaintiffs refused to settle the suit even after the Duke of Crillon offered a 
solution that offered better drainage of irrigated fields, and hence a smaller likelihood of 
malaria outbreaks. 121 In any event, although the opponents of the canal won the initial round 
of litigation in Avignon, their victory was overturned by a papal court in Rome in 1781. Yet 
the suits delayed the completion of the canal of Crillon, and even the powerful eminent domain 
rights Crillon had secured did not prevent litigation and delays. 
Beyond the institutional costs associated with large canals, the developers of 
Cabedan-Neuf and Crillon faced revenue problems that did not exist for smaller projects. Since 
the smaller projects primarily irrigated the land of the promoters, the benefits were internal-
ized, making the sale of water rights irrelevant. But such was not the case with Cabedan-Neuf 
and Crillon, which were designed to irrigate the land of several hundred landowners each: 
both the city of Cavaillon and the Duke of Crillon failed to recover their investments from Ian-
downers. For the canal of Crillon, revenues from the sale of water were only 8,000 livres in 
1781. Tills did not suffice to pay for maintenance costs, let alone to provide a return on the 
more than 400,000 livres the Duke had spent building the canal. The meager revenues from 
the canal brought the Duke to the edge of bankruptcy and he was forced to sell a number of his 
other assets (in particular land). 122 Landowners refused to buy his irrigation rights because 
121) BM Cecano, Ms. 1605, 2459, 4°6198; and Reboulet, "Le Canal de Crillon," pp. 4143 . 
122) BM Cecano, Ms 4° 6824. 
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they were aware of the fact that once the canal was built Crillon's reservation price had to be 
very low. They were evidently waiting for the Duke to lower his price. 
In addition to the four small irrigation projects, one large project was started before the 
French Revolution. The canal of Boisgelin, should have delivered water to the western half of 
the Comre; however, it was not completed until after the Revolution under the name of the 
canal of the Alpinnes. The Assemblee du Pays, a group of clerics and noblemen, was responsi-
ble for initiating the project. In the eighteenth century, there had been at least two previous 
attempts to develop a large irrigation canal in the Comre, both had been private attempts and 
both had failed, these failures had discouraged private investors from supplying irrigation. 
In the absence of private investment there was only one institution in the Comre that 
had the credit sufficient to undertake such a project: the Assemblee du Pays. The other potential 
source was, of course, the royal government, but by the 1770s it faced such deep credit and 
revenue crises that it could not even consider direct financial participation to public works pro-
jects. Nonetheless the royal government had an indirect hand in the project. The king could 
not increase the fiscal burden on Provence without the approval of the Assembtee du Pays. On 
the other hand if the Assemblee wanted to raise revenue to spend in the Comre, it required the 
approval of the king. Obviously there existed significant gains from trade if the two parties 
could agree to share the resulting tax increases. Thus in 1772, during the negotiations on 
increasing the price of salt--a royal monopoly--the province received a direct subsidy of 
200,000 livres, half specifically marked for public works projects. The archbishop of Aix, 
Boisgelin, persuaded the Assemblee that the money should be spent on an irrigation canal.123 
The canal was designed by the builder of Cabedan-Neuf, and mostly, it was a simple 
123) AN H 1 1510. 
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gravity flow network of unlined ditches. With simple technology, it should have been very 
profitable because at that time rates of return were estimated to be more than five times the rate 
of interest for all the projects for which we have data. However one important institutional 
constraint, discussed earlier, greatly increased the cost of the canal. To avoid bargaining with 
the Terres Adjacentes over rights of eminent domain, the Assemblee du Pays required that the 
canal go through the Comte only. That requirement implied that a tunnel had to be built to 
traverse the rock of Orgon, which meant tunneling through solid rock. Work on the tunnel 
started in 1777 and proceeded up to the Revolution, using over half of the funds available for 
the project 124 Unlike all other irrigation projects, which involved little more than the digging 
of ditches, the canal of Boisgelin had to resort to an extraordinarily costly technology; a tech-
nology imposed by institutional constraints. 
Given the distribution of authority the Assemblee du Pays could not have imposed its 
canal on the Terres Adjacentes. Once again the division of authority led to higher institutional 
costs than if only a small canal had been built. In the case of the canal of Boisgelin the institu-
tional costs were indirect. the Assemblee du Pays did not pay off the veto player--the Terres 
Adjacentes communities that lay across the less expensive canal route. Rather it chose to bear 
the higher costs of digging a tunnel at Orgon. 
The canal of Boisgelin seems to mark a change in the attitude of local institutions 
regarding economic development. Until this project, the primary role of the Assemblee and the 
Parlement seems to have been to protect the province's privileges--the politically written rules 
that were economically favorable to the province--against encroachment by the king. By fund-
ing the canal of Boisgelin, the Assemblee went beyond its position to get around a large 
124) BM Mejanes, Ms. 834(848) and 840(853). For the decision of the Assemblee du Pays to build theca-
nal of Bosigelin, AC AU, AA 37 ,44,45,46. 
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number of the institutional problems of irrigation. Indeed ,in the Comte at least, the backing of 
the Assemblee greatly simplified the gathering of water eminent domain rights and provided 
the funding to get around the revenue problems of so many irrigation projects. 
By promoting the canal of Boisgelin in 1777, the Assemblee was voting to provide the 
infrastructure for economic development, this action foreshadowed the role of the French state 
in the nineteenth century. The Old-Regime state, however, could not play that role because it 
lacked the resources. The failure of the national government to provide for irrigation develop-
ment left that responsibility to local organizations, and in the eighteenth century irrigation was 
developed under the direction of local organizations. In two important cases (Cabedan-Neuf 
and Boisgelin) local organizations shouldered the financial risk associated with economic 
development. Cavaillon actually underwrote the loans of the canal of Cabedan-Neuf and thus 
provided an association of landowners with little legal identity the credit necessary to build the 
canal. The canal of Boisgelin was financed by the Assemblee directly. 
The history of eighteenth century irrigation development shows how the ultimate bar-
riers to irrigation were related to the division of authority. The lawsuits between Oppede and 
Cavaillon had settled the question of water rights, and the participation of local institutions had 
also reduced institutional costs. Together these changes allowed limited development of irriga-
tion in the last half of the eighteenth century. Yet these changes were not enough. The example 
of the canals of Crillon and Boisgelin show that the eighteenth-century institutions did not 
change enough to lower the institutional costs of large projects. The extreme division of 
authority over rights of eminent domain continued to plague large projects, as numerous 
groups held authority over eminent domain and each could block certain canal routes. The 
authority of other groups was less certain, but litigation was sufficiently lengthy and costly that 
those groups were able to appropriate part of the developer's profit or impose high costs on the 
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canal. Despite its reforms, the Old Regime therefore failed to limit and simplify the problems 
associated with uncertain property rights, veto power and litigation. True fundamental institu-
tional change would wait for the Revolution. 
The Revolution and Irrigation 
For 25 years after 1789 there was not increase in the irrigated area in Provence. Revo-
lutionary turmoil and the Napoleonic wars suspended the development of irrigation. Yet at the 
very same time the Revolution was bringing about institutional reforms that would be prere-
quisites for future development even though during their effects were delayed by the wars. The 
reforms would reduce the number of veto players and simplify the state's procedures for grant-
ing water and rights of eminent domain. This section examines the institutional changes 
brought about by the Revolution and their consequences: the construction of a number of new 
irrigation canals after 1820. 
Revolution (1789-1815) 
Between 1789 and 1815, no new irrigation canals were constructed, and those net-
worlcs already in use were very poorly maintained. 125 The Revolutionary turmoil during the 
years 1789-95 cast doubt on the strength of property rights and discouraged investment. More-
over, a number of other problems with the Revolutionary economy impeded further irrigation. 
Government induced inflation, price controls, and the war economy distorted the market. Most 
importantly the Revolutionary wars drained away manpower, and drove up the price of labor 
relative to land. The manpower drain continued and even worsened during the Napoleonic 
period (1795-1815). It is not surprising then that the estimated rates of return and benefit-cost 
125) AD Vaucluse, S Usinl!s eJ Cows d' Eau Cavaillon and L'Isle sur Sorgues. 
121 
ratios were at their lowest of the two centuries between 1789 and 1815 and that irrigation 
development came to a halt. 
Nonetheless the Revolution and the Napoleonic era were important times for irrigation. 
Institutional refonns, initiated by the Revolutionary regime and continued by Napoleon, drasti-
cally cut the institutional costs of irrigation in the nineteenth century. The refonns consolidated 
all powers of eminent domain in the hands of the central government and gave that government 
the power to bind developers to announced price paths. They also eliminated the problems with 
certain veto groups and with the rent-seeking judiciary. 
The most dramatic changes associated with the Revolution were the destruction of the 
old organizations and institutions that had protected each area from royal refonns. In Provence 
the annexation of the Comtat, and the abolition of the peculiar status of the Terres Adjacentes 
removed a major obstacle the development of irrigation, and for the first time since the early 
Middle Ages, a single authority could decide issues of property right in Provence. 
Administrative Reforms 
From the point of view of irrigation development, the most important single Revolu-
tionary reform was the centralization of legal and political power. Although centralization had 
been one of the goals of the absolutist monarchy, and although the king held a veto power over 
virtually all economic activity, he had never been able to eliminate local veto players like the 
Parlement, the Assemblee du Pays, the Estates, or even city counciis. 126 Centralization during 
126) The limitations of Old-Regime royal power are demonstrated by the ability of the city of Marseille to 
resist reform over wine exports for over forty years. In 1719, a royal decision allowed wine to transit through the 
port of Marseille if it was to be exported. In order to protect their local monopoly--granted in the thirteenth century-
-wine growers in Marseille refused to allow any import of wine into the city, even for purposes of export. A suit in 
opposition to this decision was filed in 1750 but it was not until after 1767 that export was authorized again. See 
Georges Billioux, "Le Vignoble Marseillais, du XII:rme Siecle a l'Aduction d'Eau de 1840," Provence Historique, 
Melan~es Busquet, 6 (1956), pp. 166-185; and Georges Rambert, "Le Commerce de l'Eau de Vie a Toulon au 
XVIII"me Siecle," Provence Historique. 13 (1963), pp. 31-53. 
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the Revolution eliminated these local organizations and replaced them with a single pyramidic 
administrative structure headed by the Ministry of Interior. And despite violent resistance in 
some provinces, centralization was achieved early on. 
At the same time, the government appropriated all eminent domain and unused water 
rights. The appropriation of unused water rights to major rivers like the Durance was complete, 
and after 1790, all authority over water rights lay in Paris. In the case of rights of way, the 
agent of the government at the local level--the prefect--wasd charge with all the decisions, the 
government became the sole veto player for irrigation projects.127 The destruction of all other 
veto players freed irrigation development from the shackles of strategic behavior. 
Municipal government was also reformed. Unlike Normandy, municipal governments 
in Provence possessed considerable power under the Old-Regime. The Revolutionary reforms 
put an end to their independent authority and made it difficult for Provencal towns and villages 
to resist central government decisions. Authority that had previously rested with the municipal 
government was placed directly in the hands of the prefect, particularly authority over 
economic matters. Although the ability of prefects to directly coerce wayward village govern-
ments would vary between 1789 and 1860, the indirect means at their disposal were very 
significant. Prefects supervised town finances and closely controlled the management of vil-
lage assets. Finally, villages no longer had the power to block projects approved by the central 
administration. 128 
127)Jean Petot. L' Administration des Ponl et Chausstr~K pp. 383-87; Louis Bergeron. L' Episode Na-
poieonien; Aspects /llleruurs. Paris: Editions du Seuill972, pp. 33; D.M.G. Sutherland, cranc~ 1789-1815 pp. 
345; and AC Vaucluse, S ( Usines et Cours d' b~ ). 
128) Fm1and PonteiL us /n.stiiiUions de Ia cranc~ de 1814 a 1870, pp 30-34; and Louis Bergeron. 
L ' Episode Napoleonim pp. 32-39. 1be power of the prefect emerges from his day to day correspondence. He made 
the final decision over most changes in town budgets. In the case of canals he made the final decision over every 
new water wheel based on the recommendation of local officials and the engineer of the Roads and Bridges Ad-
ministration: AD Vaucluse, S Usines ~~Cows d' Eau, Cavaillon. The new power of the French administration on vil-
lage life during the Revolution is detailed in Anne Zinc Azerei.x. La Vied' une Cof711'1UU1a1ltee Rurale a Ia Fin du 
usff~me Siecle. Paris : S.E.V.P.E.N. 1969, pp. 221-234. 
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As a result of these reforms, towns and villages near a river could no longer refuse 
rights of way for new irrigation projects simply to protect the market value of their older irri-
gated land or, even worse, to syphon off part of the profits. The issue had been of great impor-
tance in the eighteenth century when towns that held authority over rights of way had argued 
they should be compensated for externalities imposed by the developers. The division of politi-
cal power allowed towns to use their authority to demand compensation for losses in the value 
of older irrigated land as a result of expanded irrigation; as if these losses were negative exter-
nalities of the project. 129 This problem highlights the difference between the impact of 
economic development at the local level and at the national level. Cavaillon was pursuing the 
best interest of its inhabitants when it sought to prevent increased irrigation in the Comtat. 
Cavaillon and many other towns that behaved similarly, where simply trying to limit competi-
tion. If the property rights to irrigation expansion had been owned by a larger political body 
than Cavaillon, irrigation would have been more fully developed in the eighteenth century, and 
the economic growth associated with irrigation would have occurred before the Revolution. 
As a result of Revolutionary reforms, those property rights to increased irrigation all rested in 
the national government in the nineteenth century. 
The national governments of the Revolution gave prefects complete authority over 
projects until they were built and those governments also removed the judiciary from the plan-
ing stages of irrigation, making it difficult for local groups to delay projects through litigation. 
Local groups could appeal a project before the prefect but they could no longer appeal an irri-
gation proposal in court. The approval of the prefect was thus sufficient to guarantee the sue-
cess of an irrigation project, and litigation--when it occurred--did not start until after the canal 
129) The modem equivalent would be if new entrants in the computer industry had to pay older firms for 
the lost profits associated with their entry. 
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was built and the social gains were realized. The ability of individuals and groups to litigate 
was further limited because conflicts over technical and engineering issues could no longer be 
litigated, they were instead decided by French administrators and the judiciary's potential 
interventions were limited to monetary (i.e. redistributive) questions. After the Revolution not 
only did the central administration have the power to provide developers of inigation with the 
property rights they needed, it also had the power to enforce all the contracts itself. 130 
Meanwhile the judiciary itself was reformed, the venality of offices was abolished. The 
Old-Regime system, where judges bought their offices, was replaced by an administrative judi-
ciary that was paid and monitored by the central government. The Revolution eliminated all 
rent-seeking because the judiciary could no longer prey on civil cases in hope of financial 
rewards. The Revolution also solved all the problems of overlapping judicial authority, by 
simplifying the geographical and legal jurisdictions of courts. 
Restoration (1815-1860) 
After the end of the Napoleonic Regime in 1815, and under a variety of different 
governments, inigation in southeastern France flourished. The hypothetical rates of return and 
benefit-cost ratios suggest that inigation entrepreneurs earned hefty profits (above 24% or five 
times the rate of interest). From 1815 to 1860 political leaders and governmental structures 
were in constant flux: Louis XVIII and Charles X, under the Restoration constitutional monar-
chy were succeeded by Louis-Philipe, under the Bourgeois constitutional monarchy, and he in 
turn, by Napoleon III, under both the Second Republic and the Second Empire. Despite the 
130) The Old-Regime had attempted give the intendants--the equivalent of the prefect--the same authority 
that the Revolution and Napoleon gave to prefects. Despite much legislative maneuvering the Old Regime once 
again failed. For irrigation specifically the case of the canal of Toulon, a town in eastern Provence--and its irrigation 
canal is most instructive. Toulon had built a canal and had allowed landowners to use the water it did not yet need 
to irrigate their land. In the 1780s the city attempted to reclaim its water. The canal rental contracts were all sup-
pqsed to be under the jurisdiction of the intendant; however, many courts were involved in the litigation. See AN, 
H1 1307 (March 1782) 
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political changes in Paris, the various governments all promoted irrigation, as had the late 
eighteenth century monarchies. It was not government support that brought about irrigation, 
but rather the new set of institutions created during the Revolution. These new institutions 
allowed for the realization of some large projects, such as the canals of Carpentras, L ' Isle, and 
Alpinnes, and many small ones, such as the canals of Plan Oriental, Vergers, and Lauris. 131 
Another post-Revolutionary change reduced the risk of investing in irrigation: the 
associations syndicales. The Restoration governments promoted these organizations of Ian-
downers who stood to benefit from a canal. The associations allowed them to share the costs of 
the canal and deal with collective problems. Each landowner was responsible for a share of the 
costs equal to his share of the land irrigated. Associations actually began during the Revolu-
tion but they did not become widespread until the 1820s, when new legislation simplified their 
creation. Although some projects (the canal of L 'Isle, half of the canal of the Alpinnes, and the 
canal of Pierelatte) were developed by private companies, other by local or departmental 
organizations (the canal of the Alpinnes), most were built and administered by associa-
tions.132 So successful were the associations that even some privately owned canals employed 
them to deal with revenue collection and water allocation in times of drought 133 
Yet the great advantage of associations lay beyond the economies of scale in adminis-
tration. Associations were organizations that solved all the price commitment problems 
131) Irrigation networks varied tremendously both in length and in area serviced. They could be as small 
as the network of the Vergers canal, which was less than a kilometer long and irrigated less than 80 hectares or as 
large as the canal of Carpentras, which was over 100 kilometers long and irrigated over 5,000 hectares. In the 
eighteenth century the distinctions between small and large canals were primarily institutional: a project which ran 
through a large number of communities (more than two or three) qualified as large. For the nineteenth century, I 
adopted the rule that any project over 800 hectares was large. 
132) See J. A. Barra!. us lrrigarions dans k Vaucluse vol. 1, p. 326. 
133) J. A. Barra!, Les lrrigarions dans le Vaucluse vol.l, pp 326-328. In 1870 there were 73 different ca-
nals in the Vaucluse, five were private properties three owned by the state, the others were owned by local adminis-
trations such as associalions and towns council. Most canals were administered by associalions, in fact more than 
75% of all the water distributed in the Vaucluse was through associalions. 
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because they were under the authority of the state. Associations could post a price for irriga-
tion water before the project occurred and the state would enforce that price forever. The state 
was the only party to these agreements who could credibly claim to enforce any price path 
despite the fact that it never had the ability to commit. Although the state had no power of 
commitment, it was a repeat player in irrigation development, as it participated in all the pro-
jects. Repeated participation gave the state reputational incentives to enforce prices. In fact, 
the state alone had reputational incentives to enforce announced price paths because it alone 
was a repeat player in irrigation. Developers could benefit from state enforced prices by creat-
ing an association, which would announce rising prices for irrigation rights. In turn rising 
prices would enduce individual landowners to buy irrigation rights before the project occurred. 
Moreover, given the association's commitment to such prices, creditors were also willing to 
finance projects because revenue was no longer risky. 
The impressive irrigation record of the period 1820-1860 is thus not surprising. The 
overall success of the nineteenth century is striking: in the Vaucluse well over half of the 
increase in irrigated area between 1700 and 1860 came after 1820, and in the Bouches du 
Rhone nearly all the increase occurred after 1820. In sum, more than 10,000 hectares (or a third 
of all the land that was ever irrigated) were supplied from canals completed between 1820 and 
1860. Moreover, by 1870 the demand for Durance water from irrigation canals was greater 
than what was available in the river during the summer drought, and as a result some canals 
could not deliver water during the summer and fall of dry years. 
Whether in the case of a small project such as Plan Oriental, or in the case of a large 
project such as the canal of Carpentras, state approval was swift and associations where 
created by the promoters to raise revenue. The canal of Plan Oriental involved only a small 
amount of land (less than 1 ,000 hectares) and delivered water only to fields in Cavaillon. The 
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project was quickly approved by the prefect and carried out less than four years after the pro-
ject was initiated. In contrast because it involved very large amounts of land (more than 4,000 
hectares were eventually irrigated), in many different communities the canal of Carpentras was 
a project that took decades to get off the ground. The small number of desirable drawing sites 
on the Durance required securing rights of way for the water of the canal of Carpentras through 
other canals (Cabedan-Neuf and L'Isle). The project was delayed until the creation an organi-
zation grouping all the canals that drew water from the site originally used by Cabedan-Neuf 
alone. Nonetheless, given the new rules, the promoters were able to rely on the support and 
authority of the national government and, within 20 years of its initiation, that canal, too, was 
completed. 
Conclusion 
In the early eighteenth century, uncertain property rights over water and and uncertain 
authority over eminent domain stifled the development of irrigation. The uncertainty in pro-
perty rights over water was resolved in the middle eighteenth century, when owners of mono-
poly water rights were defeated in a set of lengthy legal battles. The veto power of owners of 
existing canals over new projects was abolished while their rights to the water they used were 
affirmed. Thus the institutional costs of irrigation fell and development proceeded, but the 
division of authority over rights of eminent domain still limited the scale of irrigation develop-
menL In Provence, the political division of authority--a legacy of the Middle Ages--gave 
ample opportunity to a variety of groups to hold a project up using their veto power. Veto 
players successfully used this position to extract rents from potential developers. 134 
134) The use of veto power to extract rents from developers was in fact widespread in Old-Regime Pro-
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Only local irrigation projects could avoid the costs associated with divided authority 
over rights of eminent domain. As a result, the transaction costs associated with irrigation 
development increased dramatically when "projects crossed authority boundaries. Irrigation 
developers were forced to face these transaction costs because the state proved incapable of 
reform, and the limited development of the late eighteenth century was plagued by very high 
costs imposed by institutions. 
The nineteenth century witnessed the significant development of irrigation in 
southeastern France without significant litigation and with much shorter delays than had been 
customary in the previous century. The Revolutionary reforms lowered transaction costs in irri-
gation by eliminating all local veto players. Not surprisingly, between 1820 and 1865 the area 
irrigated in Provence more than doubled and all the water in the Durance was used. 
Old-Regime institutions had made it impossible for developers to commit to 
announced prices for irrigation rights, and as a result irrigation projects were plagued by the 
durable goods monopolist problem. Starting during the Revolution a number of laws created 
associations syndicales, legal organizations that grouped landowners. Coupled with the 
increased power of the state, nineteenth-century associations successfully solved the durable 
goods monopolist problem. The law allowed associations to use the state to enforce announced 
and time-inconsistent prices for irrigation rights, and the state, because it was a repeat player, 
was willing to enforce the time-inconsistent price paths. 
Tile problems of expanding the irrigation network in eighteenth-century France sug-
gest that the state must play a fundamental role in economic development: it chooses the insti-
vence, cf. Rene Baehrel, La Basse Provence pp. 450-456; Rene Pillorget,/es Mouvemeflls lnsurrectione/s, pp. 196-
207; Maurice Alguhon La Vie Sociale en Provence lfllerieiUe tu1 Lendemain de 14 RevolUlion. Paris: Societe des 
Etudes Robespierristes, 1970 pp. 43-59. 
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tutions that control economic activity. It defines property rights and the nature of the contracts 
by which they can be traded. In short the state defines the law and thereby the magnitude of 
institutional costs. Under the Old Regime there existed no organization--not even the state--
with the power to make the changes necessary for for substantial irrigation development. Not 
even the absolutist state could realize fundamental reforms. The French Revolution achieved 
just that end through the creation of a strong central state. 
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Appendix 2 
Maps, Tables, and Figures for Chapter 3 
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Map3 
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Map4 
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Figure 5: Wages in Avignon 1700-1855 
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Figure 6: Land Prices in Cavaillon 1700-1855 
l i---~----~--~----~--~----~--------~----~--~ 
D 1700 17J6 1772 1808 1844 1880 
Date 
135 
Table 7: Price Series For Provence 1700-1855 
Date Wages Land Prices 
Unskilled Skilled Dry Irrigated 
(Unfed in Francs per day) (in Francs per Ares) 
1700 0.71 1.00 5.11 21 .53 
1705 0.76 0.89 8.14 27.30 
1710 0.73 1.02 10.8 22.01 
1715 0.84 1.00 8.51 28.19 
1720 0.78 1.00 15.10 25.90 
1725 0.80 1.17 9.39 22.97 
1730 0.80 1.12 10.31 22.02 
1735 0.80 1.20 15.98 24.07 
1740 0.77 1.17 13.20 23.55 
1745 0.88 1.25 15.38 24.77 
1750 0.89 1.12 18.27 26.94 
1755 0.96 1.25 18.27 26.94 
1760 0.86 1.07 19.34 28.57 
1765 0.87 1.12 14.10 28.67 
1770 0.92 1.25 23.61 38.54 
1775 1.15 1.50 20.81 30.55 
1780 1.12 1.50 22.03 50.03 
1785 1.17 1.50 16.04 43.28 
1790 1.28 1.50 27.56 32.71 
1795 43.65 63.09 
1800 2.12 2.25 19.10 29.63 
1805 2.25 3.03 20.44 54.38 
1810 1.81 2.45 26.98 40.97 
1815 26.40 38.31 
1820 1.51 2.03 24.20 36.77 
1825 1.54 2.08 29.85 51.00 
1830 1.51 2.03 25.90 44.11 
1835 1.57 2.12 24.50 44.69 
1840 1.67 2.25 23.99 51.49 
1845 1.87 3.16 26.21 51.92 
1850 1.92 3.00 26.79 54.00 
1855 2.00 2.70 29.00 54.70 
!35)The present day department of the Vaucluse begins north of the Durance river while all the land south of the river is 
in the Bouches du Rhone. The map is inspired from Edouard Barratier, Histoiu t:U Ia Provence, p. 369. 
136) The Map is inspired from Rene Caillet, u Canal t:U Carpefllras. 
137) The map is inspired from Paul Masson, Encyclop*iie, voL Vll, p. 188. 
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Figure 7: Hypothetical Benefit-Cost Ratios 
for Irrigation Projects (estimated interest rate) 
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Table 8: Hypothetical Benefit-Cost Ratios 
for Irrigation Projects (estimated interest rate) 
Hypothetical Benefit-Cost Ratios 
Plan Crill on Cabedan Cabedan 
Oriental Neuf Neuf 
(Association) (Barral) 
- - - -
- - - -
2.11 1.90 1.89 1.25 
3.79 3.44 3.53 2.25 
2.08 1.80 1.73 1.21 
2.63 2.43 2.49 1.61 
2.30 2.09 2.12 1.39 
1.50 1.34 1.29 0.90 
2.01 1.81 1.79 1.21 
1.62 1.45 1.42 0.97 
1.62 1.40 1.33 0.94 
1.47 1.29 1.24 0.86 
1.72 1.46 1.37 0.99 
2.73 2.42 2.38 1.62 
2.47 2.10 1.94 1.43 
1.36 1.20 1.16 0.80 
3.67 3.20 3.07 2.15 
3.60 3.23 3.23 2.13 
0.66 0.56 0.53 0.38 
- - - -
0.88 0.79 0.82 0.52 
2.34 2.17 2.26 1.42 
1.21 1.08 1.08 0.72 
- - - -
1.29 1.15 1.14 0.77 
2.15 1.89 1.82 1.27 
1.90 1.69 1.65 1.13 
2.05 1.83 1.82 1.22 
2.64 2.37 2.37 1.58 
1.92 1.79 1.81 1.18 
2.09 1.93 1.95 1.28 
2.06 1.85 1.85 1.23 
Carpentras 
-
-
1.44 
2.73 
1.43 
2.13 
1.81 
1.15 
1.58 
1.23 
1.21 
1.11 
1.22 
2.07 
1.76 
1.02 
2.55 
2.59 
0.46 
-
0.64 
1.79 
0.91 
-
0.97 
1.60 
1.44 
1.58 
2.04 
1.56 
1.68 
1.59 
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Figure 8: Hypothetical Benefit-Cost Ratios 
for Irrigation Projects (Mortgage rate) 
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Table 9: Hypothetical Benefit-Cost Ratios 
for Irrigation Projects (Mortgage rate) 
Hypothetical Benefit-cost Ratios 
Plan Crill on Cabedan Cabedan 
Oriental Neuf Neuf 
(Association) (Barral) 
3.65 3.44 2.89 2.24 
4.40 3.96 3.24 2.61 
2.36 2.13 1.72 1.42 
4.08 3.69 3.03 2.43 
2.24 1.95 1.54 1.31 
2.57 2.37 1.95 1.56 
2.27 2.07 1.69 1.37 
1.48 1.32 1.04 0.88 
1.96 1.77 1.42 1.18 
1.62 1.45 1.16 0.97 
1.58 1.36 1.07 0.92 
1.44 1.26 1.00 0.85 
1.74 1.48 1.15 1.01 
2.72 2.41 1.92 1.61 
2.48 2.11 1.63 1.44 
1.35 1.19 0.95 0.80 
3.93 3.44 2.71 2.31 
3.82 3.43 2.77 2.28 
0.68 0.57 0.44 0.39 
- - - -
0.92 0.83 0.68 0.54 
2.43 2.26 1.87 1.48 
1.23 1.10 0.88 0.73 
- - -
-
1.31 1.17 0.94 0.78 
2.14 1.88 1.49 1.27 
1.90 1.69 1.34 1.13 
2.03 1.81 1.46 1.21 
2.62 2.36 1.90 1.56 
1.88 1.76 1.44 1.16 
2.05 1.89 1.54 1.25 
2.04 1.84 1.48 1.22 
Carpentras 
2.95 
3.38 
1.82 
3.15 
1.65 
2.03 
1.77 
1.12 
1.51 
1.23 
1.15 
1.07 
1.25 
2.05 
1.79 
1.01 
2.92 
2.92 
0.48 
-
0.71 
1.93 
0.93 
-
1.00 
1.60 
1.43 
1.54 
2.01 
1.50 
1.62 
1.56 
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Figure 9: Hypothetical Internal Rates of Return 
for Irrigation Projects 
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Date Plan 
Oriental 
1700 156. 
1705 185. 
1710 94 
1715 173. 
1720 86.5 
1725 105. 
1730 89.4 
1735 41.3 
1740 71.3 
1745 50.9 
1750 47.5 
1755 38.8 
1760 57.5 
1765 111. 
1770 98.4 
1775 32.6 
1780 164. 
1785 161. 
1790 -24.0 
1795 -
1800 -0.97 
1805 98.6 
1810 23.1 
1815 -
1820 29.9 
1825 81.5 
1830 67.8 
1835 75.4 
1840 107. 
1845 67.4 
1850 77.1 
1855 76.2 
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Table 10: Hypothetical Internal Rates of Return 
for Irrigation Projects 
Hypothetical Internal Rates of Return 
(In pt!rcent per annum) 
Crillon Cabedan Cabedan Carpentras 
Neuf Neuf 
(association) (Barra!) 
120. 157. 84.6 50.1 
127. 166. 102. 54.1 
68.8 77.9 35.4 30.1 
121. 157. 93.2 51.5 
58.2 61.3 27.9 25.8 
80.5 95.5 45.0 34.8 
67.6 77.3 32.4 29.2 
27.6 25.3 -3.73 10.2 
52.3 55.6 19.0 22.7 
35.8 35.5 3.19 14.4 
29.6 26.7 -0.84 11.3 
24.1 21.4 -6.70 8.34 
35.7 32.6 5.99 14.7 
77.6 88.5 47.1 34.4 
62.1 64.0 35.9 28.7 
19.6 17.1 -11.1 5.85 
106. 127. 85.3 48.0 
111. 138. 84.7 48.5 
-44.2 -36.3 -53.4 -31.2 
- - - -
-12.1 -6.86 -36.5 -10.8 
77.8 93.5 39.8 32.8 
13.4 12.7 -17.4 2.42 
- - - -
18.9 17.6 -12.5 5.38 
55.7 58.4 24.8 24.6 
47.9 49.7 15.2 20.4 
54.6 58.9 21.1 23.5 
77.3 89.3 44.7 33.9 
53.6 59.2 17.7 22.9 
59.6 66.6 24.2 25.7 
56.1 61.4 21.9 24.1 
Estimated 
Interest 
rate 
15.0 
15.0 
15. 
11.4 
11.4 
3.11 
4.37 
3.91 
3.11 
5.33 
3.11 
3.70 
6.33 
4.83 
5.79 
4.74 
10.9 
10.4 
6.87 
9.4 
9.30 
8.70 
6.15 
7.40 
6.70 
5.09 
5.16 
4.33 
4.58 
3.62 
3.57 
4.41 
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Chapter 4 
Settlement, Litigation and Eighteenth-Century Norman Drainage 
143 
Introduction 
This chapter analyzes a game of litigation and settlement with endogenous court 
costs--a game with implications for economic history and for the impact of judicial institutions 
on economic activity. The chapter demonstrates the importance of information and evidence in 
litigation and settlement decisions and shows that rules of legal proof cannot be ignored when 
modeling settlement and litigation games. I begin by arguing that the way players gather and 
use information in a litigation game is crucial to an understanding of the judicial process. I 
then review the relevant literature in law and economics, and after describing the game and 
defining the equilibrium concept, I show that an equilibrium exists and that it is generically 
unique. I next examine the impact of specific legal rules on the equilibrium. Finally I use the 
model to analyze litigation over the drainage of marshes in eighteenth-century France, the goal 
being to uncover how particular institutional rules blocked drainage and technical change. 
For our purposes litigation can be defined as a process whereby two parties who 
disagree on the value of a contract come to a binding resolution. This resolution is enforced by 
a third party--the court. Because court resolutions are costly, both parties would prefer to settle 
out of court. In this game I assume that the true value of the contract can be either high or low 
and that, at least initially, neither player knows its true value. The true value of the contract, 
though, is less important in this context than the difficulty each party has documenting its value 
before the court. If the parties fail to reach an out-of-court agreement, the court decides on the 
value of the contract based on the evidence brought before it by the players. The players must 
therefore expend resources trying to document the value of the contract. In this process they 
may or may not learn its true value. We examine the effect of their ability to learn the value of 
the contract under two assumptions: first, the information gained while they do their research is 
private; second, if neither player is able to document the true value, the court awards a convex 
144 
combination of the high and the low value of the contract. 
The judicial game that is played when the parties fail to reach an out-of-court settle-
ment is the driving force behind the magnitude of the settlement offer and the decision to 
accept the settlement or refuse it. The outcome of the court game depends on what each player 
can prove about the value of the contract, but the players only search for evidence if the settle-
ment attempt fails. Because I ultimately want to model eighteenth-century French litigation, I 
assume that only the defendant can make a settlement offer, obviously in other institutional 
settings this may not be the case. I also assume that the plaintiff is better informed than the 
defendant, another assumption that I shall defend at the end of the chapter. 
The game involves a four-step procedure. First, an uninformed defendant makes a set-
tlement offer to a partially informed plaintiff. Second, the plaintiff either accepts or sues. 
Third, if the plaintiff sues, both players do research and present evidence to the court, and that 
body, in the fourth and final step, decides on the value of the contract. 
In the first part of the chapter I characterize the unique perfect equilibrium of this 
game. The salient features of the equilibrium are as follows. First, if no plaintiff will accept a 
zero offer, it is a dominant strategy for the defendant to make a strictly positive settlement 
offer. Hence some settlement always occurs. Second, in keeping with the results of the litera-
ture, 138 higher plaintiff court costs weakly increase the probability that a settlement offer is 
accepted. Third, the model illuminates the importance of rules governing the burden of proof. 
They have, in the past, tended not to be analyzed. 139 If the burden of proof rests with the 
138) See for example Luce Bebchuk, "Litigation and Settlement under Imperfect Information."' Rand 
Journal of Economics, 15 (1894), pp. 404415. 
139) See, however, Joel Sobel, "Disclosure of Evidence and Resolution of Disputes: Who Should Bear 
the Burden of Proof?" in A. E. Roth. Game Theoretic Model of Bargaining. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1985, pp. 341-361; and David Rubinfeld and D.E.M. Sappington. "Efficient Awards and Standards of Proof 
in Judicial Proceedings," Rand Journal of Economics, vol. 18 (1987), pp. 308-315. 
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plaintiff, as in most civil cases, then in equilibrium defendants do no research, and plaintiffs 
are more likely to accept the settlement offer than under any other burden of proof rule. 
Finally, minor modifications of the model allow me to examine the issue of settlements when 
courts must either decide that the contract has a high value or let the settlement offer stand as 
the legal contract. It is this final model that most closely resembles the settlement and litiga-
tion process in eighteenth-century French contract appeals. 
Bebchuk, 140 and Wilde and Reinganum 141 have analyzed models of litigation and 
settlement. The key difference between their models is that Bebchuk has the uninformed party, 
while Reinganum and Wilde have the informed party, make the settlement offer. Whether the 
informed or the uninformed party makes the offer affects the probability of settlement as well 
as the magnitude of the expected transfer between plaintiff and defendant. While Bebchuk's 
model is closest to mine, it suffers from underdetermination: unless the density of the distribu-
tion function of damages is single peaked, there is no guarantee that the equilibrium will be 
unique. The problem of multiple equilibria in fact plagues all models where the uninformed 
party makes the settlement offer because in these models the equilibrium settlement offer 
depends on the distribution function of damages. 142 
Both Bebchuk and Reinganum and Wilde were primarily concerned with the impact of 
different rules for allocating litigation costs between plaintiff and defendant on equilibrium 
trial probabilities. Thus they have little to say about the impact of judicial resolution of 
conflicts on economic activity. In contrast, Meurer analyzes the settlement and litigation of 
patents in a setting more directly relevant to mine. 143 In that model the players compete for 
140) Luu Bebchuk, "Litigation and Settlement under Imperfect Information." 
141) Jennifer Reinganum and Louis Wilde, "Senlement and Litigation Costs," Rand Journal of Econom· 
ics, 1987. 
142) Luce Bebchuk, "Litigation and Settlement under Imperfect Information," p. 408. Bebchuk simply as-
sumes that the distribution has the right properties but does not investigate the implications of this assumption. 
143) M.J. Meurer, "The Settlement of Patent Litigation," Working Paper #21, DepartmenJ of Economics, 
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the surplus generated by a patent, but the value of those surpluses depend on the structure of 
the industry. The structure of the industry in turn depends on the impact of the litigation and 
settlement game. One problem with Meurer's model, though, is that he fails to consider the 
effect of endogenous expenditure decisions by plaintiffs and defendants. Therefore, in that 
model, trials remain lotteries. 
In the law and economics literature, trials generally occur because of imperfect infor-
mation. In preparation for a trial, plaintiffs and defendants expend resources documenting their 
respective cases. It is well established in the literature cited above that litigation costs tend to 
drive up the likelihood of out-of-court settlement. But litigation costs are also directly tied to 
the amount of evidence a plaintiff or a defendant will bring to bear on his case, and this evi-
dence directly affects the decisions of judges and juries. Most of the literature ignores the 
issues of evidence and models the trial process as a lottery that depends only on the type of the 
defendant or of the plaintiff. Oearly litigation costs, judicial outcomes, and the likelihood of 
out-of-court settlement are all interrelated. It is thus essential to make court costs endogenous. 
Moreover, with endogenous court costs it is possible to address other questions including the 
effect of rules--for example, the burden of proof--on the whole process. The model analyzed 
below is an attempt to consider these issues. 
The Model 
The game I will analyze involves two players, a developer (the defendant) and a pro-
perty right owner (hereafter the plaintiff). The developer has a license to carry out an activity 
that produces externalities. The plaintiff suffers from this activity. The object of the game is to 
set the level of compensation for the plaintiff's property right. Depending on the nature of his 
Dulce Universily . November 1986. 
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property right he may suffer high damages and be entitled to high compensation (A) or he may 
suffer low damages and only be entitled to. low compensation (B). There are two types of 
plaintiffs: strong plaintiffs and weak plaintiffs. The strong plaintiffs have a higher probability 
of having high damages then weak ones. Types are randomly distributed by nature, strong 
types occuring with probability 1-p and weak types with probability p. 
In the first stage of the game, nature draws the plaintiff's type, and that is revealed to 
the plaintiff. The plaintiff, however, does not know his true level of damage but only which 
lottery he faces over high and low damages. The developer is uninformed about damages and 
types, but he knows the probability distribution of type of plaintiffs, and the probability distri-
bution of damages given types. In the second stage, the uninformed developer offers a settle-
ment offer (denoted S) to the plaintiff. The plaintiff either accepts the settlement offer or 
appeals in court. If he accepts, the game ends; if he goes to court, both parties simultaneously 
choose their level of legal expenditures. In the final stage, the court makes a decision about the 
case. If conclusive evidence of the level of damages is brought by either party then the court 
awards that level of damages as compensation. If no conclusive evidence is brought before the 
court, the court awards a convex combination tA+(l-t)Bof the damage levels denoted by D. 
Variations in t are equivalent to variations of the burden of proof rules. Indeed, burden of proof 
rules come into play only when no conclusive evidence is brought before the court. For exam-
ple, if t is 0, then the burden of proof rests completely on the plaintiff. Figure 10, a the end of 
the text. provides a schematic diagram of the game. 
Assumptions 
Assumption 1: Plaintiffs can be two types: 1 (weak), or 2 (strong). Since there is only one 
kind of defendant. types will always refer to plaintiffs. A plaintiff is weak with probability p. 
and strong with probability 1-p. 
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Assumption 2: A plaintiff of type i has high damages (A) with probability ~; and low damages 
(B) with probability 1-~;K We assume ~1 <~O : strong plaintiffs have higher probabilities of hav-
ing high damages than weak ones. 
Assumption 3: Plaintiffs do not know their true damages; they only know whether they are of 
type 1 or 2. 
Types 1 or 2 can also be viewed as different probability distributions over evidence 
concerning high damages. Type 2 plaintiffs are more likely to be able to show that they suf-
fered high damages, and are thus more likely to get a high award in court. Because I want to 
emphasize the distinction between the true level of damages (in this case A or B) and the abil-
ity to prove such a level of damage, I introduce the issue of evidence. 
(1) For plaintiffs with low damages it is possible to obtain conclusive evidence that 
they are entitled only to low compensation but it is not possible to obtain conclusive evidence 
that they are entitled to high compensation. In short, it is only possible to document low com-
pensation claims. 
(2) For plaintiffs with high damages it is possible to obtain conclusive evidence that 
they are entitled to high compensation but it is not possible to obtain conclusive evidence that 
they are entitled only to low compensation (i.e., only high compensation claims can be docu-
mented). The research process involved in documenting claims about damage levels is 
assumed to be both costly and probabilistic. 
Assumption 4: For cases where damages are in fact low, the probability of finding conclusive 
evidence that damages are low, given expenditure c, is defined as a concave and differentiable 
function g (c) from R + into the unit interval. The probability of finding conclusive evidence 
that damages are high is 0. 
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For cases where the damages are in fact high, the probability of documenting a claim 
that compensation should be high is defined as a concave and differentiable function f (c ) from 
R + into the unit interval where c is the amount spent on research. The probability of docu-
menting low damages is 0. 
Assumption 5: 
a8 co)> 1 and~ElF> ___ I __ 
ac ~EA -B ) ac ~OEA -B) 
Assumption 5 is sufficient to avoid a corner solution with zero joint expenditure. In game 
theory terms, the assumption insures that neither party has zero spending as a dominant stra-
tegy. 
In the case of litigation, both parties are able to hire lawyers to do research for them 
and to present evidence to the court. The court makes a decision about the plaintiff's damages 
based on the evidence brought to the trial. Lawyers may find either conclusive evidence or 
inconclusive evidence. Research findings are private information, so if the plaintiff's lawyer 
finds evidence that the plaintiff has low damages, he will only report inconclusive evidence. If 
the developer's lawyer finds evidence the plaintiff has high damages then he also will report 
only inconclusive evidence. 
Going to court involves both fixed and endogenous costs. The fixed costs of the plain-
tiff are denoted FP' those of the developer (or defendent) are denoted Fd. Fixed costs are 
intended to capture such things as the cost of delay and the fixed legal expenses associated with 
the case. The endogenous costs of plaintiffs of type i are denoted ci, those of the developer cd . 
These are the costs of research to document claims. The settlement offer is denoted S while 
(1-ki) is the probability that a type i plaintiff accepts the settlement offer. Thus the loss func -
tion of the developer is: 
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Ld=p[ [1-kdp+k~[~~[fEc 1FA+[l-fEclFFag +E1-~ 1 F[ g(cd)B+[1-g(cd)]D] +cd+Fd] J 
+(1-p )[ [1-k:z.]S +k2[ ~O[! (c:z)A +[1-f (c:z)]D] +E1-~:zF [ g (c. )B +[1-g (cd)]D J +cd+F d J J . 
The profit function of a plaintiff of type i is 
0;=[1-k;)S +k; [ ~; [1 (c;)A+[1-f (c; )]D] +E1-~; )[ g (cd)B +[1-g (cd))DJ -c;-Fp J . 
Strategies 
A strategy for the developer is a pair { S ,cd (S ,Jc)} where S is a member of R +, cd (S ,Jc) 
is a function from R + x { 0,1} into the positive reals, and k is the decision of the plaintiff (0 is 
acceptance, 1 is refusal of the offer). Although the plaintiff may randomize, the developer only 
observes the outcome (0 or 1) of his action. 
A strategy for the plaintiff is also a pair: { k; (S ),c; (S .k;)} where k; (S) is function from 
R+ into the unit interval [0,1], k;(S) is a number indicating the probability of refusing the set-
tlement, and c; (S ,Jc;) is function from R + x [ 0,1] into R +. 
Assumption 6: 
s E [O,A-Fd] 
Ci e [MK~; (A-B)] 
Cd E [MIE1-~ 1 FEA-BFz 
Strategy spaces are bounded below because the players cannot spend or offer negative 
amounts. They are also bounded above because of rationality. They will never spend more than 
is at stake in the game. 
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Equilibrium 
Because research results are assumed to be private information, in equilibrium, indivi-
duals (plaintiffs or defendants) will never report information that does not help them. Incon-
clusive evidence is ignored by the court by assumption, and thus the court's decision will 
depend only on the developer's evidence if the plaintiff has low damages and only on the 
plaintiff's evidence if he has high damages. 
Definition 1: A sequential equilibrium is defined as a vector E·=cs·, c 1·, c 2·, c/, k 1•, k 2• ,q·) 
such that: 
1) c; • maximizes 
(I) ~;[/Ec;FA+[1-fEc;Fzag +E1-~;F[ g(c/)B+[1-g(cd·)]D] -c;-Fp, 
subject to c; e [MK~; (A-B)]; 
2)cd • minimizes 
(II) q• [~ 1 [fEc 1 ·FA+[1-fEc 1 •Fzaz +E1-~ 1 F[ g(c.)B+[1-g(cd)]D] l 
+E1-q·{~O[fEc OKFA+[1-fEc O·Fzag +E1-~~[ g(cd)B+[1-g(cd)]D]] +cd+Fd, 
subject to cde [E1-~ 1FEA-BFzI where q• is the developer's probability belief that i is of type 1; 
3) k; • maximizes 
(Ill) (1-k; )S• +ki [ ~i [f (ci • )A +[1-f (ci • ))D) +(1-13; )[ g (cd • )B +(1-g (cd • )]D] -c; • -FP J , 
subject to k; e [ 0,1 ]; 
4) S • minimizes 
(IV) L (S)=p [1-k 1• ]S +(1-p )[1-k2• JS +[pk 1• +(1-p )k 2•] (c. • +Fti) 
+pk 1• [ ~ 1 [1 (c 1• )A +[1-/ (c 1• )]DJ +E1-~ 1F[ g (c.· )B +[1-g (cd • )]DJ J 
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subject to S e [0, A -F d]; and 
5) q • satisfies Bayes' rule: 
(V) . q 
pkl • 
Definition 2: A self-fulfilling equilibrium is a sequential equilibrium such that the probability 
that the court awards high damages when no conclusive evidence is presented by either party 
equals the true probability t• that damages are high when there is no conclusive evidence. 144 
In other words, t satisfies Bayes rule : 
cvn t=t· = 
Notice that because of subgame perfection c;x- and c. • cannot depend on the random-
ness of the litigation rule. Furthermore, as I have defined them, neither sequential equilibria 
nor self-fulfilling equilibria are fully Bayesian because the players take the posterior beliefs of 
the court as fixed. This assumption makes the analysis simpler and seems in keeping with the 
notion that courts are bound by precedent. 
144) A more intuitive way to state the property is: an equilibrium is self-fulfilling if, when no evidence is 
presented by either party, the probability of high awards (t ), which is announced by the court at the begining of the 
game, equals the Bayesian probability that damages are high (t • ). One could assume that an outside observer com-
putes t • and compares it to t, to see if they match. if they do, then the equilibrium is self-fulfilling. 
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Theorem 1: 
There exist at most two equilibria to this game, E 1 and E 2. In any equilibrium optimal 
levels of expenditures are c 1 •, c 2•, cd • given by : 
of(c/) 
and oc 
1 
-=----- ' i =1 ,2 j3i (1-t )(A-B) 
1 
[q.j31+(1-q.)j3V(1-t)(A-B). 
Optimal settlement levels, S 1•, S 2 • (corresponding to E 1, E 2 ) are defined by: 
S 1 • minimizes 
[1-k 1• ]S +k 1•131 [t (c 1• )A +[1-f (c 1• )JD] +(1-j31)[ g (cd • )B +[1-g (cd • )JD] -c. • +F d• and 
S 2• =!32[! (c2" )A +[1-/ (c 2• )]DJ +(1-13v[ g (cd • )B +[1-g (c/ )]DJ . 
Optimal litigation probabilities for each equilibrium are as follows: 
Proof 
The proof is done by backwards induction. First, I solve for the optimal expenditures, 
c 1", c 2• and c. •, given q and S. Second, I solve for the optimal litigation probabilities proba-
bilities, k 1" and k2" givenS. Third, I solve for the optimal settlement offer s• taking the previ-
ous optimizations into account at each step. Where proofs of lemmas are not given those proofs 
can be found in the appendix. 
1. Legal Expenditures 
Fix the settlement offer, S, and the post-settlement probability that the plaintiff is 
strong, q. Assume that the plaintiff has refused the offer. The players now face the 
154 
simultaneous decision of legal expenditures. The plaintiff must choose ci to maximize (I) or, 
Noting that D=tA+(l-t)B, the first order condition is 
The developer must choose cd • to minimize (II) or , 
(3) q• [131[/(c 1•)A+[l-f(c 1·)]DJ +(1-(31)[ g(cd)B+[1-g(cd)JD]] 
+{l-q·{132[t<c2·)A+[l-/{c2·)JD] +0-13v[ g(cd)B+[l-g(cd)JD]] +cd+Fd. 
The first order condition is 
og (cd) [ l (4) ocd (B-A) q(1-(31)+(1-q)(1-(3vJ t=-1. 
The concavity off(.) and g (.) as well as assumption 5 are sufficient to guarantee that a solution 
to both problems will exist. Assume that the rationality constraints do not bind. First order 
conditions will be necessary and sufficient because concavity insures that the second order con-
ditions hold. Thus ci • and cd • are defined by 
(2') of(c/) 1 ::. R and, 
ac ..,i (1-t)(A -B) 
(4') og(c,/) 1 
oc [q(1-j31)+(1-qX1-13vlt(A-B). 
Corollary 1 
The equilibrium expenditures of the plaintiff do not depend on the size of the settle-
ment offer or on the probability that the plaintiff accepts it. The equilibrium expenditures of 
the developer, however, do depend on litigation probabilities since these affect his beliefs 
about the type of the plaintiff. The developer's legal expenditures rise with the probability that 
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weak plaintiffs sue and fall with the probability that strong plaintiffs sue. 
2. Optimal Litigation Levels 
Fix S. Let { cd • (k 1 ,k2J,c 1• ,c 2• } be the equilibrium expenditures. Plaintiffs of type i will 
want to choose ki • to maximize (III) or 
(5) ITi=[1-ki • ]5 +ki [ 13i [1 (ci • )A +[1-f (c/ )]DJ +(1-J3i )[ g (c/ (ki ))B +[1-g (c/ (ki )]DJ -ci • -FP J . 
Lemma 1 
For each S there exists at most one equilibrium pair { k 1 • (S ),k 2 • (S)} of litigation levels. 
Definition 3: let xi be the probability that plaintiffs of type j litigates. Then let ki • (xi) be the 
best response of plaintiffs of the other type to such a litigation probability. Since there are only 
two types of plaintiffs we can write simply ki • (x) 
Lemma2 
k 1 • (x )<k 2 • (x) 
Lemma 2 is enough to guarantee the existence of a unique pair of equilibrium litiga-
tion probabilities despite the fact that the best response function of strong plaintiffs (type 2) 
may not be continuous. Indeed, if it is continuous, it is either constant, at 0 or at 1; and then 
the fact that type l's best response function is monotone guarantees that the equilibrium will be 
unique. 
If the best response function of type 2 is discontinuous, then it is 1 when k 1 is low and 
0 when k1 is high. Noting that k1\x)5Jc 2.(x) for any x in [0,1] and that k1.(x) is weakly 
decreasing guarantees that k1• =0. The equilibrium will thus be k1• =0 , k 2• =1. Thus for any S, 
the equilibrium pair of litigation probabilities is unique. Furthermore strong plaintiffs always 
use pure strategies. 
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Definition 4: zi is a reservation settlement for type i if and only if (1), ki • =1 for all s >zi, and 
(2), ki • =0 for all S <zi. zi is a reservation like o.ffer if only (1) or (2) hold. 
Lemma3 
There exists one reservation settlement offer for strong plaintiffs (type 2) and two reservation 
like offers for weak plaintiffs (type 1). 
The reservation offer of strong plaintiffs will be denoted z2. Strong type plaintiffs 
reject any offer less than z2 with probability one and accept any offer higher then z2 with pro-
bability one. Reservation like offers of weak plaintiffs will be denoted ~ and z-;. Settlement 
offers less than ~ are refused by weak plaintiffs with probability one, those offers between ~ 
and ;; are accepted with some probability less than one, and those offers above z-; are accepted 
with probability one. 
Lemma4 
The reservation offer of strong types is accepted by weak types with probability one (z 2>z 1). 
Thus if strong plaintiffs accept the settlement offer, then weak plaintiffs accept the 
offer as well. For any settlement offer above z-; q • =0, and the developer will spend the least 
documenting his claim. Define c-;; to be his litigation expenditures in this case. 
Lemma 4 allows us to naturally define out-of-equilibrium beliefs for the developer. The 
natural extention of q • above z-; when no trials should occur is clearly q • =0. 
To find ~ and ;; recall (III), the profit function for type 1 plaintiffs. Differentiating 
with respect to k1, yields: 
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:J. is the S such that (VII) is verified when k1=1 and kz==I. z-; is the S that solves (VII) when 
k 1=0 and kz==I. 
To avoid the trivial equilibrium where the settlement offer is 0 and everyone accepts, I 
assume that strong plaintiffs would always sue if offered 0. However there is no guarantee that 
weak plaintiffs will not accept a zero offer with positive probability (z-;so or :J_SO). The reser-
vation like offer of type 1 plaintiffs will be negative if the fixed court costs of the plaintiff are 
high enough. If either ~so or ~soI we can redefine them without loss of generality to be 0. 
The possible equilibrium litigation levels are described in Table 11 
p<~ Se [~Kztl Se [z1.z2l s-a2 
kl. 1 [0, 1] 0 0 
k2. 1 1 1 0 
Table 11 
Optimal Litigation Probabilities Given Plaintiff Type and Settlement Level 
3. Optimal Settlement 
Now that optimal expenditures and litigation probabilities have been determined let us 
consider the choice of settlement offers by the developer. 
Claim: there are three potential settlement offers o.S ,z 2, where S minimizes 
(7) [1-k 1"]S +k 1" ~~ [t (c 1" )A+[1-f (c 1" )JD] +E1-~ 1F[ g (c,/ )B +[1-g (c,/ )]DJ -c. • +F d. 
subject to s e [~Iz tJ. 
Proof: 
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Other potential equilibrium settlement offers are ruled out because they are dominated 
by those listed above. For example, settlement offers greater than z-; but less than z2 are dom-
inated by z-;. If offered a settlement between z-; and z2, type 1 plaintiffs still accept the offer 
with probability one but get higher settlement. Type 2 plaintiffs' behavior is also unchanged, 
they sue with probability one. So the developer pays strictly more and thus;-; dominates S. 
The developer's loss function is: 
(8) Ld=P[ [1-le 1]S +le 1 [ ~~[t (c 1)A+[1-/ (c 1)JD] +E1-~ 1F[ g (cd)B +[1-g (cd)]D] +cd+F d J J 
+(1-p)[ [1-k:zzp+feO[~z[f<czFA+[1-fEczFzaz +E1-~:zF[ g(cd)B+[1-g(cd)JD] +cd+Fd] J. 
Now for S e [ O.:J_] , 0 is a weak local minimum. For S e [ :J. ,;-;] the developer's loss 
function is : 
(9) p[ [1-let• )S +le1• [ ~~ [t (c 1• )A +[1-f (c 1• )JD] +E1-~1F[ g (c/ )B +[1-g (cd • )]D] +cd • +Fd]] 
+E1-pF[~z[f<cO•FA+[1-fEczKFgaz +E1-~:zF[ g(cd •)B+[1-g(cd •))DJ +cd • +Fd] . 
The first-order condition for the developer is 
• a1e 1 • [ [ • • ~ [ • • ~ • J (10) [1-/c 1 J---a:s ~1 /(c 1 )A+[1-f(c 1 ))DJ +{1-~ 1 F g(c. )B+[l-g(cd )]DJ +cd +F.-S =0. 
a2L ale • 
The second-order condition always holds because as; =-O~~- The loss function, thus, 
has a unique minimum between :J. and z 1• Call S 1 the settlement that minimizes the loss func-
tion between :J. and z-;. Then the only possible equilibrium candidates for fixed t are 
- • • • • pie I. ) 
£1 = (S .Jc1 ,1,C.t .C1 ,C2 , • • , 
plc 1 +{1-p)/c2 
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LemmaS 
E 0 is never an equilibrium, because it either S =0 or 0 is a setlement offer dominated by S. 
Proof: 
We must look at two cases O<Z 1 and O>Z 1• Consider first O<Z1• Now let us compute the loss 
function of the developer if he offers 0: 
(11) p[~ 1 [/Ec 1 KFA+[1-/Ec 1 •Fzag +E1-~ 1 F[ g(c,. •)B+[1-g(c/)]DJ +c,. • +F,.] 
+E1-pF[~z[fEc OKFA+[1-fEc O·Fzag +E1-~zF[ g(c/)B+[1-g(c/)]DJ +c/ +F,.]. 
Because O<z_1 all plaintiffs sue with probability one, now let us compute the loss function if the 
developers offers S: 
(12) p[ [1-k 1• ]S +k 1• [ ~~ [1 (c 1• )A +[1-/ (c 1• )]DJ +E1-~1 F[ g (c,. • )B +[1-g (c,. • )]DJ +c,. • +F,. J J 
+(1-p )[ ~O[! (c 2• )A +[1-/ (c 2• )]DJ +E1-~zF[ g (c,." )B +[1-g (c,. • )]DJ +c,. • +F,. J ; 
now let us look at (11) -(12) or 
(13) k 1 K~ 1 [fEc 1KFA+[1-/Ec 1 •Fzag +(1-131)[ g(c/)B+[1-g(c/)JD] +c/ +F,.-S. 
Then recall that p=~1 [1 (c 1• )A +[1-f (c 1• )]DJ +E1-~ 1 F[ g (c,. • )B +[1-g (c/ )]DJ 
Now suppose O>Z 1, then 0 belongs by assumption to the interval [Z1,0Zz) . On that 
interval the unique minimum of the loss function is S so 0 cannot be an equilibrium offer 
unless it is S and E rr=E 1• 
Therfore there remain only possible equilibria: 
160 
- • • • • pkl. 
£ 1 = (S,k 1 ,l,cd ,c 1 ,c 2 , • • ) pkl +(l-p)k2 
• • • 145 £ 2 = (z 2,0,0,c 2 ,C 1 ,c 2 ,0). 
This completes the proof of theorem 1. 
Corollary 2 
The equilibrium is unique for almost all sets of parameter values (t ,A ,B ,F d ,FP .131 K1P~K Further-
more, as t increases compensation increases weakly, as the fixed court costs of the defendant 
increase compensation increases weakly, and as the fixed court costs of the plaintiff increase 
compensation decreases weakly. 
Proof" 
Sup{X>se that the initial conditions lead to multiple equilibria. Then any o rise in the 
fixed trial costs of the developer, Fd, will make him prefer the high-settlement equilibrium. 
Similarly any o increase in the fixed court cost of plaintiffs, F P, will raise the probability that 
type 1 accepts S which lowers the developer's cost in that equilibrium only and thus breaks the 
tie. So without loss of generality I will assume that the equilibrium is unique for every t. Com-
parative statics follow directly. 
Self-Fulfilling Equilibria 
145) One should note that, strictly speaking, in E 2 sttong plaintiffs are indifferent between settling and li-
tigating. At first glance, the indifference of sttong plaintiffs suggests that there is a continuum of mixed sttategies for 
these plaintiffs in this equilibrium and two pure sttategies, one where they sue and one where they settle. Yet if 
sttong plaintiffs sue with positive probability then z 2 no longer minimizes the loss function. For any k 2 probability 
of suits the developer can find a 0 such that z 2+0 is an offer that dominates z 2 because if the offer is superior to z 2 
then it is a dominant sttategy for plaintiffs of all type to settle. Yet z 2+0 is dominated by all the offers in the interval 
[z 2,z 2+0] for any 0. So if sttong plaintiffs litigate with probility when offered z 2• then there is no sequential equili-
brium. Thus E 2 remains the only sequential equlibrium. 
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From a Bayesian point of view one might argue that it is inconsistent if the plaintiff 
and defendant act in a Bayesian way but the court does not In other words, the court's beliefs 
(1) should also be properly updated given the prior actions of the players. Recall the definition 
oft·: 
If we retain the assumption that defendant and plaintiff take 1 as fixed and allow the court to 
announce 1, then the question is whether there exists an equilibrium 1 such that t=t·. 
If £ 2 is the equilibrium for some 1 then the answer to our question is trivial because in 
equilibrium there are no trials and hence the court's beliefs do not matter; all sequential equili-
bria where everyone is compensated outright (£ 0 are trivially proper. 
Theorem2 
There exist's at least one 1 such that 1• =l. 
The generic uniqueness of self-fulfilling equilibria on the other hand is not possible to 
prove because the derivative of 1• with respect to 1 is not necessarily monotone. An alternative 
to the assumption that 1 is fixed is to assume that the defendant and the plaintiff both know that 
the convex combination of high and low compensations handed out by the court in the absence 
of conclusive evidence is equal to the Bayesian expected damages. While such Bayesian res-
trictions on 1 have great game theoretic appeal, they are less meaningfull in judicial contexts 
because, as I argue in the next section, courts may not behave as Bayesian players. 
Rules 
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A number of rules limit the behavior of court, most often they are embodied in pre-
cedent and in burden of proof. These rules !ife well known in advance by the litigants. or at 
least by their lawyers. The rules of litigation show little concern for Bayes· rule, they tend to 
set l at 0 or 1. Because trials are redistributive games as opposed to production games, 
whether the plaintiff ends up with high or low compensation has little impact on the economy. 
By setting l at 0 rather than at some strictly positive level in civil cases, courts would in fact 
discourage trials and minimize total legal expenditures. Since trials consume resources for 
purely redistributive purposes, they are a net social cost. Courts would thus have reason to set r 
at 0. In contrast, states would have reason to set r at 1 when they are the plaintiffs--as seems to 
be almost always the case when the judiciary is part of the state. One reason for setting r at 1 is 
that it reduces the cost of state action. Thus courts have no clear economic incentive to behave 
in a Bayesian way and they have political incentives to behave otherwise. 
Beyond the social and political reasons for setting a fixed t. there are important cost 
considerations that suggest courts may not want to behave as Bayesians. If t is Bayesian, then 
it is specific to each trial and each set of pre-trial circumstances. Bayesian behavior would, in 
effect, force courts to solve the game theoretic problem for each different case separately. 
Indeed the priors over residual cases--those not decided by conclusive evidence--depend on all 
of the initial conditions, the fixed costs, the evidence production functions, the settlement level, 
and the range of damages. This implies that judges and juries not only have to deal with the 
evidence and decide if it is conclusive, but they must also cope with all the information neces-
sary to solve the game theory problem. In reality, I believe, this does not happen. At the very 
least, it would greatly increase the social cost of trials; a fixed rule for determining incon-
clusive cases would be far less expensive. Indeed, both plaintiff and defendant would have 
strong incentives to misrepresent the elements of the case. Therefore the court would have to 
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carry out its own estimation of the relevant parameters. The issues of updating costs and social 
incentives suggest that, although there is strong game theoretic justification for full Bayesian 
updating, judicial systems may not necessarily function in this fashion. 
In fact, courts in the Western world are often bound by precedent; that is, their actions 
are highly constrained for each case and each set of circumstances. The stylized facts of most 
judicial processes not only suggest t is fixed, but, in an even greater departure from Bayesian 
rules, it is in fact either 0 or 1. In other words the burden of proof rests with the plaintiff (t=O), 
or, when the state is involved as prosecutor, it may rest with the defendant (t=l). The Anglo-
Saxon judicial system, as well as the French court system in civil cases presumes innocence for 
the defendant and requires evidence beyond reasonable doubt or that the preponderance of the 
evidence go against the defendent to convict. 146 Other judicial systems presume for the plain-
tiff in criminal cases: this seems to have been true for the Spanish Inquisition as well as for the 
French judicial system when the state prosecuted criminal cases. 
The ability to vary the burden of proof in this model leads to another conclusion: 
when the burden of proof rests completely on the shoulders of the plaintiff, the defendant does 
no research, i.e. c4 =0. Doing no research does not imply bearing no court costs, since the 
defendant still bears the cost of going to court (F4 ). Defendants do no research because, unless 
the plaintiff presents evidence that damages are high, the court awards only low damages. The 
impact of the rule t=O on the probability of an out-of-court settlement is ambiguous because the 
defendant's decision to separate the different types of plaintiffs or not is largely determined by 
the savings from settling versus going to trial. When t is 0, however, the settlement offer is 
smaller than for any other value of t; and the expected total losses from having to play the 
146) William Spencer and Cornelius Gillam, A Tarboolc on Law and Business. New York: McGraw Hill 
Co., 1952. page 68. 
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game are smallest for the defendant. Furthermore when t is 0 the assumption that research is 
private information is irrelevant for two simple reasons. First, the defendant does no research 
and thus has nothing to hide. Second, plaintiffs want to reveal their evidence to the court when 
it shows that the compensation should be high. Plaintiffs do not care whether they reveal their 
evidence when that evidence documents low compensation because that information does not 
affect the court's decision. 
The model analyzed assumes that the court decides to award either A or B. An alterna-
tive formulation that gives much greater insight into eminent domain litigation is focused on 
the assumption that the court considers whether S is 'appropriate.' Here the court forces the 
plaintiff to bear the burden of proof and obliges the developer to offer at least B as compensa-
tion. Then when a compensation offer has been appealed, the court can either find it appropri-
ate (and award S ) or too low and award A). The plaintiff presents evidence that the settle-
ment is too low and the defendant evidence that it is appropriate. For convenience, this new 
model will be called the appeal model. The loss function of the developer can be rewritten as 
(VIII) L'd=p[ [1-kg1p+k 1 [~1 [/Ec 1FA+[1-/Ec 1Fzpg +E1-~1F[ g(cd)S+[1-g(cd)]SJ +cd+Fd]] 
+(1-p )[ [1-k21S +k2[ ~[1 Ec~ +[1-/ Ec~zsz +E1-~~[ g (c.)S +[1-g(cd)]s] +cd+F d J J . 
The profit function of a plaintiff of type i can be rewritten as 
(IX) n'i=[1-kdS +ki [ ~i [1 (ci )A +[1-/ (c;)]S] +E1-~i )[ g (cd)S +[1-g (cd)]S] -ci-Fp] . 
Note that it is a dominant strategy for the defendent to do no research. This allows consider-
able simplification, the loss function becomes: 
(14) L'd=p[ [1-kdp+k 1 [~ 1 [/Ec 1FA+[1-/Ec 1Fzpz +E1-~ 1Fp+cdzz 
+(1-p )[ [1-k21S +k 2[ ~O[! Ec~ +[1-/ (cvls] +E1-~~s +Fd J J . 
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and the profit functions: 
(15) Il';=[l-k;]S +k; [ 13; [t (c; )A +[1-f (c;)]s] +(1-13; )S -c;-Fp J . 
In this case there also exists an equilibrium with properties similar to those derived above. 
Theorem3 
Theorem 1 and Corollary 2 hold when the defendant seeks to maximizes L' d subject to S ~ 
and plaintiffs of type i seek to maximize Il';. In other words there exists generically a unique 
sequential equilibrium to the appeal game with the same comparative static properties as those 
described above. 
The appeal model can be used to gather some intuition about compensation offers 
when eminent domain rights are exercised. In most cases the holders of eminent domain 
privileges make offers of compensation to holders of property rights. 'The property rights own-
ers can either accept the offer or appeal it in a judicial setting. In case of a suit, the court must 
decide whether the offer was sufficient or whether the property rights owner should receive 
higher compensation. Adding to this model the further restriction that t is 0 accurately 
describes the contract appeal process in the case of marsh drainage in Normandy--and indeed 
most property rights litigation in eighteenth-century France--a topic we tum to next. 
Settlement Litigation and Norman Drainage 
The model that most closely approximates the problem of litigation over drainage pro-
jects in eighteenth-century Normandy has two basic properties: B =S and t=l for contracts 
between the developer and communities over property rights to marshland and t=O for all other 
contracts (for historical evidence and a more detailed discussion of institutional obstacles to 
drainage in eighteenth-century Normandy, see Chapter 2). In the case of marsh drainage, the 
litigation game began when a developer decided he wanted to drain a marsh. The developer 
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then secured a royal grant, which was a pennit to carry out the project. Included in the grant 
was a compensation (settlement) offer for all owners of property rights affected by the project. 
Obviously, the developer could fail to mention certain property rights in the contract, leading 
to a zero compensation offer for the damages suffered by the owners of the property rights in 
question. The property rights owners had three years to accept the contract implicitly--by not 
appealing it--or to appeal its validity. Appeals were judicial and began when the owner of a 
property right filed a brief before a royal court. The developer would often face a number of 
different potential plaintiffs: owners of rights over marshland, proprietors of mills damaged by 
the project, downstream landowners who might bear a higher risk of flooding, etc. 
Let us first consider the game between the developer and individuals other than the 
proprietors of marshland. In these civil cases plaintiffs bore the burden of proof, thus t=O is the 
correct modeling assumption. If property rights owners proved that the distribution of cost and 
benefits did not in fact reflect the original distribution of property rights or that damages 
remained uncompensated, then the court could strike the contract down and award the plaintiff 
higher compensation. None of the proposed drainage contracts available made compensation 
offers to anyone except owners of marshland. There are also no recorded appeals by owners of 
other property rights until after the projects were completed. The intuition behind the zero set-
tlement offers to mill owners and downstream landowners is that the cost of litigating compen-
sation for damages to mills, increased flooding, or other, smaller matters, was usually greater 
than the expected award if for no other reason than the fact that this litigation took place before 
the king's council in Paris, far away from Nonnandy. Thus, except when there were very large 
damages that were easy to document--after the drainage project had occurred--the zero offers 
were accepted. 
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Developers also had to make compensation offers to the owners of the marshland. In 
Nonnandy, marshes were jointly owned by C?mmunities and lords, and their shares of the pro-
perty was uncertain. Lords remained the titular owners of the marshes that they had rented to 
communities who had acquired use rights to the marshes. Part of the task of drainage contracts 
was to aportion the marshland between lord and community, a process ruled by the medieval 
law of triage. What mattered here was the extend of the community's use rights because the 
law awarded two-thirds of the marshland to communities with strong use rights but only one-
third to communities with weak use rights. The communities' use rights were based on 
medieval--feudal--contracts that they had negotiated with the lord. In the case of property 
rights based on feudal contracts, unlike other civil suits, the burden of proof always rested on 
the lord, whether he was plaintiff or defendent. Thus unless the lord could prove that the 
community's use rights were weak, the community was entitled to two-thirds of the marsh. In 
drainage contracts the developers usually received half the drained land as compensation for 
draining the marsh while the community and the lord divided the other half between them-
selves. The owner of strong property rights, whether lord or community, received one-third of 
the drained land (two-thirds of one-half) and the owner of weak property rights one-sixth. 
The triage rule awarded a community with strong use rights two-thirds of the marsh 
and veto power over the project. Indeed, in a community with strong use rights, the marsh was 
part of the common land and its use was ruled by customary law. Since draining the marsh 
implied dividing it into separate parcels and a shift from communal to private pasture, drainage 
would necessarily lead to a change the customary pattern of using the marsh. Although cus-
tomary law could theoretically have been modified by the royal judiciary at high cost, in effect 
refonn of customary law required the unanimous consent of everyone concerned. Because 
drainage restricted access to the marsh, anyone with use rights could file--and win--a judicial 
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appeal claiming that his customary rights had been violated. Thus any villager able to bear the 
costs of litigation could hold out strategically for a share of the surplus from the project. 
The issue of customary law sheds light on the compensation offers for marshland that 
were included in the drainage grant. In the grant, the developer could either assign strong or 
weak use rights to the community--the lords share of the marsh was simply the residual. If a 
developer offered a community strong use rights, he possibly would have faced an appeal by 
the lord but more importantly, he would have been vulnerable to the strategic behavior of 
groups of villagers trying to appropriate the surplus from the project, and drainage would have 
been greatly delayed. If the drainage contract only recognized the communities' weak use 
rights and if it was unopposed by the community, then drainage would have proceeded swiftly. 
Developers could only protect themselves from strategic behavior by offering communities 
only one third of the marshland, which is exactly what developers offered in eighteenth century 
Normandy. 
Drainage rarely occurred because communities almost invariably appealed drainage 
contracts. Most communities had firm beliefs that their documents could back their claims to 
strong use rights to the marshes in question. Moreover the burden-of-proof rules favored com-
munities when neither they nor the lords could document their claims, that is when no con-
clusive evidence was brought before the court Courts could have decided these cases in a 
number of ways: they could have sided with the lords and given them two thirds of the marsh 
and ordered drainage to proceed--in effect setting 1 at 0; they could have sided with communi-
ties and given them two thirds of the marsh as well ordering drainage; or they could have 
decided to give the communities two thirds of the marsh and left the drainage decision to the 
communities, in effect setting 1 at 1. Because burden of proof was on lords in the case of feu-
dal property, the courts had to award strong property rights to the communities; and because 
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they could not order changes in customary law, the courts had to leave the drainage decision to 
the communities. 
Returning to the model it is easy to see that if t=l, the probability that strong property 
rights are attributed to the lord and the marsh is drained, is at most p (1-j31}+(1-p )(1-j32). In con-
trast, that probability is at least p(l-j3 1}+(1-p)(l-j32) when t=O. If we assume that the optimal 
level of search always leaves some cases undocumented, then strong property rights are attri-
buted to lords with strictly greater probability when the burden of proof is on communities than 
when it is on lords. As a result, the effective burden-of-proof rule was the least favorable to 
drainage because when strong property rights were attributed to communities marshes did not 
get drained. If the burden of proof had been on the communities far more drainage would have 
occured. 
One alternative would have been for the courts to have refused to hear any such rent-
seeking cases; however French royal courts were themselves rent-seekers: French court 
officials bought their titles for life and were paid a small salary but allowed to "tax" plaintiffs 
and defendants in the cases they heard. Thus, French court officials had no desire to limit the 
number of cases brought before them. The costs of litigation alone would not have stopped the 
drainage of marshes in the eighteenth century; in fact the costs of litigation were small com-
pared to the profitability of projects. What stopped drainage was the inability of the French 
government to give its judiciary true authority over local custom and thereby clarify property 
rights. In the absence of such authority the judiciary was free to pursue its own rent-seeking 
activities, and marshes remained undrained. 
To make the analysis complete we must confront the question of why communities 
appealed the developers' settlement offers. Indeed, because draining marshes greatly increased 
the productivity of land, developers argued that even with only one-sixth of the drained marsh 
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the villager would be better off than with a whole marsh undrained. If this were true than com-
munities should not have litigated because in all events they were worse off-- even when they 
won, further litigation over customary rights prevented drainage. However the ; .,centives to 
appeal the drainage contract were big if they won communities were entitled to twice as much 
land than if they accepted the contract, clearly making all villagers better off. Villagers could 
easily aggree to appeal a drainage proposal not realizing that their united opposition to the 
developers would be transformed into competition for the surplus should they win their suit. 
Such an explanation is appealing because villagers never faced a decision to file such an appeal 
more than once and because it does not rely on any assumption that villagers could be made 
worse off by drainage projects. However if individuals in communities actually believed that 
they were worse off with only one-sixth of the marsh then suits would occur automatically. 
Developers attempted to drain marshes despite the formidable odds against them for 
two reasons. The royal government promised institutional reforms after 1750, and although 
reforms failed to occur, developers may well have thought that the institutional problems asso-
ciated with draining marshes would be resolved. Some developers no doubt thought that their 
position at the French court would help them secure sufficient royal backing to enforce 
drainage. Draining marshes was also attractive because it was potentially very profitable, as the 
rates of return analyzed in Chapter 2 show. Developers were willing to bear the institutional 
cost, which were small relative to the profits, for a small probability of success. 
Institutions seem to explain why developers systematically offered low levels of com-
pensation to communities. Moreover the fact that burden of proof was on the lord made it easy 
for communities to win their appeals, thus institutions, again, seem to explain the extraordi-
narily high amounts of litigation in eighteenth-century Normandy--a subject of considerable 
interest to historians. More importantly the inability of courts to mandate drainage after 
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property rights issues had been resolved in favor of communities made it virtually impossible 
for drainage to occur. Had there been another burden-of-proof rule in the case of feudal pro-
perty rights then more marshes would have been drained in eighteenth-century France. 
Conclusion 
This chapter points to the importance of asymmetric information in court outcomes, 
but it departs from the previous literature by recognizing the fact that plaintiffs and defendants 
can do research to gather evidence for their case. In this model the ability to document one 's 
claims affects court decisions directly and settlements indirectly. In this setting the defendant 
can choose either to separate different types of plaintiffs and face some litigation or to offer 
everyone high compensation. The distribution of coun costs among plaintiffs and defendent 
clearly affects court outcomes and out-of-court settlements. Yet when the plaintiff bears the 
burden of proof, the defendant chooses to remain uninformed, independent of the cost of infor-
mation. The model thus illustrates the imJX>rtance of legal rules once litigation expenditures are 
endogenized, for defendant and plaintiff value evidence differently. Furthermore, when the 
difference between the expected value of court outcomes of strong and weak type plaintiffs is 
high relative to court costs (that is when there is a lot of uncertainty about who the plaintiff is) 
the defendant has an incentive to make an offer that will separate the weak plaintiffs from the 
strong. If cases are frequently settled out of court, as happens today, then the model suggests 
that by the time the settlement offer is made, little uncertainty about the type of the plaintiff 
remains. 
A model that describes learning not only after, but also before, the settlement offer has 
been made, may offer more insight into the issue of out-of-coun settlement. The model 
analyzed in this chapter should therefore be extended to allow for two-step spending on 
research to fully endogenize informational asymmetries. Under this more complex model, 
172 
plaintiffs and defendant would start with a simple information structure and choose how much 
research to do in a first phase. Using the info~ation he has gathered, the defendant would then 
make a settlement offer, which the plaintiff could accept or reject depending on the informa-
tion he had acquired. If he refused, the game would go to court after another round of research. 
Individuals would then present their information, and the court would give a verdict. A more 
sophisticated model of this sort would be appealing because it would describe more fully the 
strategic play in litigation and settlement. 
But even the simple model described in this chapter provides significant insight into 
how specific institutional rules--rules such as burden of proof on the plaintiff or respect for 
precedent--constrain the equilibrium settlement offers and litigation probabilities. The model 
also suggests that rules that force the plaintiff to bear the burden of proof may well be superior 
to Bayesian behavior from the point of view of the court for they discourage trials relative to 
other rules. Moreover a fixed burden-of-proof rule greatly decreases the costs of judicial action 
over one that is endogenous to every type of trial brought before the court. 
The model also singles out the institutional features of the Old-Regime French judici-
ary that prevented drainage in Normandy. Drainage was profitable despite the judicial costs of 
sorting property rights between seigneurs and communities. Because court costs are sunk, 
developers were faced with a choice: they either could bear those costs or not litigate. If 
drainage had been unprofitable as a result of high court costs, as some developers claimed, 
there should have been no litigation. Therefore it was not the high court costs of litigation that 
prevented marshes from being drained but the inability of judicial system to resolve issues of 
property rights internal to the community. The lack of judicial finality can be attributed to the 
rent-seeking nature of courts and to the costs of reforming customary law. To explain the per-
sistence of developers to bear litigation costs one should note that the important issue was not 
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the profitability of such projects, rather it was the division of these profits. Furthermore, at any 
stage in the game past court costs are all sunk but the expect profits are unchanged. 
The central issue behind the eighteenth-century litigation was the division of the 
profits earned from drainage between developer and property rights owners. This issue was 
resolved in courts. Developers chose to separate weak from strong type communities despite 
the very low probability that communities were of the weak type. The model suggests that 
doing so was rational because the extraordinary difference between high and low compensation 
to communities relative to court costs may have made separating between community types 
profitable. Drainage, of course, should have proceeded once this round of litigation was 
resolved, because the costs associated with litigation were sunk costs. In most cases marshes 
were not drained because another layer of property rights existed, and no binding contract 
governing them could be legally enforced. Thus, drainage schemes did not occur in 
eighteenth-century France because the judicial system lacked both power and finality. 
The goal of economic history is not only to document economic development but also 
to explain that development and different experiences across countries. These goals demand a 
focus on the effect institutions have on economic growth. Models like the one in this chapter 
began to explain the impact of different institutional rules on economic activity. 
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Figures and Proofs for Chapter 4 
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Proof of Corollary 1 
. ac • 
By the envelope theorem and the second order conditions +has the same sign as 
uk; 
aL 22 aL 2 a • a a . In turn the sign of ~ depends solely on the sign of 5!!-- . Because ~ 1 is smaller 
c 2 k; uc 2uk; uk; 
. :. . E.g_ . . . UCr.t 
than ~O• :. ts postuve, thus -:.->0. 
uk1 uk1 
acd. a2cd. a2cd. 
Symmetrically -:.-<0. We can also show that --2- <0 and --2->0. 
uk z ak1 akz 
Proof of Lemma 1 
Without loss of generality we can assume that k2* (0)=1 Otherwise s• =0 which leads to a trivial 
problem. In this case no compensation is ever paid and no trials ever happen. Furthermore 
accepting an offer of A with probability one is a dominant strategy because trials are costly to 
plaintiffs, so k 1 • (A )=k 2 • (A )= 1. 
To prove the lemma, first examine type 2's litigation decision. Going back to (III) and differen-
tiating with respect to k 2 gives 
aged acd . . Clearly k OE1-~-:K--;-tEA-BF is the only part of (16) that depends on k 2 and It IS non-ocrK~ uk 2 
negative and increasing in k 2 (from corollary 1). Therefore we only need to evaluate <1>2 at k 2 
=1. If <1>2 is positive at 1 then the type 2 sues with probability one, if <1>2 is negative, type 2 
accepts with probability one. Differentiating (16) with respect to k 1 gives 
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Because of corollary 1 and because g (.) is increasing and concave, (17) is negative. It 
is important to note that changes in lc 1 only affect the profitability of going to court. As k 1 
increases the value of going to court falls for type 2 because the developer spends more on 
each case when his priors that he faces weak types increases. As the value of going to court 
falls strong plaintiffs sue less, however (16) may not bind so /c 2" is weakly decreasing ink 1 
Now let us look at the optimization problem for type 1 plaintiffs. Differentiating (III) 
with respect to k 1 gives us a first order condition 
Clearly -p+~1 [fEc 1 "FA+[l-fEc 1 "FFag +E1-~1 F[ g(c4 ")B+[l-g(c4 "))D) -c 1" -a does not depend 
og (cd) OCa 
on k 1• k 1 E1-~ 1 F ac
4 
o/c
1 
t(B-A) depends on k 1 but not on S and is strictly decreasing in Jc 1 
from corrolary 1. To compute the reaction function of k 1 • to Jc 2, differentiate (18) with respect 
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(19) 
a2rr. 
Note again that g (.) is concave, thus --d ~K What is also important is that changes in the 
ok 1 
other type's probability of going to court only affect the profits of going to court, not those of 
accepting. Since the profits of going to court rise with type 2's probability of going to court, 
the probability that type 2 refuses the settlement k 2 is weakly increasing. For fixed S we now 
know that the best response function of type 1 is monotonic increasing, and type 2 's is mono-
tonic decreasing, with respect to the other types acceptance probability. There is, thus, at most 
one equilibrium pair for each settlement offer (S) such that k 1• is best response to k 2• and vice 
versa. 
Proof of lemma 2 
Definition 6: let cl>lx ,y) be the value of the f.o.c. for strong plaintiffs when they sue with pro-
bability x and weak plaintiffs sue with probability y. Let 4>1(x ,y) be the value of the f.o.c for 
weak plaintiffs when they sue with probability x and strong plaintiffs sue with probability y. 
The proof of lemma 2 is a simple dominance argument. I show that 4>2(k 2• (x), x) is 
greater than cl>1(k 2• (x), x ), so weak plaintiffs want to sue less than strong plaintiffs in any 
equilibrium. 
(20) 4>2(k2• (x ), x )=-S +132[! (c 2 • )A +[1-/ (c 2• )]DJ +(1-132) [ g (cd • )B +[1-g (cd • )]D J 
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However the optimality of c 2• guarantees that 
(21) ~O[fEcO·FA+[l-fEcO·Fgaz -c1· > ~O[fEc1•FA+[l-fEc1•Fgaz -c 2•. 
• ag(c/) ac/ 
Note also that k 2 E1-~z} a a tEA-BF~K 
cd k2 
So let <l>2'Ck2• (x).x)= -p+~O[fEc 1 KFA+[l-fEc 1 ·Fgaz +E1-~z}[ g(c/)B+[l-g(c/)JD] -c 1• -FP. 
Oearly <l>2(k2• (x), x) > <1>2'(k 2• (x), x). 
Define <1>1'(k2• (x) , x) by: 
(22) <l>1'(k2• ExFKxF=-p+~1 [fEc 1 ·FA+[1-fEc 1 •Fgaz +E1-~ 1 F[ g(c. •)B+[1-g(cd •)]D] -c 1• -FP. 
We can dominate <l>1(Jr. 2• (x).x) by <1>1'(Jr. 2• (x).x), simply because 
and f (c 1• )A +[1-f (c 1• )JD )>(g (cd • )B +[1-g (cd • )JD ). 
that IX is decreasing in Jr. 1• Thus, k 1 • (x F~O • (x ). 
Proof of lemma 3 
a2n. 
Both (16) and (18) are monotone decreasing with respect to s (as a~ K =-1 ). Given that 
' 
k 2 • (A )=0 and Jr. 2 • (0)= 1 there must exist (z z) such that k 2 • (S )=0 if and only if S >z 2, and k 2 • (x )= 1 
if S <z 2• 
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Thus z 2 is the reservation offer of type 2. 
Similarly define z-; such that k 1 • (S )=0 if and only if S >z-;. Define :J as the s such that 
weak plaintiffs sue with probability one if and only S <:J· :J and z-; exist because the best 
response of type 1 is a continuous decreasing function of S. 
Proof of lemma 4 
Look at (18) at z 2 , evaluate it at k :z= 1 , k 1 =0 
• og (c •• ocd. 
-c2 -a+kOEl-~~ 
0 
-
0
-t(A-B)=z2 because of the definition of z2. Ca k2 
Furthermore using the same argument as in lemma 2 one can show that: 
But at S =z-;, 
Proof of Theorem 2 
When the second equilibrium is selected at t then t automatically verifies theorem 2. This case 
is clearly uninteresting from a Bayesian point of view because there is no need for updating 
because no trials occur. So assume that only the first equilibrium ( E 1) is selected. 
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Define t• (t) to be the Bayesian probability of high damages when no evidence is brought to 
the court given that the court announced t . Since the first equilibrium is selected for all values 
of t between 0 and 1, to show that there exists a self-fullfilling equilibrium it is sufficient to 
show that (a) t• (t) is continous, (b) t• (0)>0 and (c) t• (1)<1). 
(a) t • (t) is continous because 
sum of positive reals that are never all 0. 
(b) t• (0)>0 because the denominator of t• is non-zero since the solution to the expenditure 
problem for plaintiffs of either type always lead to interior solutions so f (c; • )<1. 
(c) t• (1)>1 because the denominator is always less then the numerator since the solution to 
expenditure problem for the developer always leads to an interior solution so f (c; • )<1. 
Therefore when only the first equilibrium is selected for any value of t there exists a 
least one t that is part of a self-fulfilling equilibrium. When the second equilibrium is selected 
for some t then it is automatically self-fulfilling. 
Proof of theorem 3 
The proof is again carried out by backward construction, note that defendants spend 
nothing, second plaintiff expenditures are given by: 
of(c··) 1 (26) I ;2. 
oc ~; (A-S) ' i = 1 . 
The concavity off(.) insures that there will be a unique spending level for each type and for 
each settlement level. Strong types spend more than weak types and research decreases as the 
settlement increases. 
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1. Optimal litigation levels 
The first order conditions for type i are now : 
(27) -S +~i [t (ci • )A +[1-f (ci • )JS] +E1-~i )S -c 1-FP or 
(28) -s[ 1-[E1-~i F+~j (1-/ (ci • )]] +~i [t (ci ·)A -c 1-FP . 
Thus (28) is a razor's edge reaction function. If (29) ic; positive, i sues with probability one, 
and if it is negative, i always settles. Differentiating (29) with respect to S yields 
OC ·. 
Note that M~ is negative. Hence (27) is negative, so (26) is monotone with respect to S. This 
allows us to define one reservation offer for each type ( zj ). Once again settlement offers other 
than, z1 • z2 are weakly dominated. These two settlement offers lead to two equilibrium candi-
dates: 
By the same argument as in the proof of corollary 3, the equilibrium will be unique 
generically. 
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ChapterS 
Conclusion 
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This research was begun as an investigation of the economic impact of the French 
Revolution. Understanding the economic consequences of 1789 would lead, I thought, to a 
better grasp of the Revolution. A focus on economic questions had the enviable characteristics 
of simplicity and of measurability. Unlike social and political historians who seek to under-
stand the causes of the French Revolution, I could resolve my questions simply by determin-
ing what institutions changed, and then measuring the economic consequences. The procedure 
was simple: first identify the institutions reformed by the Revolution, then model theoretically 
the impact of the new institutions on transaction costs and finally assess the economic impact 
of changed transaction costs on specific segments of the French economy. Although the direct 
measurement of transaction costs was rarely possible, indirect measurements sufficed to show 
how important institutions were to economic growth. 
The procedure outlined above leads to two general conclusions. First, although recent 
historiography has moved away from the old Marxist view of the Revolution 147 as the dawn 
of a new economic era, there is nonetheless no doubt that the Revolution dramatically changed 
the economic history of France. Second, the research suggests that Old-Regime institutions 
shackled the economy with high transaction costs and blocked the spread of more productive 
methods in agriculture. The research has investigated the problems of high transaction costs in 
two specific settings: drainage and irrigation, however it is possible to extend the conclusions 
of the studies much further. Let us confront each of these conclusions in turn. 
The French Revolution Revisited 
The recent historiography of the French Revolution from Cobban through Sutherland 
147) See for example the introduction of D.M.G. Sutherland, France 1789-1815. 
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has been critical of the Marxist thesis that the Revolution marked the beginning of a new polit-
ical and economic order exemplified by the rise of the bourgeoisie. In an unfortunate conse-
quence of their rejection of the Marxist model, historians have also rejected the investigation of 
the economic consequences of the Revolution. This study shows how important institutional 
change, during and after the Revolution, was for the promotion of irrigation and drainage. 
Beyond the limited setting of agricultural improvement I also want to argue that the Revolution 
significantly decreased the cost of any reform, and therefore was a significant event both in the 
economic and political history of France. 
Let us first examine the contributions of the Revolution in the context of drainage and 
irrigation. Most of the legislation governing property rights in Old-Regime France had been 
codified in the Middle Ages. The allocation of authority over these property rights between the 
central government and local groups was also mostly medieval, despite some modifications in 
the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. In the eighteenth century, changes in technology and 
demand made investments like drainage and irrigation profitable. But such investment in agri-
culture required a reallocation of property rights. Had all resources been freely traded in com-
petitive markets, a Coasian reallocation might have occurred. But in the case of irrigation and 
drainage projects, important resources were peculiar to a project and owned by specific indivi-
duals or groups. Each of these groups held veto power over the project and attempted to 
appropriate the profits from the project. Veto players attempted to claim the profits of the pro-
ject through lengthy and expensive judicial appeals of developer's permits. The Revolution 
was the first time that veto players were sufficiently constrained by law that projects could 
occur. Both before and after 1789, institutions dictated at what price these resources were 
transferred from the owners to the developer. After 1789, property rights were transferred with 
much lower transaction costs. 
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The impact of the Revolution on transaction costs is best illustrated by the analysis of 
the transaction costs induced by a specific set of institutions: those that govern the strength of 
rights of eminent domain and those that locate the power to grant such rights. When the 
developer of a project gathers rights of eminent domain, transaction costs may occur in a 
number of ways. If rent-seeking individuals (such as eighteenth-century local administrators, 
or a city ) hold the power to grant rights of eminent domain then they will attempt to extract 
the surplus from the developer. Any bribes, for example, made to granting powers are transac-
tion costs. Moreover, the strength of the developer's rights of eminent domain will itself dic-
tate the price that he will pay for the land he needs. The capitalized value of the ex ante rent is 
the reservation price of the landowner and if the market for land was competitive, that capital-
ized value would be the price paid by the developer. Thus the difference between the capital-
ized value of rent and the price actually paid for land by the developer is a further transaction 
cost. 
Both bribes to corrupt authorities and compensation above the market price for land 
are transaction costs that may be incurred even if the developer's rights of eminent domain are 
well defined, yet other transaction costs will occur because of uncertainty. The power of the 
authority that grants the right of eminent domain may be uncertain, and other authorities (such 
as seigneuriallords) may challenge the grant The developer's power of eminent domain may 
itself be based on an uncertain grant, and that power can also be challenged either by granting 
authorities or by landowners. Both types of uncertainty impose further transaction costs on the 
developers of drainage and irrigation projects. Indeed, challenges to the validity of grants are 
determined in court, and court procedures can be lengthy and costly. Moreover, rent-seeking 
courts create even higher transaction costs. Bribery to secure eminent domain rights, compen-
sation above the market price, bribery to uphold the same rights, and litigation to determine the 
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extent of authority were all transaction costs faced by eighteenth-century developers of 
drainage and irrigation. The Revolution, dramatically and simply, eliminated them all. 
These transaction costs were eliminated by three basic reforms. First, during the Revo-
lution, reforms made challenges to grants of eminent domain by the state unprofitable. The 
state appropriated complete authority over eminent domain issues and restricted the authority 
of the judiciary in eminent domain question. Second, the Revolution and Napoleon created an 
administrative structure with enough power to dictate to landowners the price at which they 
would be compensated for their assets. Third, the reforms of the judiciary not only restricted its 
authority in economic matters but also ended all rent-seeking problems. These reforms affected 
questions other than rights of eminent domain. The centralization of France, achieved early on 
in the Revolution, destroyed all local veto players in questions of drainage and irrigation. The 
Revolution, thus, seems to have had a dramatic impact on transaction costs in irrigation and 
drainage. 
The nineteenth century also provided institutions that decreased the maintenance costs 
of drainage and irrigation projects and resolved most revenue problems. The new institutions--
associations or syndicats--grouped the landowners that benefited from projects. The associa-
tions could use the power of the state to assess landowners for their share of the costs of a pro-
ject, and many of the revenue problems that had plagued Old-Regime developers disappeared. 
The power of the state was an instrument that had never been available to eighteenth-century 
developers, and drainage and irrigation projects had often been poorly maintained and a finan-
cial drain on the developer. Associations also decreased the costs of projects by eliminating 
the ability of landowners to behave strategically toward the developer. Indeed, once a 
developer formed an association, landowners could either join and bear a share of the costs or 
they would be excluded from the benefits of the project. 
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The reduction of transaction costs due to reforms during the Revolutionary period had 
a signi ficant impact on agriculture in Normandy and Provence. In Normandy all the communal 
marshes were divided and drained between 1820 and 1850; in contrast there had been no 
drainage whatsoever between 1714 and the Revolution. In Provence during the period 1820-
1860 the irrigated area nearly doubled, a change that led to an increase in total output greater 
than 5%. In contrast there was no increase in irrigated land between 1700 and 1760. After 
1760, limited irrigation development occurred, but only at very high transaction costs. The 
institutional change of the Revolution lowered transactions costs and led to renewed invest-
ment in agriculture. 
The institutional changes that reduced the cost of promoting agricultural improvements 
were embedded in a much larger context. The French Revolution of 1789 was an important 
political and economic event not only because of the reforms that occurred immediatly, but 
also because it gave the central government the means to achieve further reform. All the insti-
tutional changes that occurred from 1789 on were based on two events that marked the death of 
the Old Regime: the establishment of a supreme legislative assembly (June 1789), and the 
abolition of feudal privileges (August 4 1789). The Third Estate's goals in establishing the 
Constituante may well have been to limit the arbitrary power of the king but, in fact, as the 
Third Estate seized power from the crown it established an executive with unprecedented 
power. 
As a result of centralization, the actions of the Constituante do not stand alone. Using 
the new power of central government, subsequent regimes, regardless of their political orienta-
tions, promoted, enacted, and protected reforms that reduced transaction costs. Napoleon, after 
all, was responsible for the administrative structure of France based on prefects. Simmilarly, it 
was not until after the Restoration of 1815 that the rules of associations, groups of landowners 
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that administered drainage and irrigation projects, were codified. 148 
Prior to 1789 any of the dozen Parlements--regional courts of appeal--had the right to 
object and propose amendments to laws before they registered (accepted) them. Without the 
acceptance of the Parlement the law had no validity in the region. Although ultimately Parle-
ments could not refuse to register a law, they could add very substantial costs, simply in terms 
of delay to any reform. Furthermore each Parlement could bargain for different amendments, 
leading to Royal laws that differed from place to place. 149 As a result, reform was a very slow 
and costly process in the Old Regime. In contrast, the Revolution simply erased most of these 
costs. The central government could decide virtually alone on new legislation. Although the 
shares of power of the executive and the legislative branches of government varied between 
1789 and 1860, none of the national governments that succeeded the Constituante ever relin-
quished the power that the central government had acquired during the Revolution. Beyond 
the extraordinary increase in the power of the central state--a fundamental consequence of the 
French Revolution--a number of other reforms decreased the transaction costs of agricultural 
investments. Foremost was a set of judicial reforms that ended all rent-seeking behavior in the 
judiciary. These reforms also transferred jurisdiction over most economic matters to the 
prefect--the national government's local representative. The adoption of an administrative 
approach to the resolution of disputes over property rights eliminated all veto players and 
greatly reduced transaction costs in the planning stages of most projects. 
148) I do not wish to imply that the governments that succeeded the Old Regime were free traders. Quite 
to the contrary, they promoted state intervention in the economy in as intense a fashion as the Old Regime. This in-
tervention however, was different than in the past because it was not based upon a rent-seeking bureaucracy, nor did 
it have to deal with the millennia! accumulation of privileges. Thus, after 1789, governments were freer to promote 
economic growth than in the past. 
149) Roland Mousnier, The Institutions of France under the Absolute Monarchy. Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1979, vol. II p. 259. 
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When the Third Estate convened as the Constituante it was also giving France a means 
of institutional change that was far simpler than anything the country had known before. After 
1789, a majority within the legislative assembly and the approval of the executive were 
sufficient for the enactment of reform into law all over France. As a result reforms that had 
seemed impossible in the closing days of the Old Regime were achieved often overnight. The 
French Revolution, thus, greatly decreased the cost of institutional change in France. This 
alone, it would seem, makes the Revolution an important event in the economic and political 
history of France. 
The Long-Term Costs of Eighteenth-Century Institutions 
The institutions of the eighteenth century raised transaction costs sufficiently to deter 
investment in agriculture. The investigations suggest that in Normandy transaction costs might 
have led to a reduction in output of 3% while in Provence the lack of irrigation led to a reduc-
tion in output greater than 5%. The shortfalls in output were calculated by assuming that 
changes in rent due to improvement captured the net increase in output. In fact, the change in 
rent due to improvement should be, in equilibrium, equal to the change in output minus the 
increased input of labor and capital. Thus, if drainage and irrigation had succeeded in the 
eighteenth century, output would have increased more than the 3 to 5% suggested above; how-
ever, total factor productivity would have changed by less. 150 Beyond these local conclusions 
each of the studies suggests that the institutional structure was largely responsible for the lack 
of investment in the French economy. 
150) I chose to focus on output because eighteenth-century governments were more preoccupied with the 
level of output of French agriculture than with productivity. See AN H1 1489. 
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The argument that institutions played a significant role in the backwardness of French 
agriculture relative to that of England has been implicitly challenged by O'Brien and Keydor 
and by George Grantham. O'Brien and Keydor argue that soil and technology are the primary 
explanation of French retardation. 151 Yet if this remains true over the whole of France, soil 
and technology fail to explain why landowners in areas that suffered extensively from 
drainage failed to enclose, consolidate, and drain their fields. Although O'Brien and Keydor 
may be correct in suggesting that mixed husbandry was more appropriate for Britain than it 
was for France, they fail to explain why the French chose to forego improvements entirely in 
the eighteenth century. O'Brien and Keydor are able to show that England was proportionately 
better endowed for agriculture on the basis of soil type. They do not explain why, in the areas 
that had similar land characteristics as England's, agriculture did so poorly in terms of produc-
tivity. 
George Grantham suggests that lower levels of urbanization in France than in England 
depressed the demand for livestock and made the conversion of arable to artificial pasture 
unprofitable. 152 Grantham calculates the returns of artificial pasture in a specific scenario. He 
assumes that the fodder would be used to fatten animals that have worlced on the farm for years 
and thus only gain weight slowly. 153 Grantham also fails to account for part of the benefits of 
cattle-raising, such as manure. Moreover, it is not clear that fattening old animals would have 
been the most profitable use for fodder--one alternative would have bee to raise young animals 
either for sale as draft animals or even to butchers. In any case Grantham's data seem to show 
151) Patrick O'Brien and Caglar Keydor, Economic Growth in Britain and France, 1780-1914, London: 
George Allen and Unwin, 1978, pp. 104-112. 
152) George Grantham, 'The Diffusion of the New Husbandry in Northern France. 1815-1840", Journal 
of Economic History. 39 (1978), pp. 311-337. See tables 7-10, pp. 328-330. 
153) A different scenario would allow the owner to use the pasture strictly for intensive cattle raising; 
however, neither this alternative scenario nor using fodder prices--and accounting for transport costs directly-- were 
explored by Grantham. 
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only that the costs of converting fields from fallow to pasture were relatively close to the reve-
nues. Given the competitive nature of agriculture his results are not too surprising. His study 
analyzed the marginal gain from converting an extra field from the three-field system to pas-
ture, with any other changes in production. In effect Grantham computes the marginal deriva-
tive of farming profits with respect to pasture, and in the competitive industry of farming that 
derivative is zero. Yet the important gains of mixed husbandry, as shown by Allen, had mostly 
to do with the better drainage allowed by consolidation and enclosures, not increased pasture 
per se.154 Grantham does not tackle the issue of the profitability of drainage, enclosure, conso-
lidation, and conversion to pasture schemes, which demanded some cooperation between lan-
downers. Thus, the thesis that institutional barriers were responsible for much of French retar-
dation remains unchallenged. 
In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the French economy grew more slowly than 
the economy of Britain. 155 Although endowments and technologies differed between Britain 
and France, institutions were important causes of French retardation. To argue this point is 
difficult, for there is a lack of evidence on the transaction costs imposed by French institutions 
on investors. When transaction costs make certain activities unprofitable, these activities do not 
occur, and it is impossible to measure directly their institutional costs. It is possible, however, 
to measure the transaction costs of related activities and derive some more general conclusions; 
this study accomplishes just that. 
Each of the preceding chapters focused on a set of institutional constraints and its 
impact on a specific economic activity in a specific region; in tum the conclusions suggest that 
154) Robert Allen, "Enclosures and Productivity Growth," U .B.C. Dept. of Economics, Discussion Paper 
1984. 
155) Patrick O'Brien and Caglar Keydor, Economic Growth in Britain and France, 1780-1914, chapter 3. 
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other potentially profitable activities failed to occur in other parts of France. Drainage in Nor-
mandy tells us something about the fate of enclosure, consolidation and drainage improve-
ments in eighteenth-century France. Irrigation in Provence leads to the conclusion that the 
division of authority in eighteenth-century France made it difficult to take advantage of 
economies of scale inherent on certain new technologies. The size of the market was severely 
limited in Old-Regime France by institutional constraints--tolls, tariffs and quotas to cite only 
three. Finally, the theoretical chapter suggests that the differences between the British and 
French paths of agricultural development were in part due to difference in burden of proof in 
litigation over property rights. Let us examine each of these questions in tum. 
Consider drainage in Normandy. Drainage did not occur because the unanimity rules 
of Norman communities allowed groups of landowners to hold out strategically for an 
increased share of the profits from drainage. Strategic behavior took the form of judicial 
appeals and resulted in unending litigation. Because the appeals courts granted staying orders, 
none of the social gains from irrigation were ever captured. The same sort of strategic 
behavior would have been possible for any landowner in France facing a proposal to drain, 
enclose and consolidate the lands of his village. Ideally one would want to study the question 
of enclosures in eighteenth century France directly; however, in all of France fewer than a 
dozen villages saw their lands drained, enclosed and consolidated in the eighteenth century, 
thus there is little direct evidence on transaction costs associated with such improvements dur-
ing the Old Regime. 156 Only by studying related activities, such as the drainage of marshes 
for example, can one get evidence on the level of transaction costs associated with enclosures. 
156) Philip Hoffman, "Instirutions and Agriculrure in Old-Regime France," p. 10. The near total absence 
of drainage, enclosure, and consolidation schemes carried out in France, makes it very difficult to carry out counter-
facrual calculation of the profits that such projects would have earned. One alternative, not yet explored, would be to 
use British cost data, which is available, and estimate counterfactual profits if French prices had prevailed in Eng-
land. Such an approach would yield interesting conclusion for northern France, which is similar to England. 
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It is because of threats of litigation similar to those faced by Norman drainers that little invest-
ment in enclosure, consolidation, and drainage took place. 
Jean Meuvret has shown that there is little evidence that landowners were legally 
prevented from enclosing their fields .157 One would, thus, think that if enclosure had 
significantly raised output then it would have occurred on its own. Robert Allen's studies of 
rural England suggest that enclosure alone, however, did not raise output significantly but that 
a combination of drainage, enclosure and consolidation did. 158 To achieve this triple improve-
ment required the coordination--willing or coerced--of all the landowners ofthe village. Unlike 
Britain where promoters of enclosures could rely on the threat of parliamentary acts, and 
whereas the approval of the owners of a majority (of two-thirds, most often) was sufficient to 
decide for a drainage, enclosure and consolidation scheme, in France unanimous consent was 
necessary. Although Jean Meuvret was correct in pointing out that there were few institutional 
obstacles to enclosure alone, this was not the case for drainage, enclosure and consolidation 
schemes because they modified the custom. 
In France, unanimous consent was also necessary for division of the commons, another 
improvement that eighteenth century royal officials tried to achieve with little success. 159 
Unanimous consent rules were based on customary law. Custom ruled common lands as well 
as access to fallow fields. As a result, landowners who enjoyed benefits from either the fallow 
or the commons could base their appeal against improvement projects on their customary 
rights. Royal courts had jurisdiction over such appeals against improvements, and they could 
not refuse to hear such appeals because drainage, enclosure, and consolidation did modify 
157) Jean Meuvret, Le Prob/eme des Subsistences a L' Epoque Louis XIV, part II, vol. 1, pp. 16-19. 
158) Robert Allen, "Enclosure, Capitalist Agriculture and the Growth in Com Yields in Early Modem 
England," U .B.C. Dept. of Economics, Discussion Paper# 86-39, and "Enclosures and Productivity Growth," 
U.B .C. Dept. of Economics, Discussion Paper 1984. 
159) Philip Hoffman, "Institutions and Agriculture in Old-Regime France", pp. 10-14. 
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custom. Thus the institutional costs faced by Britain's famed triple improvements of drainage, 
enclosure, and consolidation were at least as high as those faced by Norman drainage schemes. 
As the chapter on Normandy has shown, once the issue became the modification of customary 
law, it was not even certain that the project would ever get out of court. 
Royal courts often sided against the promoters of improvements because an opposite 
decision would have led to dangerous precedent. The customary law formed by precedent 
served as the basis for the privileges of regions, towns, villages, lords and other groups (e.g. 
wealthy landowners). Opening customary law to reform also threatened the privileges of royal 
justice officials who were, most often, nobles and wealthy landowners. Customary law, unlike 
royal law, was thus very costly to change and to reform because royal justice officials found it 
in their interest to demand many amendments and to lend a favorable ear to the appeals of lan-
downers and seigneurs opposed to reform. As Philip Hoffman has shown in the case of laws 
favoring enclosures and division of the commons, the royal judiciary was often "successful in 
emasculating most of the royal legislation. "160 As a result, no enclosures--particularly those of 
the sort that would promote drainage and consolidation--ever occurred in Old-Regime France. 
The investigation of drainage in Normandy does not allow us to measure the institutional costs 
associated with drainage, enclosure and consolidation, but it points to the causes of these costs. 
Furthermore, the failure of institutions to constrain distributional problems in drainage 
schemes in Normandy suggest that drainage, enclosure and consolidation projects would have 
fared even worse because the magnitude of distributional issues was even greater. 
By the middle of the eighteenth century, the cost of poorly drained, vastly dispersed 
narrow strips had become apparent to many large landowners in France. There is widespread 
160) Philip Hoffman, "Institutions and Agriculture in Old-Regime France," p. 14. 
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evidence that both seigneurs and large landowners were slowly creating consolidated landhold-
ing throughout the Paris basin, the major gr~n producing area of France. In effect these lan-
downers were attempting to gather all the property rights in an area so as to internalize the 
costs and benefits of improvement. Yet the consolidation movement was uncoordinated and 
proceeded only at a slow pace because each improver was only concerned with a few specific 
parcels and by the Revolution few areas had been consolidated successfully. One could argue 
that landowners were in effect attempting a Coasian reallocation privately. Two factors 
weighed against such private attempts to acheive efficiency. First, as large landowners create 
ever greater consolidated holdings, small landowners become local monopolists and may stra-
tegically hold out to claim the surplus of consolidation. The idea that individuals will be wil-
ling to sell their assets at the competive price underlies most Coasian reallocation theory; how-
ever, when an individual is a monopolist his reservation price is irrelevant. What mattered in 
issues of consolidation was the division of the surplus between small and large landoweners. 
Second, although it might have been possible for large landowners to secure all the privately 
owned land in an area they would not necessarily have secured the right to do away with com-
mon lands, which were ruled by customary law. Once again various individuals would have 
had high incentives to block consolidation to claim part of the surplus. Thus, without the threat 
of legal coercion--as existed in England thorugh parliamentary acts--private attempts to attain 
greater efficiency in agriculture through consolidation failed. 
The complete lack of enclosure, drainage and consolidation schemes had a far greater 
impact than the absence of drainage of marshes. While comon lands, marshes, fens, moors and 
heath represented more than 15% of French agricultural land as late as 1840, the amount of 
arable that could have been improved was far greater. Jean Meuvret stressed the dramatic 
losses in productivity per acre associated with billionage an agricultural technique that 
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involved creating a series of ridges and furows in a field to improve drainage. Meuvret suggests 
many regions amounting to nearly half of northern France suffered from bad drainage. In the 
absence of general drainage schemes French landowners resorted to billionage, which by all 
accounts dramatically reduced per acre yields. 161 Using data from the 1840 census of agricul-
ture we can make a guess at the impact of better drainage on the overall performance of French 
agriculture. 162 In 1840, northern France produced 57% of total agricultural output and 60% of 
the grain of the nation. The assumption that half of northern France would have benefited from 
better drainage is equivalent to assuming that 25.5% of all France should have been improved. 
If enclosure, drainage and consolidation lead to yield increases in grain of 20% in French 
heavy soils--that is improvement had an impact equivalent to what Allen found for England--
than total grain output would have increased by about 5%.163 However enclosure drainage, 
and consolidation would have brought far greater increases in output than the calculation sug-
gests because enclosure should have led farmers to raise more livestock; the shortage of lives-
tock is but another of the failures of eighteenth and nineteenth century agriculture. Oearly, if 
the state had reformed customary law, output would have increased by more than 10% over all 
of France, yet further research is necessary to determine the role of institutions in the back-
wardness of French agriculture. 
A second set of Old-Regime institutional constraints on the French economy is 
highlighted through the research on irrigation in Provence. Despite its absolutist trappings, the 
161) Jean Meuvret, Le Probleme des Subsistences, part 1 pp. 110-114. Meuvret lists the Angoumois, 
Beauce, Brie, Flandre, Perche, Picardie, Poitou as in the north well as areas in the Southwest of France as areas that 
suffered from bad natural drainage. We should add that most of Normandy and Britany fall in that category. 
162) Statistique Agricole de Ia France. Paris: Imprimerie Nationale, 1845. Vols. 4, 5, 6,7, tableaux A, G, 
H. See also Hugh Clout, Agricullure in France on the Eve of the Railway Age. London: Crown Helm. 1980. 
163) Robert Allen, "Enclosures and Productivity Growth," U.B.C. Dept. of Economics, Discussion Paper 
1984, Tables 2 and 3. Aliens offers only per acre analyses of the impact of enclosure and drainage on British agri-
culture. 
198 
Old Regime was an institutional structure characterized by widely diffused authority, and a 
large number of organizations with veto power. In Provence, strategic behavior due to extreme 
diffusion of authority was responsible for the lack of development of irrigation in the 
eighteenth century. To be sure, irrigation was not very important outside the South of France. 
Most of the North of France needed drainage rather than irrigation, and even in the South the 
amount of land susceptible to low-cost irrigation was always limited. The study's conclusions 
go beyond issues of irrigation and suggest that the division of authority in Old-Regime France 
was an important institutional constraint on the economy as a whole. The division of authority 
allowed many institutional constraints on the size of markets to survive in eighteenth-century 
France. The question of market size in eighteenth-century France has gone almost uninvesti-
gated.164 Yet it is an important component of the economic environment and one where insti-
tutions embodied in law, as well as other transport costs, play an important role. 
By the eighteenth century no region or town could impose new institutional restraints 
on trade (such as tariffs) without the approval of the king; however, it was much more difficult 
for the state to remove such barriers. Trade barriers are important to economic growth because 
they tax inputs and outputs. Tariffs make any economic activity less profitable and more 
importantly, they decrease the size of the market. As a result some improvements in techniques 
may not be adopted and economies of scale may not be realized. The task of measuring the 
impact of trade must be left to a further study, yet this work suggests why these barriers sur-
vived and prospered for so long. The power to levee tariffs, and other basic import restrictions, 
as well as the power of guilds to regulate the labor market were all privileges granted by the 
164) See, however, David Weir, "Markets and Mortality in France 1600-1789," mimeo 1984. Weir shows 
that for wheat, by one measure at least, market integration greatly increased in eighteenth-century France. Unfor-
tunately he does not investigate the impact of the Revolution on market intergrations. 
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state to a town, or to a trade organization in return for funds or political support. Every town, 
every region, every organization and most elite groups in France had their privileges. The 
removal of these privileges without compensation would have had tremendous distributional 
consequences and would have been opposed by all intermediary organizations, either political 
ones such as the Estates or judicial ones such as the Parlements. At no time in the seventeenth 
or eighteenth century did the state have the funds necessary to compensate privileged groups 
for the losses inherent in any reform. 
The study of irrigation shows far the state had alienated authority over rights of 
eminent domain and that it was powerless--until the Revolution--to recapture that authority. 
More generally, over the course of the centuries, the state had alienated most of its authority 
over privileges. When, in the eighteenth century, reform became essential, the state was unable 
to respond. The costs of such divided authority were probably enormous. They affected not 
only agriculture, but in all likelihood manufacturing as well. Only further research can estab-
lish without doubt the impact of divided authority on investment in agriculture and manufac-
turing. Such research should investigate the importance of institutional constraints on market 
size and in turn the impact of limited markets on the French economy. It seems clear, how-
ever, that institutions did shackle the French economy. 
This study has focused on the impact of institutions on eighteenth-century France. I 
have been concerned throughout with the question of why Frenchmen failed to invest in agri-
cultural improvements in the eighteenth century, when Britons were doing so. Another com-
parative question in British and French agrarian history comes to light through the conclusion 
of Chapter 4. Burden of proof may be an important explanatory factor of the difference 
between landownership structures in Britain and France. The differences in landownership 
structures between Britain and France emerged in the late Middle Ages when confrontations 
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between peasants and lords crystallized property rights. 
The importance of landownership structures to economic growth has been stressed by 
Robert Brenner in a series of papers. 165 Brenner argues that from the Middle Ages onward 
England's agriculture was always more advanced--capitalistic--than that of France because 
lords retained ownership of the land in England while in France they lost control of the land to 
a peasantry disinterested in profit maximization. Brenner makes his argument through an 
analysis of the medieval conversion of arable land to sheep run in England, an event that did 
not occur in France. The Marxist presumption of the lack of rationality of peasants has been 
thoroughly attacked by political economists, 166 yet in this case it is largely irrelevant. The 
question of the peasantry's interest in medieval economic growth is moot, considering that 
medieval sheep runs were enterprises restricted to lords. Sheep runs did have a significant 
impact on productivity, 167 but they demanded large amounts of land, far more than peasants, 
who are by definition smallholders, could muster. Thus, the "capitalistic" improvements 
Brenner believes were responsible for England's performance were not options peasants could 
consider. So where peasants owned the land, the convertion of arable land to sheep runs would 
have been taxed by significant transaction costs. Indeed, to convert arable land to sheep runs in 
an area of scattered plots would require buying out all the peasants, who would then attempt to 
hold the project by refusing to sell. The important question is rather why were French lords so 
indifferent to economic growth? In other words, why did French lords not buy out peasants and 
thereby regain control of the land? And why did they lose control of the land in the first place? 
165) Robert Brenner, .. Agrarian Class Structure and Economic Development in Pre-Industrial Europe, .. 
Past and PresenJ. 70 (February 1976): 30-75; and 'The Agrarian Root of European Capitalism, .. Past and PresenJ. 
97 (November 1982): 16-113. 
166) See, for example, Samuel Popkin, The Rational PeasanJ: The Political Economy of Rural Society in 
Vietnam. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1979. Especially the introduction. 
167) Robert Allen, .. Enclosures and Productivity Growth, .. U.B.C. Dept. of Economics, Discussion Paper 
1984. 
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The answers to such questions flow out of a comparison of property rights law. 
English lords were able to transform their long-term feudal leases into short-term leases when 
peasant families bequeathed property to their heirs. They could then readily evict the peasants 
and convert land into sheep runs if prices warranted. The lords could do this because they had 
ultimate title to the land. If a peasant could not show a deed then he could not own the land, no 
matter how long he had farmed it. In England the burden of proof thus rested squarely on the 
shoulders of the peasants. With such strong property rights the effective size of the firm was 
the manor, and when relative prices dictated that sheep runs were more profitable than arable 
land it was relatively costless for the lord to effect the transition from the open field to enclosed 
pasture. 168 The large size of the manor also further decreased the cost of responding to 
increased trade and relative price changes. One such widespread response in the late Middle 
Ages was conversion of land from arable to pasture. 
In France, by contrast, early on the lords lost title to the land that they had rented out. 
One reason for the alienation of feudal property was that, by the late Middle Ages, royal courts 
laid the burden of proof squarely on the lord in cases of property rights to land. 169 Unless the 
lord could show that he maintained control over the feudal rent--by varying its amount for 
example--and that the rent had been collected regularly, tenure became customary and the 
peasant received possession of the land. Once tenure was customary, the rent could no longer 
be revised and entry fines (fees levied by lords when title to land was transferred from one 
peasant to another) were fixed as well. Soon the peasant could sell his access to the land, 
therefore he had acquired effective title as well. As a result, whenever a lord's administrative 
168) J.A. Yelling, Common Field and Enclosure in England 1450-1850. London: Archon Books, 1977, 
pp. 23-26. 
169) George Duby, ed. La France Rurale. Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1975, Vol. 1, pp. 498-501 and 575-
576, and vol. 2, pp. 78-81. 
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abilities lapsed, part of his property was thus transferred to the peasant and soon French lords 
owned only demesne land. 170 By the late Middle Ages, lords rarely held enough land in the 
demesnes to create sheep runs. Furthermore, not all demesne land was consolidated, some of it 
was scattered among peasant holdings. Any attempt to create consolidated holdings would 
have made the last few peasants monopolists and effective veto players. Thus France did not 
adopt the farming techniques of England. 
Burden of proof in property law may seem an unimportant institutional detail, yet the 
difference in that detail between England and France seems to explain much of the differences 
between their landownership structures. In France, burden of proof was placed on the lord in 
cases of property to land and as a result landownership was far more dispersed in France than 
in England. A dispersed landownership structure leads to high transaction costs when coordina-
tion is necessary, as would be the case should peasants try to convert their holdings to sheep 
runs. Further costs are imposed when there are no outside sources of coercion. Thus the cost of 
capturing whatever gains British agriculture realized from 1400 to 1789 were simply higher in 
France. 
The three general conclusions all suggest how important institutions and the law are to 
economic performance. Each study suggests how institutions were responsible for the poor per-
formance of the French economy and each general conclusion, in turn, makes a claim about the 
long-term costs of the French institutional structure. These claims should be investigated in a 
quantitative fashion because we do not know how much French agriculture suffered from the 
failure to drain, enclose and consolidate landholdings in the eighteenth century, nor do we 
know the impact of barriers to trade on total output under the Old Regime. Finally the impact 
170) Marc Bloch, French Rural History . Berkeley: University of California Press, 1966, pp. 70-88. 
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of the French landholding structure relative to that of England over four centuries should be 
investigated. Yet institutions seem to have been responsible for the failure to enclose, the per-
sistence of small markets and the erosion of seigneurial property. Institutions must therefore 
have imposed a large cumulative cost to the French economy. 
Despite Pierre Gaubert's wise assertion that the Old Regime could only survive as long 
as it could avoid paying its debts, historians have refused to view the fiscal crisis as the primary 
cause of the Revolution. 171 Rather they sought to indict the closing days of the Old Regime as 
a social and cultural failure. The relative merits of such an approach, or of one that seeks to 
understand the objective demands imposed on the state will not be discussed. It should suffice 
to point out that fiscal reform could not have occurred without dramatic social change because 
the basis of Old-Regime society was fiscal privilege. 
The eighteenth century was a time of widening markets and increased urbanization and 
both altered relative prices. Thus opportunities for investment existed, yet the allocation of pro-
perty rights and privileges under the Old Regime left so little of the profits to entrepreneurs 
that investment was, to say the least, risky. Moreover, reform of privileges was impossible 
within the political structure of France despite the fact that many investors and government 
officials agreed on the need for economic and judicial reform. 169 Such reform could not occur 
without dramatic political change which is just what the Revolution brought. 
171) Pierre GoubertL'AncienRegime, vol. 1, p. 144. 
169) Keith Baker, Condorcet from Philosophy to Social Mathemalician. Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1975, pp. 57-61. The Cahiers de Doleances compiled in 1788-89 are a good source of such demands for re-
form. Indeed few of the writers of the cahiers and few of those who represented France at the Estates general of 
1789 were without assets . See D.M.G. Sutherland, France 1789-1815, p. 42, and Beatrice Hyslop, The General 
Cahiers of 1789, with the Texts of Unedited Cahiers. New York: Columbia University Press, 1936. 
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Toufreville 9 E 698/48-50 Etang, Communaux. 
Vimont 9 E 761n5 (Saint Pierre Oursin) Etang, Communaux. 
3. Notarial Archives 
The notarial archive for Troarn are all at the departmental archives in Caen. I sampled 
the archives of the Notaire at Troan for land sale and lease every four years from 1702 to 1870. 
Two years (1778, 1798) was missing. The call numbers go from 8E25117 (1702) to 8E25365 
(1870). 
II. Vaucluse (A vignon) 
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Serie C volumes 34-46, 61. 
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Serie 4 G 2-5. 
Serie H Celestin d'Avigon 57-59, Chartreux de Bompas 150, 182-184, Cordeliers d'Avignon 
37-39, Hopital ste Marthe 162-167. 
Serie 1 L 365-378. 
Serie S 6 Usines Et Cours D'Eau. This Serle was under classification at the time I saw it. 
Documents had until then been assigned to boxes on the basis of the village of origin and 
which project they concerned. Thanks to the amiable cooperation of the staff at the archives, I 
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was able to consult all the documents relevant to Cavaillon, A vignon and l'Isle sur Sorgues, 
three towns with lots of canals and water wheels. This series is precious because it holds much 
evidence on the working of the nineteenth century administration. 
Printed documents 1 doc 220-225 
2. Communal Archives 
Cavaillon BB 21-24 archives of the Bishop, (available in Cavaillon). 
Avignon CC piece a l'appuis des comptes (account records) every five years from 1700 to 
1790 (available at the Departmental Archives in Avignon). 
3. Notarial Archives 
The notarial archives for Cavaillon have been given to the Departmental archives in 
Avignon. Cavaillon always had at least four Notaires between 1700 and 1860. I sampled the 
Blaze archives (fond Rousset) once every five years from 1700 to 1860. Because the Blaze 
archives had few land contracts before 1750, I also sampled the Lieutard archives (fond Lif-
fran) from 1700 to 1745. The call numbers are Rousset 905-1048 and Liffran 659-729. 
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1. Communal Archives 
Aix en Provence, series AA. cartons 34-46. 
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Mediatheque Cecano (Avignon Municipal library) 
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Manuscripts 1558-60, 1605, 1632-35, 2060, 2433-36 2459, 2511-13, 2549, 2575, 2741, 2826, 
2852,2931,2932,2933,2955,3334. 
Bound volumes of rare printed documents 46198 46824 
Bibliotheque M~janes (Aix en Provence Municipal library) 
Manuscripts 722(609), 741(614), 831(846), 834(848), 837(851), 840(853), 
Bound volumes of rare printed documents F 335, F 415 
The primary sources of data I have not used in this study were the Archives des 
Bouches du Rhone because of a lack of time and resources. While there is a lot of data on 
institutions and irrigation in these archives, the wealth of printed data as well as the informa-
tion available in manuscript form in the Vaucluse did not make it necessary to use them. 
